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Editorial
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From 2008–2014, an estimated 184.4 million people were displaced from their homes by environmental factors.1 The 
list of these factors is endless, and includes rising temperatures and changes in the frequency of high temperature 
regimes; changing rainfall regimes; changes in atmospheric and ocean chemistry; changes to coastal, marine and 
freshwater ecosystems; the melting of mountain glaciers; coastal flooding; land and soil erosion; and extreme weather 
events such as tropical storms, cyclones, floods, landslides, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis.2
The significance of these environmental changes is exemplified by the huge number of individuals that have been 
displaced. Unfortunately, this figure is set to rise. Low-elevation coastal areas that accommodate 10 per cent of the 
world’s population; global drylands,3 with a population of 2 billion; and more sparsely populated mountain regions 
are likely to become even more significantly affected by future global environmental changes and extreme weather 
events.4 Although there is growing agreement that degrading environmental conditions, environmental changes, and 
other weather-related events influence mobility, there remains significant research to be done on how law and policy 
can react to these changes.5 
It was in the spirit of fostering research on this important topic that the workshop entitled ‘Environmental Displacement 
in 2017 – Current Displacement Challenges’ was held at the University of Sheffield in June 2017.6 Six junior researchers 
presented their research on two central issues: how to conceptualise the issue of human mobility in the context of 
environmental factors across disciplines, and how to approach the issue of human mobility in policy and legal responses. 
The presenters received feedback from three established scholars in the field – Professor Walter Kälin (University of 
Bern), Dr David James Cantor (Refugee Law Initiative, University of London), and Dr Ilan Kelman (University College 
London). The workshop was deliberately small in size, which helped foster feedback and discussion, the development 
of networks, and the identification of opportunities for future collaboration. Prof Kalin, Dr Cantor, and Dr Kelman closed 
the workshop with their thoughts on current challenges in environmental displacement and prospects for the future. 
This mini-volume of the Refugee Law Initiative Working Papers Series gathers together some of the papers presented 
at the event.
The papers in this mini-volume centre around the theme of human movement in the context of environmental factors. 
Such movement can be either internal or cross-border, and occupies a continuum ranging from voluntary migration 
to displacement. Migration is generally understood to involve elements of decision-making, whether regarding the 
location, timing or means of movement.7 Displacement occurs where people lacking resilience and adaptive capacity, 
are forced to leave their place of residence in order to avoid any ‘immediate and foreseeable’ harm.8 
To reduce vulnerability and increase resilience, is to reduce the impact of environmental changes and extreme weather 
events. Adaptation strategies are important in dealing with the effects of global environmental change and increased 
vulnerability, and migration is one such adaptation strategy.9 In this mini-volume, Lauren Nishimura examines the 
three adaptation obligations – of actions, assistance, and cooperation – established by the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). She argues that the UNFCCC and climate change regime provides little 
guidance as to the meaning of these obligations, and argues that they should be interpreted through the lens of 
other international law obligations. By drawing on human rights law, environmental law, guidance on resettlement and 
relocation, and the work done by the Nansen Initiative, Nishimura develops and clarifies the adaptation obligations of 
both countries of origin and destination for those displaced by environmental factors.
The relevance of climate change law to human movement in the context of climate change is confirmed by the 
1 Nansen, Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change (Final Draft) (The Nansen 
Initiative 06/10/2015), Executive Summary, I. Because human movement is multi-faceted, it cannot be solely attributed to environmental factors. 
Rather, environmental factors interact with economic, social, political and demographic drivers of human movement. See Foresight, Migration and 
Global Environmental Change (The Government Office for Science 2011), pp. 44–5; Nansen, Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons 
in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change (Final Draft), para 17.
2 Foresight, Migration and Global Environmental Change, pp. 51–2.
3 Uriel Safriel and others in Rashid M. Hassan, R. J. Scholes and Neville Ash (eds), Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Current State and Trends: 
Findings of the Condition and Trends Working Group of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Current State and 
Trends: Findings of the Condition and Trends Working Group of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Island Press 2005), p. 625: ‘Drylands are 
limited by soil moisture, the result of low rainfall and high evaporation, and show a gradient of increasing primary productivity, ranging from hyper-
arid, arid, and semiarid to dry subhumid areas. Deserts, grasslands, and woodlands are the natural expression of this gradient.’
4 Foresight, Migration and Global Environmental Change, pp. 39–40.
5 See for example: ibid; UNHCR, The Environment and Climate Change (October 2015); Neil Adger and others, Human Security in: Climate Change 
2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014); Nansen, Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and 
Climate Change (Final Draft).
6 Funding from the University of Sheffield Migration Research Group and the Sheffield Centre for European and International Law is graciously 
acknowledged. Details of the event, including the programme, are available here: https://mrg.group.shef.ac.uk/mrg-workshops-2/. 
7 Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law (Oxford University Press 2012), p. 5.
8 Nansen, Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change (Final Draft), para 16. 
9 See IOM, Making Mobility Work for Adaptation to Environmental Changes: Results from the MECLEP Global Research (2017); Jane McAdam, 
‘Refusing “refuge” in the Pacific: (de)constructing climate-induced displacement in international law’ in Etienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud and Paul 
De Guchteneire (eds), Migration and Climate Change (Migration and Climate Change, UNESCO Publishing, Cambridge University Press 2011), p. 88; 
and Foresight, Migration and Global Environmental Change, p. 173. See also for a visual representation IOM, Migration and Environmental Change: 
Vulnerability and Resilience Scenarios (2015).
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Task Force established by the 21st Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC agreement. This Task Force will produce 
recommendations on how to ‘avert, minimise and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate 
change.’10 The UNFCCC’s acknowledgement of the effects of climate change on human movement is complemented 
by other legal developments over the last 20 years. For example, the European Court of Human Rights’ has found that 
a State’s lack of resources to deal with a naturally occurring phenomenon can create such dire conditions so as to 
warrant complementary protection under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.11 The international 
community has paid increased attention to the plight of Internally Displaced Persons, and the Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement have included ‘natural or human made disasters’ as a driver of internal displacement.12 The 
completion of the Guiding Principles has been complemented by the entry into force of regional African treaties for 
the protection of IDPs, including the 2009 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally 
Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention). In this mini-volume, Alfredo dos Santos Soares aims to take stock 
of the progress made in the Kampala Convention’s implementation and, in particular, assessing its effectiveness in 
protecting people displaced in the context of climate change. Dos Santos Soares argues that, despite the remarkable 
efforts made towards the implementation of the Kampala Convention, the concrete impact of its provisions on 
enhancing the protection of and assistance to environmental internally displaced persons is lacking. Much work 
remains to be done to translate this innovative instrument into practice, particularly to secure concrete improvements 
in the protection of those displaced within their states by environmental disasters.
A different approach with regards to protection in cases of displacement is to provide for temporary protection based 
on humanitarian grounds. This depends on the discretion of each state to either establish exceptional measures in 
ad hoc situations or apply existing provisions when necessary where these are included in domestic law.13 At present, 
such practices exist at the domestic level and have not yet been incorporated into a binding regional or international 
framework. However, in this volume, Giovanni Sciaccaluga explores whether this could be done at EU level. He 
argues that the Temporary Protection Directive – though it addresses individuals fleeing civil war, endemic violence, 
or systematic violations of human rights – could nonetheless be applicable to persons fleeing sudden-onset natural 
disasters. Sciaccaluga argues that EU Member States would be more favourable to activating the Temporary Protection 
Directive if it were designed for displacement from rapid-onset natural disasters, since such disasters cause damages 
that are restorable in a relatively brief period. Hence, the paper calls for modification of the Temporary Protection 
Directive with a view to rendering it more specifically disaster-oriented.
The need for further research on the topic of human mobility and the environment is evident. Comprehensive 
responses are lacking with regards to protection in cases of displacement and facilitating adaptation strategies such 
as migration. Important legal questions include which terminology should be used; whether existing legal obligations 
such as international human rights law, European Law or International Climate Change Law can be interpreted so as to 
cover the legal gap; whether there is a need for negotiating new binding or soft law solutions; and finally whether the 
issue is best addressed at the international, regional, or domestic level. The publication of this mini volume by a new 
generation of early career scholars is a step forward in exploring these topical questions.
10 Decision 1/CP.21: ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, Paris (30 Novemeber – 13 
December 2015), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, Loss and Damage, Paragraph 49.
11 Sufi and Elmi v. The United Kingdom [2011] ECHR 4 para 282.
12 UNHCR, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (11 February 1998), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add), Introduction: Scope and Purpose. 
13 For more see David Cantor, Law, Policy and Practice Concerning the Humanitarian Protection Aliens on a Temporary Basis in the Context of Disasters 
(The Nansen Initiative 2015).
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Assessing the protection of environmentally displaced 
persons under the Kampala Convention
Alfredo dos Santos Soares 
CEDIS, Universidade NOVA de Lisboa
fedysantos@hotmail.com
Abstract
The geography of progressive climate change impacts places the African continent among the most vulnerable regions 
of the world. In line with the prediction of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its fi rst report (1990), the 
involuntary migration of population is already proving to be one of the most serious of such impacts across the region. 
The overwhelming majority of victims remain within their own countries. Thus, coupled with confl ict, violence and 
development projects, slow-onset and rapid-onset disasters have currently made Africa home to the largest number 
of internally displaced people. Determined to tackle this plight, in 2009 the African Union adopted its Convention for 
the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), articulating the need for a 
holistic response based on a combined framework of international human rights law and international humanitarian 
law. Five years since the convention entered into force (2012), this paper aims to take stock of the progress made in 
its implementation and, in particular, assessing its eff ectiveness in protecting people environmentally displaced in 
the context of climate change. To this end, it identifi es the existing and ongoing normative, policy and institutional 
processes on domestication and implementation of the convention and explores the degree to which these processes 
provide for the protection due to people displaced by environmental disasters, with a particular focus on slow-onset 
environmental disasters. The paper fi nds that, despite the remarkable eff orts towards the implementation of the said 
convention, the concrete impact of its provisions on enhancing the protection of and assistance to environmental 
internally displaced persons is still unperceivable. Much work remains to be done to translate this innovative instrument 
into practice, particularly to secure concrete improvements in the protection of those internally displaced by disasters 
in the context of climate change.
Keywords
displacement; climate change; States obligations; Kampala Convention; Responsibility to Protect
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Introduction
In contrast to visible flows of refugees and cross-border migrants to Europe, in recent years the plight of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) has been largely neglected by the international community.1 Yet, it is clearly a growing crisis 
and ‘a key challenge of our times’.2 This is particularly severe in Africa, ‘a continent disproportionately affected by 
internal displacement’3 and home to the largest number of IDPs. In fact, as of the end of 2016, over 12.2 million people 
were living in displacement across the continent as a result of conflict and violence. That is more than 30 per cent of the 
global total (40.3 million).4 Added to this figure should be countless more IDPs engendered by development projects, 
sudden-onset disasters, such as floods, and slow-onset disasters, such as desertification and more frequent droughts, 
which are linked to the adverse effects of climate change. Indeed, while precise data is not available since it has not 
been collected systematically, it is easy to assume that the continent is also strongly impacted by displacement due to 
this threefold cause.
Concerned about internal displacement as ‘a source of suffering for millions of people, a driver of food insecurity and 
a barrier to the sustained development’,5 African States showed their willingness and determination to address this 
problem in a comprehensive and detailed manner by adopting, on 23 October 2009, the African Union Convention for 
the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, the Kampala Convention, which entered into force 
on 6 December 2012, being the fastest African Union treaty to do so. It is the world’s first and so far only legally binding 
regional instrument to cater specifically to IDPs.
Premised on the consideration of drivers of migration in general as being influenced by multiple factors, the Kampala 
Convention applies, in a holistic fashion, to all situations of internal displacement regardless of its causes (Article 15). 
While this makes sense, it does not preclude me from evaluating the extent to which implementation of the convention 
is being effective with regard to IDPs due to environmental disasters. In other words, the aim of this paper is to assess 
the current effectiveness of the Kampala Convention in providing protection to people displaced by disasters in the 
context of climate change. Among other reasons, this purpose is largely justified by the growing affirmation of climate 
change, which is becoming the dominant force in inducing human displacement,6 since it operates as an amplifying 
factor in conflicts and other elements of socio-economic vulnerability, in particular in the African continent.
To meet this aim, methodological relevance is given to conceptual analysis of three disasters (explicitly referred to in 
the convention as one of the major drivers of internal displacement), as well as to the identification and analysis of the 
existing or under construction policy, legal and institutional national frameworks on environmental IDPs. In this sense, 
I also lay methodological emphasis on the examination of measures taken or to be taken by States parties specifically 
to prevent and mitigate the effects of disasters, including by establishing early warning systems and implementing 
disaster risk reduction strategies, emergency and disaster preparedness and management measures in areas at risk. I 
try to find out how all this is used to prevent displacement and protect people displaced by disasters, including those 
that are induced by climate change.
The paper consists of three sections. The first reviews and delves into the international academic debate around the 
linkages between climate change and human mobility, as well as the evolution of the international response to the 
protection needs of people displaced as a result of severe impacts of climate change. The purpose is helping to clarify 
the necessary theoretical framework for the assessment of the Kampala Convention in protecting IDPs due to disasters 
and climate change. The second section undertakes an overview of the African context of forced displacement, with 
particular emphasis on the characterisation of internal displacement caused by environmental disasters in the context 
of climate change. Then it gives an outline of the convention’s scope, drawing particular attention to its key provisions 
on displacement due to disasters. The third and final section discusses the domestication and implementation process 
of the Kampala Convention, seeking to find out its current and future incidence and effectiveness in protecting 
environmental IDPs. The case of Angola will be used as an example to illustrate the debate, as the only State party to 
the Convention that has its own legislation on internal displacement.
I. Approaching climate change and environmental displacement
Climate change has been characterised by the former UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon as ‘the defining challenge of 
our era’.7 As such, it affects directly or touches upon all areas of human life, being a subject of study in many scientific 
and academic disciplines. One of the key questions for many disciplines deals with the impact that climate change has 
or may have on human mobility.
1 This is clearly reflected in the fact that IDPs ‘ended up largely excluded from the outcomes of the UN’s Summit for Refugees and Migrants’ 
held in September 2016. Indeed, ‘the single reference to IDPs in the New York Declaration pointed to links between internal displacement and large 
movements of migrants and refugees. However, addressing internal displacement was recognised mostly as a way of mitigating large cross-border 
movements of vulnerable people’ (IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement, Geneva, May 2017 [hereinafter referred to as GRID 2017], p. 5).
2 Idem.
3 African Union, ‘Explanatory Note on the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa’, p. 2.
4 IDMC, GRID 2017, p. 26.
5 IDMC, Africa report on internal displacement, Geneva, December 2016, p. 4.
6 Fabrice Renaud, Janos J. Bogardi, Olivia Dun and Koko Warner, Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration? (Bonn: UNU-EHS, 
2007), p. 16.
7 ‘Climate change poses ‘defining challenge’ of our time, Ban says’, UN News Centre, 7 October 2008, www.un.org/apps/news/story.
asp?NewsID=28458 (accessed 25 Apr. 2018).
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I.1. The links between climate change and displacement
In recent times, in particular since 2000, Mozambique has experienced an unusual increase in the frequency and 
intensity of floods, with tragic consequences, the last of which occurred in January 2013. Both national authorities and 
victims attribute this increase to climate change.8 Similarly, floods that devastated Pakistan between July and August 
2010 have been widely considered a sign of extreme weather events that the entire region may suffer in the future 
more frequently due to the climate change.9 Aligned with this perception are the peasants of eastern Madagascar, who 
feel unable to cope with the increasingly persistent storms (and cyclones) devastating their crops and homes,10 as well 
as those peasants of the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, who are continuously affected by the scarcity of rainfall, 
desertification and soil degradation.11 At the same time, the inhabitants of several small island states, especially atolls 
(Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu), do not hesitate to attribute to climate change the predictable 
sea level rise, which could lead to the disappearance of their countries and inexorably reduce them to statelessness.
I.1.1. Discussion on the causal links between environmental events and climate change
It should be emphasised that any of the environmental events mentioned above usually involves population 
displacement. This leads me to take a brief overview of the ongoing debate on the causal links between the events 
and climate change. Before that, it is necessary to point out the existence of persistent scientific dissent, sometimes 
polarised, on anthropogenically based climate change. Immersed in heated discussions, advocates and detractors 
accuse each other of ‘climate-scepticism’ perceived as ‘business lobbying’ serving the fossil fuel industry (oil, coal 
and natural gas); and of ‘science fiction’ and ‘ecoalarmism’ of those who have allegedly turned climate change into a 
summary of all problems affecting humanity.12
Obviously, both sides agree on the apodictic recognition of change as something inherent to planet Earth, which, over 
its millions of years of existence, has undergone enormous and intense mutations. The difficulty arises when appealing 
to the suggestion that human beings are responsible for some of those changes. On the other hand, there are many 
scientists who consider that human activity has the capacity to directly affect the climate system, as evidenced by 
massive emissions of greenhouse gases resulting from the use of fossil fuels. They assert the existence of clear evidence 
linking this increasing emission of gases to the atmosphere over the 20th century with the consequent increase in 
average global temperature which, according to them, has been rising since the 1970s, and may have suffered an 
additional acceleration over the first decade of the 21st century.13
One cannot ignore the great uncertainties surrounding a reality of such dizzying complexity as the climate and the 
processes of its variability, nor the need to resort to prudence and rigorous and deep analysis, which can lead to greater 
scientific evidence, and shed more light on the subject, favouring its better understanding and adequate management. 
In any case, here I do share not only the perception that the climate is changing, but also and above all the scientific 
certainty that endeavours to demonstrate that the anthropogenic climate change is a reality in which we are already 
immersed, not a mere and picturesque speculation concerning a remote future.14 This is, after all, the major conclusion 
reached by the IPCC in its fifth assessment report, asserting that climate change is unequivocal, as well as the human 
influence on and responsibility for it.15
Climate change is by many considered as one of the major threats facing humanity along with terrorism and nuclear 
proliferation,16 and one of the four forces that are to determine the future of civilisation.17 As such, it entails serious 
dangers and terrifying consequences that in many regions might be of cataclysmic dimensions, especially if global 
warming, instead of being limited to 2°C, increases to 4°C. Waves of heat, flooding in coastal cities, worsening water 
shortages, growing food production risks, increased tropical hurricane intensity and unprecedented loss of biodiversity 
make up the bleak picture that may likely emerge from this increase in temperature.18
8 K. Asante, R. Brito, G. Brundrit, P. Epstein, A. Fernandes, M. R. Marques, A. Mavume, M. Metzger, A. Patt, A. Queface, R. Sanchez del Valle, M. Tadross 
and R. Brito (eds.), Main report: INGC Climate Change Report: Study on the impact of climate change on disaster risk in Mozambique (Mozambique: INGC, 
2009).
9 GMF, Report: Climate-induced migration growing problem for nations of all kind, Washington, 29 September 2010, www.ehs.unu.edu/file/
get/6336 (accessed 25 Apr. 2018).
10 Walter Kälin, Climate Change Displacement – A Challenge for International Law, Kolkata, Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group, www.mcrg.ac.in/
DL3.pdf (accessed 25 Apr. 2018).
11 Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Climate Governance in Africa: Adaptation Strategies and Institutions (Cape Town: Unity Press, 2010).
12 Juan José Sanz Donaire, ‘Precisiones a las bases científicas del cambio climático’, en Centro Superior De Estudios De La Defensa Nacional (Ed.), 
Cambio climático y su repercusión en la economía, la seguridad y la defensa (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2009), p. 11; Dinyar Godrej, El cambio 
climático (Barcelona: Intermón Oxfam, 2002), pp. 90–7.
13 Carlos M. Duarte (ed.), Cambio global. Impacto de la actividad humana sobre el sistema Tierra (Madrid: CSIC, 2006).
14 Jim Motavalli, ‘Prólogo’, in Jim Motavalli (ed.), El cambio climático. Crónicas desde las zonas de riesgo del planeta (Barcelona: Paidós, 2005), pp. 
9–16.
15 Working Group I Contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis Summary for Policymakers, 
Stockholm, Sweden, 27 September 2013.
16 William J. Burroughs, Climate Change. A Multidisciplinary Approach (2nd edn., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
17 Lauren C. Smith, El mundo en 2050. Las cuatro fuerzas que determinarán el futuro de la civilización (Barcelona: Debate, 2011).
18 Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research And Climate Analytics, Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must Be Avoided (Washington 
D.C.: The World Bank, 2012).
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I.1.2. Linkages between environmental events, climate change and displacement
It is unnecessary to resort to catastrophic projections to realise that the repercussions of climate destabilisation are 
already perceptible worldwide, as well as their translation into social and economic changes, which can force people 
to be displaced, either temporarily or permanently. As highlighted by the aforementioned IPCC in its first report in 
1990, human migration movements could be the greatest individual impact of climate change, since millions may be 
displaced by it.19
It should be noted that the causal relationship between climate change and population displacement is an area of a 
controversial debate that has come to confront the positions between natural and social scientists, who have been 
labelling each other as ‘maximalists’ and ‘minimalists’.20 However, this debate tends to depolarise, since both sectors 
coincide in recognising that the relationship between climate change and (forced) migration is not linear but complex 
and ‘multicausal’.21 As such, it is broadly influenced by social, economic and political forces that determine the way 
societies interact with their own environments. In fact, as pointed out by Margareta Wahlström, ‘it is not necessarily the 
temperature increase itself that poses the largest challenge in terms of human mobility, but the associated changes in, 
and combined effects of, precipitation patterns (drought and flooding), storms and sea level rise; loss of biodiversity, 
and ecosystem services; and resulting health risk, food and livelihood insecurity’.22
Certainly, the study of this reality still demands exhaustive and consistent empirical research, resulting from the use of 
more coherent and, where possible, unified methodologies.23 It also should include the examination of such important 
issues as the plurality of factors that shape migration dynamics, the social determinants of people’s vulnerability to 
climate change, and the diversity of migratory patterns associated with climate change.
Meanwhile, in its current evolutionary stage, the discussions about the causal nexus of climate-displacement are 
marked by two main and complementary arguments.24 The first deals with the weight of environmental and climatic 
factors in migration and its connection with other agents of diverse nature. It is argued that understanding the role of 
the environment in migration dynamics may lead not only to the analysis of how and why people are vulnerable to 
climate change impacts, but also to examine different strategies they develop to cope with or adapt to environmental 
adversity. In this sense, migration is considered one of many possible adaptation strategies. The second argument 
focuses on the political context in which migration flows occur, as well as on the treatment people displaced in relation 
to environmental factors should receive. Stemming from here, it discusses the protection deserved by people in 
situations of vulnerability to climate change, as well as the responsibilities of States and the international community 
to ensure such protection. Without prejudice to the complementarity between both points of view, in coherence with 
its nuclear concern, this paper focuses more on the second argument.
In short, the need for further scientific and systematic research to deepen the understanding on this subject is 
undeniable.25 However, this does not prevent me from realising that, although it is impossible at present to determine 
and precisely specify its magnitude, displacements motivated by the impacts of climate change are already a fact and 
will be exacerbated in the foreseeable future.26 Most of these movements take place within countries, although the 
dimension of potential external displacements should not be underestimated.27 This highlights the already mentioned 
trend of climate change to become the most important factor generating forced displacement.
In view of all the above, across the following part will review the conceptual framework that is being developed 
regarding the victims of these displacements. It is, in short, an effort to identify, define and/or categorise as clearly 
as possible their situation and/or special needs in order to outline their proper treatment in the international legal-
political sphere.
I.2. In search of an appropriate conceptual framework
The debates outlined above on the complex links between climate change and human mobility are closely linked 
to the persistent lack of consensus on the concepts and terminology to be used to refer to people who migrate due 
to environmental factors. Expressions such as ‘environmental migrants’, ‘climate refugees’, ‘environmental refugees’, 
19 IPCC, First Assessment Report (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
20 Franc Laczco and Christine Aghazarm (eds.), Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence (Geneva, 2009).
21 Carolina Fritz, Climate Change and Migration: Sorting through Complex Issues without the Hype (Washington: Migration Policy Institute, 2010), 
www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm? ID=773 (accessed 25 Apr. 2018).
22 Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century, Oslo, 6–7 June 2011, www.unhcr.org/4ea969729.pdf (accessed 
25 Apr. 2018).
23 Marc Stal and Koko Warner, The Way Forward. Researching the Environment and Migration Nexus, research brief based on the outcomes of the 
2nd Expert Workshop on Climate Change, Environment, and Migration 23–24 July 2009, Munich, Germany (Bonn: UNU-EHS, 2009), p. 7.
24 Étienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud and Paul de Guchteneire (eds.), Migration and Climate Change (Paris/Cambridge: UNESCO/Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), pp. 1–26.
25 Renaud et al., Control, Adapt or Flee, p. 33.
26 IFRC, Cambio climático y movilidad humana: punto de vista humanitario, 22 April 2009, www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/disasters/climate%20
change/climate_change_and_human_mobility-sp.pdf (accessed 25 Apr. 2018).
27 Walter, Kälin and Nina Schrepfer, Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Cl.imate Change. Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches 
(Geneva: UNHCR, Division of International Protection, 2012).
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‘ecological refugees’, ‘environmentally displaced persons’, inter alia, make up the variety of concepts and terms in use, 
scattered in the existing literature, adding some confusion to the subject rather than clarifying it. It is evident that 
climate change is challenging language, legislation and long-established institutions in their approach to human 
displacement.28
Indeed, the environmental displacement taking place in the context of climate change is clearly a ‘new reality’ that 
demands an original approach and creative and imaginative responses in both the conceptual, normative and political-
institutional realm.
In the process of constructing the conceptual and terminological framework that I am dealing with, numerous authors 
have already laid a greater or lesser emphasis on several related aspects, including: the (in)adequacy of the terms 
refugee, migrant or displaced; the specific causality of the displacement (whether economic, social or political); 
crossing or not of State borders; the sudden or progressive nature of the environmental degradation; its natural or 
human origin; and the voluntary or forced, temporary or permanent character of the displacement. Yet, attempts to 
conceptualise people displaced by environmental factors hitherto both include and exclude or contradict some or 
several of these aspects. In addition, directly or indirectly, authors try to position themselves in favour of or against 
the need to articulate mechanisms of international protection for displaced persons.29 And, what is most important 
in this sense, they seem to agree that ‘it makes a big difference whether people are perceived as refugees, other types 
of forced migrants or voluntary migrants’.30 This denotes the strong political component – beyond the scientific and 
academic – entailing this debate.
I.2.1. ‘Environmental refugees’
Despite the lack of its recognition in International Law, the term ‘environmental refugee’ has become the most popular 
of all the aforementioned. This is due in large part to its ‘strength’ in attracting the attention of the international 
community to issues related to the protection of human rights of people who may be displaced by environmental 
reasons.31 Introduced in the 1970s by Lester Brown,32 its use has been generalised by Essam El-Hinnawi who, in 1985, 
elaborated a policy document for the United Nations Environment Program entitled ‘Environmental Refugees’. Therein 
he provided the first formal definition of ‘environmental refugees’, understood as people ‘who have been forced to 
leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural 
and/or triggered by people) that jeopardised their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life’.33
The institutional affiliation of its author has given rise to the thought that this definition relies more on the humanitarian 
mission of his organisation than in the use of analytical criteria.34 However, given its pioneering character, the recognition 
of the potential heterogeneity of environmental displacement as well as the different types of people displaced by 
environmental factors, this definition has become the obligatory starting point for work on this subject, which has 
already generated a vast amount of literature and long debates. Scholars such as Jacobson,35 Myers, Kent36 and Bates37 
are among those who have made a significant contribution to popularising the use of the term ‘environmental refugees’ 
and improving its conceptualisation. Their contributions have a common denominator: they do not distinguish whether 
displaced persons have crossed an internationally recognised State border or not.38
In the meantime, I must point out that, from the perspective of research, the juxtaposition of the terms ‘environment’ 
or ‘climate’ with ‘migrants’ or ‘refugees’ has been criticised for suggesting a ‘monocausal’ nexus between environmental 
factors and human mobility, thereby denying the multiplicity of causes leading to environmental displacements.39 
Obviously, this critical assessment conditions most of the terminology and concepts adopted so far.
28 Roberta Cohen and Megan Bradley, ‘Disasters and displacement: gaps in protection’, International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 1 (2010), p. 3.
29 Mostafa M. Naser, ‘Climate change-induced displacement: definitional issues and concerns’, Chicago-Kent Journal of Environmental and Energy 
Law, 2 (2011), pp. 1–52.
30 Stephen Castles, Environmental change and forced migration: making sense of the debate, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper 70 
(Geneva: UNHCR, 2002), p. 9.
31 Camillo Boano, Roger Zetter and Tim Morris, Environmentally displaced people: Understanding the linkages between environmental change, 
livelihoods and forced migration, Refugee Studies Centre’s Forced Migration Policy Briefings (University of Oxford, 2008), p. 1.
32 James Morrissey, Environmental Change and Forced Migration. A State of the Art Review, Refugee Study Center’s Background Paper (University of 
Oxford, 2009), p. 3.
33 Essam El-Hinnawi, Environmental Refugees (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environmental Programme, 1985), p. 4.
34 Diane C. Bates, ‘Environmental refugees? classifying human migrations caused by environmental change’, Population and Environment, 23 
(2002), p. 466.
35 Jodi L. Jacobson, Environmental Refugees: A yardstick of habitability (Washington: Worldwatch Institute, 1988), pp. 37–8.
36 Norman Myers and Jennifer Kent, Environmental Exodus: An Emergent Crisis in the Global Arena (Washington DC: The Climate Institute, 1995), 
defined ‘environmental refugees’ as persons: ‘who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their erstwhile homelands because of drought, soil 
erosion, desertification, and other environmental problems. In their desperation, they feel they have no alternative but to seek sanctuary elsewhere, 
however hazardous the attempt. Not all of them have fled their countries; many are internally displaced. But all have abandoned their homelands on 
a semi-permanent if not permanent basis, having little hope of a foreseeable return’ (pp. 18–19).
37 Bates, ‘Environmental Refugees?’.
38 Renaud et al., Control, Adapt or Flee, p. 13.
39 Piguet, Pécoud and Guchteneire (eds.), Migration and Climate Change, pp. 17–20.
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The use of the ‘refugee’ notion applied to those displaced by environmental factors motivated by climate change 
still raises a number of persistent objections and controversies. Stephen Castles,40 for example, considers the term 
‘environmental refugee’ to be simplistic, unilateral and misleading, since it involves an exclusive cause which is seldom 
given in practice. Thomas Homer-Dixon equally opposes to the use of this term as ‘misleading’.41 More bluntly, Richard 
Black denies the existence of ‘environmental refugees’ or ‘climate refugees’, as he considers them ‘a myth’.42 According 
to him, ‘there remains a danger that academic and policy writing on “environmental refugees” has more to do with 
bureaucratic agendas of international organisations and academics than with any real theoretical or empirical insight’.43
From the political-legal point of view, the terms ‘environmental refugees’ or ‘climate refugees’ are rejected as they are 
considered an extrapolation of the term refugee, which is commonly used to designate a person fleeing violence and 
persecution. Its legal definition is outlined in the 1951 Convention44 and its 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees,45 
and does not include environmental factors. It is further argued that the use of the term ‘refugee’ in the context of 
climate change could dilute the refugee definition, which would cease to be a specific legal category but become a 
broader and indefinite concept. The UNHCR46 itself has sought to settle the debate by stating that these terms have 
no basis in international refugee law, and that most of those commonly described as ‘climate refugees’ or ‘refugees 
from environmental disasters’ have not crossed an international border. Furthermore, it states that the use of such 
terminology could undermine the international legal regime for the protection of refugees and create confusion by 
suggesting a link between the impact of climate change, environmental degradation, migration and persecution, the 
latter being the main reason for a refugee to flee their country of origin and seek international protection.
Based on the convenience and usefulness of the terminology, several analysts47 still consider that even though it is 
not legally correct, the term ‘environmental refugee’ proves to be the most convincing as it puts a human face to the 
consequences of climate change, it evokes a sense of global responsibility towards them and also a sense of urgency to 
deal with imminent or ongoing disasters. Certainly, this reasoning makes an interesting point in the debate. However, 
the UNHCR’s ‘position of authority’ makes the use of this terminology nonviable and determines the need to find 
alternatives.
I.2.2. Alternative terminology: environmentally displaced persons
In 2007, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) proposed the use of the term ‘environmental migrants’ to 
refer to ‘persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment 
that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, 
either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad’.48 Despite the effort of this 
organisation to demonstrate the opposite, for many this definition is equally unsatisfactory, since, according to them, 
it suffers from the same problem mentioned above: ‘monocausality’, to the detriment of the ‘multi-causality’ character 
of the conceptualised reality. The expression ‘population movements induced by environmental factors’, which has also 
been considered is, in addition to being vague and diffuse, is not attractive to the general public.49
Used in the context of one of the most rigorous and comprehensive studies on the nexus between climate change 
and population movements – the EACH-FOR Project50 – the term ‘displaced for environmental reasons’ is perhaps the 
most comprehensive, covering ‘environmental migrants’, ‘environmentally displaced persons’ and ‘people displaced for 
development reasons’. However, blurring the boundaries between these three subcategories prevents the term from 
being satisfactory.
It is clear, therefore, that the persistent terminological dissent and the lack of a valid and consistent definition 
determine the institutional and normative vacuum. There is no doubt that language is decisive, since it frames the 
problem and defines the associated response, rights and responsibilities. In this sense, a precise definition would be a 
crucial step towards the design and development of the desired institutional and legal framework and active policies 
for the protection and assistance to both externally and internally displaced persons, likely victims of environmental 
adversities either natural disasters or related to climate change. In any case, and as Walter Kälin warned51 in 2008, ‘we 
40 Castles, Environmental change and forced migration, p. 5.
41 Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity and Global Security, Headline Series, no. 300 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1993), pp. 
40–1).
42 Richard, Black, Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality? New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper No. 34 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2001).
43 Ibid., p. 14.
44 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted in Geneva on 28 July 1951, entered into force on 22 April 1954. UNTS, vol.189, p. 137.
45 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted in New York on 31 January 1967, entered into force on 4 October 1967. UNTS, vol. 606, p. 
267.
46 ACNUR, Cambio climático, desastres naturales y desplazamiento humano: la perspectiva del ACNUR, 2009, pp. 8–9.
47 Maria Como Stavropoulou, ‘Alterações climáticas: desastres naturais e deslocações forçadas’, en: Refugiados e deslocados ambientais: o lado 
humano das alterações climáticas’. Actas do IX Congresso Internacional do Conselho Português para os Refugiados (Lisbon: CPR), p. 38.
48 IOM, Discussion Note: Migration and the Environment, MC/INF/288, 1 November 2007), www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/
about_iom/en/council/94/MC_INF_288.pdf (accessed 25 Apr. 2018), p. 1–2.
49 Piguet, Pécoud and Guchteneire (eds.), Migration and Climate Change, p. 181.
50 Renaud et al., Control, Adapt or Flee.
51 Walter Kälin, The Climate Change – Displacement Nexus (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2008), www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2008/07/16-
climate-change-kalin (accessed 25 Apr. 2018).
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should not be distracted by semantic discussions with little practical meaning about whether to call affected persons 
“climate change refugees”, “environmental migrants” or something else. Instead, what is needed is a thorough analysis 
of the different contexts and forms natural disaster induced displacement can take’.
It is a question of the participants in the debate sharing the fundamentals, so that the variety of terms should not 
prevent the development of a coherent common approach on what is really at stake.52
With all those arguments in mind, and without the slightest pretence of adding to the confusion, here I opt for the term 
‘environmentally displaced persons’ (hereinafter EDPs),53 which is intended to designate all persons or groups of persons 
who have been forced or obliged to escape or flee their home or place of habitual residence for an indeterminate 
period of time as a result or to avoid the effects of natural or man-made disasters, including climate change, whether 
or not they have crossed an internationally recognised State border. This general definition aims to promote an overall 
view of the environmental displacement problem, giving due weight to environmental factors motivated by climate 
change, but without neglecting the complex linkages and interaction between those factors, other factors that are 
socio-political in nature, and human mobility. From this conceptual overview, I will try to approach the magnitude and 
geography of the EDPs.
I.3. Magnitude and amplitude of environmental displacement
Linked to the precocity and fluctuations of the above-mentioned epistemological status on human displacement in 
the context of climate change are the figures of EDPs that have been recently amended and vary greatly depending 
on the definition, environmental factors, ventilated hypotheses and methodologies used.54 It is clear that the growing 
awareness of the nexus between climate change and human mobility still lacks comprehensive empirical research that 
may lead to conclusive results.55
As a consequence, the quantification of EDPs remains a territory of unlikely consensus among the different parties in 
the debate, specifically between sceptics and alarmists. Lonergan, for instance, suggests that existing estimates and 
projections rely almost exclusively on ‘anecdotal evidence and intuitive judgments’.56 Nevertheless, he warns about 
the detriment of underestimating the role that environmental alterations and the scarcity of resources can have in the 
population displacements. In turn, the IPCC itself, based on a number of reasons, considers most projections as being 
‘mere conjectures’. However, in its aforementioned fifth report in 2014, this institution provides overwhelming data on 
the physical and environmental consequences of climate change that would lead to the displacement of millions of 
people.
As aforementioned, the need for concrete investigations and objective assessments is therefore indisputable, allowing a 
better understanding of the problem and reaching credible forecasts and valid estimates, surpassing mere conjectures 
and ‘academic approximations’. Meanwhile, increasing numbers of experts do not hesitate to include climate change 
among the main causes of forced migration, noting the existence of millions of people already displaced and millions 
of others who may be displaced as climate change impacts become more acute.57
Norman Mayer predicted that by 2050, up to 200 million people could be displaced by environmental and climate 
reasons. It is worth to bear in mind that by then, out of a world population estimated at nine billion people, one in 45 
might be displaced for these reasons. This makes population displacements ‘one of the most serious challenges’ and 
‘one of the main political problems’ to be faced over the 21st century.58
Joining the ‘numbers game’, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) estimates that by 2060, in Africa alone 
there could be some 50 million EDPs.59 This reinforces forecasts that the impact and consequences of environmental 
degradation related to climate change could be exceptionally severe in this region of the world. I will get back to this 
later on.
The most apocalyptic of the above-mentioned estimates so far belongs to Christian Aid. In 2007, this institution 
predicted that by 2050, around one billion people could be permanently displaced, including 250 million due to climate 
change-related phenomena such as droughts, floods and hurricanes, and 645 million as a result of dam construction 
and other large scale development projects.
52 Piguet, Pécoud and Guchteneire (eds.), Migration and Climate Change, p. 184.
53 The term ‘environmental IDP’ is used interchangeably.
54 Tamer Afif and Koko Warner, The Impact of Environmental Degradation on Migration Flows across Countries, UNU-EHS Working Paper 5 (2008), p. 4.
55 Dominic Kniveton, Kerstin Schmidt-Verkerk, Christopher Smith and Richard Black, Climate Change and Migration: Improving Methodologies to 
Estimate Flows (Geneva: IOM – Migration Research Series Paper no. 33, 2008), p. 5.
56 Steve Lonergan, ‘The role of environmental degradation in population displacement’, Environmental Change and Security Project Report, 4 
(1998), pp. 5–15.
57 Achim Steiner, ‘Prólogo’, RMF, 31 (2008), p. 4.
58 Kälin, The Climate Change – Displacement Nexus; Andrew Morton, Philippe Boncour and Frank Laczko, ‘Seguridad humana y desafíos Políticos’, 
RMF, 31 (2008), pp. 5–7.
59 Brown, Oli, ‘El baile de las cifras’, RMF, 31 (2008), pp. 8–9
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It is therefore not surprising that from these figures, some circles have begun to talk about what they call the largest 
mass global migration in the history of mankind.60 As a result, ‘demographic catastrophes’ and large-scale international 
migrations flows have been predicted to ‘damage the nature of destination regions and countries and thereby 
exacerbate the risk of conflict’.61 There is no need to demonstrate how dangerous this approach is because it promotes 
xenophobia and social tensions by diverting attention from the protection and assistance needs of refugees and IDPs.
In a meritorious effort to overcome the ‘alarmisms’, in 2009 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) and IDMC unveiled a pioneering study assessing the worldwide existence of 36 million displaced 
persons, in 2008 alone, as a consequence of natural disasters. This figure rose to more than 42 million in 2010, fell 
to under 15 million in 2011, and reached 32.4 million at the end of 2012. Of these data it is estimated that those 
displaced by environmental reasons linked to climate change were around 20 million in 2008, over 38 million in 2010, 
almost 14 million in 2011 and 32.4 million (98 per cent of the given figure) for 2012.62 In the same period, there were 
approximately 4.6 million (2008), 2.9 million (2010) and 3.5 million (2011) persons displaced by violence, respectively. 
This highlights the trend of environmental phenomena related to climate change to turn into the main factor in 
population displacement around the world.
This demonstrates the progressive affirmation of climate change as becoming the dominant force inducing human 
displacement, since it acts as an amplifying factor to conflicts and other elements of socio-economic vulnerability. In 
providing the global scale of displacement caused by disasters, many of them related to climate change, the IDMCpoints 
out that these displace three times more people than conflicts. In fact, as illustrated below (figure 1):
Since 2008, an average of 26.4 million people per year have been displaced from their homes 
by disasters brought on by natural hazards. This is the equivalent to one person being displaced 
every second. The number and scale of huge disasters creates significant fluctuation from year to 
year in the total number of people displaced, while the trend over decades is on the rise.63 
In its key findings, this same institution indicates that ‘by the end of 2016 there were 40.3 million people internally 
displaced by conflict and violence across the world. An unknown number of people remain displaced as a result of 
disasters that occurred in and prior to 2016’.
It should be noted that, despite this unknown character of the magnitude of people displaced by disasters, the IDMC 
asserts that, adding to the already existing high number of IDPs by conflict and disaster, in 2016 alone a total of 31.1 
million new displacements were recorded in 125 countries and territories. This is roughly the equivalent of one person 
forced to flee every second. Of this total number, 24.2 million new displaced people were due to disasters, while 6.9 
million were motivated by conflict and violence.
Figure 1: Total annual new displacements since 2008
Source: IDMC, GRID 2017.
There is a broad consensus on the largely internal nature of displacement in the context of climate change, albeit it 
should be emphasised that the issue and size of EDPs crossing State borders should not be underestimated.
60 Scott Leckie, ‘Implicaciones sobre los derechos humanos’, RMF, 31 (2008), pp. 18–19.
61 RSH-OIM, El cambio climático, la degradación del medio ambiente y la migración: qué hacer ante las circunstancias de vulnerabilidad de la población 
y cómo aprovechar las oportunidades de solventar el problema. Informe de la Conferencia (Ginebra, 2008), p. 8.
62 IDMC, Global estimates 2012. People displaced by disasters (Geneva: IDMC, May 2013).
63 IDMC, GRID 2017.
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From all the above, it is necessary to come to the conclusion that the environmental displacements occurring in the 
context of climate change, make up a ‘new reality’. This overflows and poses enormous challenges to the legal order 
and international policies and relations, thereby demanding the adoption of new and imaginative answers. In this 
regard, and in order to analyse the extent to which international law is and should be an essential instrument for the 
management of environmental displacement as huge a social problem, the following two sections will review both the 
international recognition of environmental displacement and the evolution of States’ obligations towards the victims.
I.4. International recognition of environmentally displaced persons
Both the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)64 and the Kyoto Protocol65 make no 
reference whatsoever to displacement induced by climate change.66 Thanks to the decisive action of important sectors 
of the humanitarian community, international awareness on the issue has grown, as has the need for tighter integration 
of humanitarian and human rights approaches into international negotiations on climate change.
Inviting all States Parties to enhance their efforts on adaptation to implement inter alia ‘measures to enhance 
understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and 
planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels’, article 14 f ) of the Cancun 
Agreements (Decision 1.CP/16) marks a turning point in the official recognition by States community, both of population 
displacement due to the impacts of climate change and the need to adequately address this reality at all levels, local, 
national, regional and international. In fact, it should be stated that this article represents the first inclusion of the 
environmental displacement issue in the international agenda.
However, it should be pointed out that this remarkable step was not followed up in successive climate change 
conferences. This is said without ignoring either the Decision on Loss and Damage adopted in Doha in 2012 (Decision 
3.CP/18 paragraph 7 (a) (vi)), paragraph 50 of which refers to ‘integrated approaches to avert, minimise and address 
displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change’, or the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and 
Damage, established by COP 19 to address loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including 
extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects 
of climate change.67
Adopted by COP 21,68 the Paris Agreement, the first ever universal, legally binding global climate deal, which sets out 
a global action plan to limit global warming to well below 2°C, is considered by many to represent an unprecedented 
breakthrough for action on migration and climate change or, mutatis mutandis, a stepping stone for the protection 
of EDPs. However, it can be conversely argued that the issue of human mobility taking place in the context of climate 
change is widely under-represented in the Paris Agreement. In fact, the only mention of migrants in the treaty can be 
found in its preamble, which reads as follows:
Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when 
taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations 
on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, 
migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to 
development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity. 
(emphasis added).
Therefore, even in the aftermath of the Paris Agreement, it fully makes sense to consider that negotiations under the 
UNFCCC should continue to factor in and make progress on the question of human mobility in relation to climate change.
At any rate, once the reality of environmental displacement has been recognised, the correct approach under 
international law should be to identify its forced or voluntary character; to classify those affected as migrants, IDPs, 
refugees or stateless persons; as well as to analyse the existence or not of an international normative and operational 
framework pursuant to which to respond adequately to this ‘multicausal’ and ‘new reality’. It is worth, at this point, 
to recall the distinction proposed by Kälin69 among five specific scenarios triggering human displacement and 
migration: i) the increase of hydro-meteorological disasters (flooding, hurricanes/typhoons /cyclones, mudslides etc); 
ii) designated areas as high-risk zones too dangerous for human habitation; iii) environmental degradation and slow 
onset disasters (e.g. reduction of water availability, desertification, recurrent flooding, salination of coastal zones etc.); 
iv) ‘sinking’ small island States caused by rising sea; v) decrease in essential resources (water, food production) due to 
climate change, which may well trigger armed conflict and violence. Needless to say that these diverse scenarios shape 
different subcategories of displaced persons or migrants, posing considerable challenges, at the very least from legal 
and humanitarian perspectives, at domestic, regional and international levels.
64 Adopted in New York on 9th May 1992, it came into force on 21st March 1994 (UNTS, vol. 1771, p. 107).
65 Adopted in Kyoto on 11th December 1997, it came into force on 16th February 2005 (UNTS, vol. 2303, p. 148).
66 These two legal instruments, the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, are relevant to this debate since they set a significant precedent as a means 
of solving long-term international environmental problems, and constitute the first steps towards implementing an international response strategy 
to combat climate change.
67 FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1. Decision 2/CP.19, paragraph 1.
68 FCCC/CP/2015/L.9.
69 Kälin, The Climate Change Displacement Nexus.
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I.5. International obligations of States under the legal regime on climate change
At its current evolutionary stage, international law imposes three kinds of general obligations for States in the context 
of climate change: mitigation, adaptation and protection.
Focusing on the causes of climate change, mitigation implies the commitment of States Parties to the UNFCCC and 
its Kyoto Protocol as well as to the Paris Agreement to reduce and limit global warming to well below 2°C, thereby to 
curb the ongoing climate change and its disastrous consequences. Considering that, due to the inertia of the climatic 
system, it is already impossible to avoid some of its effects,70 States commit to undertake adaptation measures, thus 
reducing the risk of disasters and structural weaknesses whilst enhancing the resilience of people and communities, 
especially in developing countries. The third obligation seeks to address the impacts of climate change by protecting 
the human rights of the affected people, including the environmentally displaced.71
It should be noted that international negotiations under the UNFCCC on the fight against climate change still remain 
focused on mitigation and adaptation; the protection of people has not yet been taken into account to a sufficient 
degree. Even so, we must point out that, despite the recognition of climate change as a cause of human mobility 
which can increase risks and vulnerability, regretfully human mobility seems far from being accepted and boosted 
as an adaptation strategy to climate change, or as a mechanism that can increase resilience of people affected by the 
negative impacts of climate change. As pointed out by António Guterres,72 ‘although there is a growing awareness of 
the perils of climate change, its likely impact on human displacement and mobility has received too little attention’.
I.6. Protecting the environmentally displaced persons: a pending issue
When it comes to assessing the protection of people in the context of the global and multi-level response to climate 
change, it is worth stressing that this task should be based on the foundations of humanity, dignity, human rights, 
solidarity and international cooperation. On the basis of these principles, States have the primary responsibility 
to protect their populations, giving particular attention to special needs of those most vulnerable and affected by 
environmental disasters, including displaced people, host communities and those at risk of displacement.73 To this end, 
it is essential that States develop legislation, policies and institutions, as well as invest in adequate resources.
In the wake of the discussions and five scenarios of displacement proposed by Kälin as outlined above, it is worth 
noting that, on the ground, States may face difficulties on how to deal with the aforementioned different subcategories 
of EDPs and determine the type of protection to be granted. To begin with, there is a lack of both a mandatory definition 
on EDPs and specific rules that could help to frame and regulate the protection that they need and deserve. Hence, 
the existence of a legal and institutional vacuum in this regard. This is despite the fact that a thorough examination of 
the existing rules – particularly in refugee law, humanitarian law, human rights law, environmental law and even the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement – leads to the conclusion that, for their protection and assistance, some of 
EDPs may be covered by the existing international legal and institutional framework.
It is worth remembering and insisting that the five scenarios mentioned above are considered useful for, among other 
things, categorising those who move as migrants, IDPs, refugees, stateless persons or several of these categories at 
the same time. Certainly, such categorisation is a risky and debatable task, which requires the development of specific 
analysis criteria. Notwithstanding, it seems to be opportune to look at the direction of displacement, which allows me 
to address two subcategories of EDPs, resulting from internal and external migratory movement.
I.6.1. Internal environmentally displaced persons
It is worth emphasising again both the predominantly internal nature of the environmental displacement crisis and 
the primary responsibility of States for the protection of victims. It should not be forgotten that, most of the time, the 
displaced are citizens of countries whose governments are unable or unwilling to provide them with assistance and 
protection. This situation itself should trigger international protection. In addition, acceptance of climate change as 
a root cause of displacement implies, therefore, the international community’s assumption of common and shared 
responsibility to protect and assist victims. However, the inclusion of this protection within the emerging principle 
of R2P has proven to be a highly controversial issue that has so far been able to bring together more detractors than 
supporters.74
70 Xavier Labandeira and Pedro Linares, ‘El Acuerdo de París sobre cambio climático’, ICADE, 97 (2016), p. 12.
71 Considering that ‘climate change threatens the full enjoyment of a wide range of rights, including the rights to life, health, water, food, housing, 
development and self-determination’, existing human rights obligations defined under legally binding treaties must consequently inform States’ 
climate action (policies and measures builds on the principles of non-discrimination and meaningful public participation principles), in order to 
effectively protect the rights of those most affected by climate impacts. See CIEL & GI-ESCR, States’ Human Rights Obligations in the Context of 
Climate Change, Geneva 2018, www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/HRTBs-synthesis-report.pdf (accessed 21 Apr. 2018), pp. 1–2.
72 Guterres, António, ‘Millions uprooted: saving refugees and displaceds’, Foreign Affairs, 2008, www.foreignaffairs.org/20080901faessay87506/
antonio-guterres/millions-uprooted.htmls (accessed 27 Apr. 2018).
73 The Nansen Principle II, available at www.unhcr.org/4ea969729.pdf (accessed 27 Apr. 2018).
74 Sara E. Davies, ‘A responsibility to protect persons in the event of natural disasters?’, in Sara E. Davies and Luke Glanville (eds.), Protecting the 
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It is widely believed that existing human rights norms and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement make up 
the normative framework of reference to ensure international protection for the vast majority of EDPs, who make up 
the majority of IDPs. While the Guiding Principles do not explicitly include climate change among the causes of internal 
displacement, they do so implicitly in providing a non-exhaustive list of causes and factors for such displacement.75 
In particular, the Guiding Principles expressly recognise natural and man-made disasters as potential root causes of 
displacement, regardless of their linkages to climate change patterns.76
However, the Guiding Principles have certain shortcomings that give rise to the lack of protection of IDPs. It should 
be recalled that, in addition to their non-binding nature, these Principles have definition problems, more descriptive 
than legal; they do not adequately cover environmental alterations in their complexity and breadth; they seem to 
focus more on displacements resulting from sudden environmental phenomena, leaving aside those that occur as a 
result of slow and progressive environmental disasters. Moreover, their transformation from soft law principles into 
national normative standards and policies of protection has proven insufficient and far from exhaustive. All of this is 
compounded by the enormous challenges of their implementation, shortcomings in institutional arrangements, and 
the unlikely emergence of any realistic alternative framework on the ground. It is therefore necessary to conclude that 
the protection of the human rights of the internal EDPs is far from being sufficiently assured.
On the other hand, those people who, presumably, make the decision (without being forced) to leave their homes and 
places of habitual residence due to the effects of climate change, such as environmental degradation that adversely 
affects food production, are often included in the category of voluntary internal migration. This is usually taken for 
granted without considering or promoting at all migration as a mechanism or a strategy of adaptation to climate 
change, that may allow people and communities ‘to minimize harm for themselves and/or improve their overall lives’.77
I.6.2. External environmentally displaced persons
Regarding the transboundary movement of people in the context of climate change, the lack of a specific and 
comprehensive legal framework for protection is even more blatant. For external EDPs who do not fit into any legally 
established status for ‘economic’ or ‘forced’ migrants across State borders, the human rights protection system, while 
still relevant in general terms, is nothing but a nominalist system.78
It should be also recalled that, with very few exceptions – such as the fifth scenario of displacement, in which climate 
change can trigger disturbances, violence and armed conflicts; or scenarios one and two79 – external EDPs do not fall 
within the scope of the international legal regime for refugees. This is so even in those regional areas – such as the Africa 
and Latin America – where significant extensions have been made to the Geneva definition of the term refugee. In fact, 
both the OAU Convention regulating specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa (Article 1.2) and the Cartagena 
Declaration on Refugees80 (in its conclusion no. 3), include among the constitutive assumptions of refugee status 
events which may seriously disturb public order. In that sense, both instruments could cover EDPs, since the impact of 
disasters can become severe enough to violate public order. However, although it seems possible, this interpretation 
still finds no support in either the praxis or the opinio iuris of States in either region.
In any case, it can be admitted and hoped that certain aspects of refugee law can be of great help in developing responses 
to population movements in the context of climate change. Following Jane McAdam,81 I am looking in particular at the 
criterion of proof (‘well-founded fear’), envisaged durable solutions, rights-based protection framework and the status 
it creates, as well as institutional oversight guaranteed by UNHCR. It should also be noted that, if well understood and 
informed by principles of dignity, human rights and international cooperation, the institute of non-refoulement can 
provide the necessary foundation for the development of an adequate framework for the protection of those EDPs who 
manage to cross States’ borders. However, until now all this has been nothing more than good intentions or a mere 
aspiration of a still minority sector inside a somewhat enclosed debate.
The lack of a legal, political and institutional framework to provide protection for EDPs still prevails in the international 
arena. Yet, the relevance of regional organisations in the fight against climate change has been recognised in the 
correlative international negotiations process, as clearly reflected in the aforementioned paragraph 14 (f ) of the 
Cancun Agreements. This gives us the opportunity to return to the Kampala Convention with the aim to evaluate 
how effective is and should be its implementation in providing protection to environmental IDPs in the African Union 
regional context.
Displaced. Deeping the Responsibility to Protect (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010), pp. 164–84.
75 Guiding Principle 6.
76 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Introduction: Scope and Purpose, paragraph 2.
77 Diana Ionesco and Mariam Traore Chazalnoe, ‘Migration as an adaptation strategy to climate change’, IOM 2015, http://weblog.iom.int/
migration-adaptation-strategy-climate-change (accessed 27 Apr. 2018). See also Robert A. McLeman and Lori M. Hunter, Migration and Adaptation to 
Climate Change Working Paper Population Program, December 2009.
78 Kälin and Schrepfer, Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change, pp. 32–3.
79 Referring to the event that national authorities ‘politicised’ the assistance and, in a discriminatory attitude, refused to provide any kind of 
protection and assistance to certain people due to their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
80 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico 
and Panama Adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, held at Cartagena, 
Colombia from 19–22 November 1984. 
81 Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law (Oxford/New York, University Press, 2012), p. 51.
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II. The African Union context of internal displacement
As Adepoju pointed out,82 Africa, aptly described as a moving continent, is experiencing all the migratory configurations. 
Although fragmented, fluid, and often inaccurate, available migration data reveal the African migration reality as 
essentially internal, intra-regional, and south-south movement. The common denominator of the three most visible 
migratory configurations (labour migration, refugee flow and internal displacement) is that they are, in the majority, 
confined to the continent, including refugees and migrants who move to neighbouring countries and people forcibly 
uprooted within their respective countries.
At the end of 2016, the African continent was home to the greatest number of people (over 13 million)83 displaced by 
conflict, violence and sudden-onset disasters, thus facing an internal displacement crisis far greater than any other 
region in the world.
According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC),84 among disasters triggered by rapid-onset natural 
hazards, flooding is by far the most significant cause of flight in the continent, accounting for more than 90 per cent of 
displacement associated with disasters every year since 2009. In the meantime, this same institution reveals the limited 
character of these estimates, since a complete picture of the African internal displacement cannot be achieved without 
taking into account its other two important drivers, which have so far been largely ignored or less contemplated. I am 
referring to development projects (including the growing phenomena of land grabbing) and to slow-onset disasters, 
mostly droughts and the resulting food insecurity. The lack of accurate, systematically collected quantitative data on 
displacement as a result of both drivers makes it difficult to determine the real dimension of the plight in the region.
II.1. Approaching the dimension of African environmental displacement
As will be discussed later in this paper, pending better and more comprehensive scientific evidence that may lead 
to a greater understanding of climate change in its complexity and also to a clear need for a strong will to mitigate 
the impact of human activity on the planet, responses to questions about the magnitude and amplitude of global 
and regional environmental displacement are nothing but mere approximations. Even so, some of such responses are 
already extremely worrying.
In line with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),85 which clearly states that anthropogenic climate 
change is accelerating and already has serious impacts on the environment and people’s lives, the humanitarian 
community notes that this is verifiable in frequency, intensity and severity of disasters. In this sense, it is estimated 
that disasters have doubled over the last four decades, rising from about 200 to more than 400 a year, most of them 
related to climate change. As a result, the total number of people directly affected by disasters during the 1990s tripled 
to an average of 211 million people each year. In 2016 alone, 445 million people were reported,86 with economic losses 
amounting to 83 billion dollars a year.87 Needless to say, many of those affected are or turn into displaced persons. 
Therefore, these figures seem to indicate that, due to growing climate change impacts, along with increasingly intense 
and frequent disasters, environmental displacement can shape the ‘new normality’ of our world, especially in the 
African continent.
In fact, the generality of quantitative data available and handled coincides in placing the African region among the 
most vulnerable, despite emitting far less carbon dioxide than other continents. As illustrated below (figure 2), Africa’s 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per year represent only a small fraction, 3 per cent, of global emissions, yet Africa 
hosts 15 per cent of the population of the world. Besides, this continent accounts for only 3 per cent of world energy 
consumption, which translates to the average energy consumption of an African inhabitant being six times less than 
the average for individual inhabitants across the populations of the world.88
82 Aderanti Adepoju, ‘Migration dynamics, refugees and internally displaced persons’, UNAI, 20 September 2016, https://academicimpact.un.org/
content/migration-dynamics-refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons-africa (accessed 27 Apr. 2018).
83 Excluding the North, the rest of the continent accounted for 12.2 million IDPs by conflict and violence, and 1.0 million by disasters by the end 
of 2016, says IDMC, GRID 2017, pp. 26 and 37.
84 IDMC, Africa report on internal displacement, Geneva, December 2016, p. 5.
85 R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.), Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Geneva: IPCC, 2014).
86 This figure was made public during the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, held in Cancun, Mexico, 22–26 May 2017, under the slogan 
‘From Sendai to Cancun, From Commitment to Action’.
87 As indicated in the Letter from the IASC Principals to Yvo de Boer, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 30 April 2009, www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc (accessed 27 Apr. 2018).
88 Oliver C. Ruppel, ‘Climate change law and policy positions in the African Union and related developments in selected African countries’, in 
Oliver C. Ruppel, Christian Roschmann and Katharina Ruppel-Schlichting (eds.), Climate Change: International Law and Global Governance Volume II: 
Policy, Diplomacy and Governance in a Changing Environment (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), pp. 411–12.
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Figure 2: Africa’s carbon dioxide emissions
Source: Fatih Birol89
In the same way, in reporting on the effects of climate change that trigger displacement, in 2007 the IPCC90 pointed 
to the African continent as being among the regions that could be most affected by water stress – both its scarcity 
(desertification) and its excess (floods, sea level rise, tropical cyclones) – and food insecurity and hunger as a consequence 
of the decrease in crop yields. Recently, the IDMC pointed out that although no African countries were among the 
10 to experience the largest-scale or relatively large-scale displacement in 2016, ‘significant sudden-onset disasters 
did occur, however, and the displacements they triggered compounded the impacts of other natural and man- made 
hazards, including drought, coastal erosion, land degradation and conflict’.91 Then, this same institution concluded, 
clearly stating that if displacement associated with slow-onset disasters were included in their estimates, particularly 
those related to drought conditions and food insecurity, the displacement figures for Africa would be significantly 
higher than they are right now.92
Outside IDMC and in an attempt to quantify this pressing reality, some estimations93 indicate that in the coming 
decades, disasters related to climate change may put around 80 to 120 million people in the African continent at risk. 
Certain sub-regions, in particular the Sahara and semi-arid areas in southern Africa, may suffer from a temperature 
increase of 1.6 degrees by 2050. In the Horn of Africa region rainfall may decline to about 10 per cent of current levels. It 
should also be noted that around 50 per cent of the population lives in dry regions susceptible to drought. As Jean Ping 
points out,94 the phenomenon of desertification in Africa is extremely disturbing, affecting 43 per cent of productive 
land, equivalent to 70 per cent of activity and 40 per cent of the continent’s population. Besides, sea level could increase 
up to around 25 centimetres, jeopardising lowlands of the western part of the continent and coastal fishing banks. 
89 Fatih Birol, ‘Global energy outlook and the implications for Africa’, presentation in Paris, 25 April 2012, https://es.slideshare.net/
internationalenergyagency/birol-18th-meeting-of-the-africa-partnership-forum (accessed 29 Apr. 2018). 
90 R. K. Pachauri and A. Reisinger (eds.), Cambio climático 2007: Informe de síntesis. Contribución de los Grupos de trabajo I, II y III al Cuarto Informe de 
evaluación del Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático (Ginebra: IPCC, 2007).
91 IDMC, GRID 2017, p. 38.
92 Ibid.
93 Oriol Solà Pardell, Desplazados medioambientales: una nueva realidad (Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, 2012), pp. 27–8.
94 Quoted in ‘Desertificação afecta a economia’, Jornal de Angola, 26 Oct. 2011.
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Being highly exposed to all these impacts of climate change, which interact with relevant sociopolitical factors, the 
economies of a large part of the African populations have seen their vulnerabilities accentuated.95 Taking all this into 
account, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) predicted that, ‘by 2080, due to climate 
change, it is likely that 75 per cent of the African population will be at risk of hunger’.96
All the above leads to the consideration that, if ongoing trends are not reversed, forced displacement caused by 
disasters related to climate change is likely to increase exponentially over the second half of this century. As for the 
orientation, with African displacement being predominantly internal (sub-regional at most),97 only a small number of 
affected people would be able to undertake transcontinental migration.98 This is despite the fact that some alarmist 
estimations insist that, by 2020, some 60 million Africans will move from other regions to northern Africa and Europe 
to flee the adverse effects of climate change.99
Conscious of internal displacement as a source of suffering and specific vulnerability for millions of people, a driver of 
continuing instability, food insecurity and a barrier for human and sustainable development, the heads of state and 
governments of the Member States of the African Union showed their willingness, commitment and determination 
to address such a challenging predicament by establishing an appropriate legal and comprehensive binding regional 
framework for the protection of and assistance to IDPs across the region, the Kampala Convention.
II.2. Scope of the Kampala Convention on the protection of environmental IDPs
II.2.1. The paradigm of State sovereignty as Responsibility to Protect IDPs
Unanimously celebrated as a ground-breaking convention, the first and so far only regional legally binding instrument 
for the protection and assistance of IDPs is premised on the new legal, political and ethical paradigm from which 
premise the AU aims to address forced displacement: the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) principle.
It should be recalled, in this sense, that the change from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to African Union (AU), 
in 2000, represented a significant qualitative leap in the goals and orientation of the pan-African organisation, which 
decided to shift from a non-interference to a non-indifference-based attitude. This led to the assumption of R2P as the 
appropriate paradigm to handle the continent’s enormous challenges, forced migration included.100
At this point, it is worth to bear in mind that, in contrast to the trend to dissociate IDPs and the R2P, excluding those 
from the conceptual and operational scope of this emerging international regulation, the AU reaffirms the historical 
and factual proximity between the need for protection of IDPs and the R2P principle.101 In this sense, it should be 
stated that the Kampala Convention represents a qualitative contribution coming from the pan-African organisation 
to the doctrinal and normative development of State sovereignty assumed as R2P. The maximum regional normative 
expression in this regard is enshrined in Articles 4 (h) (j) and 23.2 of the AU Constitutive Act. Both articles make up the 
cornerstone of the African system for the protection of populations in peril, including IDPs. Therefore, the Constitutive 
Act establishing the AU (2000) has turned into the first international treaty to stipulate the obligation and responsibility 
for regional and international organisations to intervene in a particular Member State in order to assure human 
protection. Therefore, the above mentioned Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act, clearly reflected in Article 8 of the 
Kampala Convention, represents, at least on paper, a significant endpoint in the evolution of international discussions 
on the so-called ‘right to humanitarian intervention’.
With that said, it is opportune to mention that, from the chronological perspective, the first formal collective 
manifestation of the R2P paradigm took place at the Great Lakes sub-regional level, through its incorporation into the 
Great Lakes Pact (2006). Thanks to its Protocol on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons, that Pact 
became the first multilateral instrument in the world to commit States to adopt the United Nations Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement (1998)102 as a legally binding instrument. In this sense, this sub-regional legal instrument 
95 Solà Pardell, Desplazados medioambientales, pp. 27–8.
96 Statement available at www.climdev-africa.org/content/fact (accessed 29 Apr. 2018).
97 Sara Mercandalli and Bruno Losch (eds.), Rural Africa in motion: Dynamics and drivers of migration South of the Sahara (Rome: FAO and CIRAD, 
2017).
98 IASC, ‘Climate change, migration and displacement: who will be affected?’, Working Paper submitted to UNFCCC Secretariat by the informal 
group on Migration/Displacement and Climate Change of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 31 October 2008, http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2008/smsn/igo/022.pdf (accessed 29 Apr. 2018).
99 ‘ONG reclaman que se reconozca a los ‘desplazados ambientales’‘, www.elmundo.es, 25 May 2010.
100 Tim Murithi, ‘The African Union’s transition from non-intervention to non-indifference: an ad hoc approach to the Responsibility to Protect?’, 
IPG, 1 (2009), pp. 90–106; Paul D. Williams, ‘From non-intervention to non-indifference: the origins and development of the African Union’s security 
culture’, African Affairs, 106, (2007), pp. 253–79.
101 Outlined in paragraphs 138–9 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome (A/60/150), this principle refers to the obligation of States toward their 
populations and all populations at risk of genocide and other mass atrocity crimes. It consists of three levels or pillars of responsibility: i) every State 
has the Responsibility to Protect its populations from mass atrocity crimes (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing); 
ii) the wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual States in meeting that responsibility; iii) if a State is 
manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action, in a timely and 
decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter.
102 E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, annex.
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proved to be an authentic embryonic experience for the Kampala Convention and its R2P approach.103 Similarly to the 
above-mentioned Protocol, the Kampala Convention proceeds from the premise of the primary responsibility of the 
State in addressing internal displacement and directly incorporates the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 
Yet, it goes beyond the Guiding Principles, since it articulates the need for a holistic response to internal displacement 
based on a combined framework of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as Chaloka 
Beyani pointed out.104
As aforementioned, in its preamble the Kampala Convention clearly recognises that in addition to generating specific 
suffering and vulnerability for the victims, displacement caused by natural or man-made disasters, including climate 
change, has a devastating impact on human life, peace, stability, security and the development on the continent. 
Starting from this observation, the Convention, besides encouraging the exercise of national sovereignty as R2P, also 
fosters collective responsibility at regional, international and global levels for the sake of a new solidarity, as a sine qua 
non strategy to successfully deal with adverse climate change impacts on human life and mobility.
II.2.2. Key provisions on environmental IDPs
The conceptual scope of environmental IDPs can be found within the general definition of IDP, enshrined in Article 1(k) 
and (l) of the Kampala Convention. That is, environmental IDPs qualify as a subcategory of:
persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or 
places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed 
conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made 
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.
Those persons who move in anticipation of avoiding the effect of disasters, both sudden-onset (e.g. floods) and slow-
onset (e.g. droughts and soil degradation), also qualify as environmentally displaced. Moreover, environmental IDPs 
and, therefore, the subjects of the Convention, are likewise those people displaced as a result of States’ adaptive 
measures, such as evacuations or relocation, as stated in Article 1(l), especially when such measures are arbitrary. Thus, 
in its Article 4(4)(f ), the convention goes even further by clearly defining as arbitrary any ‘forced evacuation in cases of 
natural or human made disasters or other causes if the evacuations are not required by the safety and health of those 
affected’.
Under Article 5(4) of the convention, States Parties are required to take measures to protect and assist people displaced 
in the context of natural or human made disasters, including climate change. In areas of potential displacement, these 
measures include the devising by States Parties of continental early warning systems, as well as the establishment 
and implementation of disaster risk reduction strategies, emergency and disaster preparedness and management 
measures. And, where necessary, States are required to provide immediate protection and assistance to IDPs. This also 
means that a State’s responsibility for preventing environmental displacement implies the adoption of appropriate 
legislation and policies, the designation of a national focal point, and the allocation of necessary funds for protection 
and assistance, without prejudice to international support (Article 4).
In addition to the above, States should assess or facilitate the assessment of the needs and vulnerabilities of displaced 
populations and host communities, a task requiring a national registry of victims and areas at risk. The set of national 
preventive measures must be harmonised with the alert system of the AU, which development is foreseen under Article 
13 of the AU Constitutive Act.
State responsibility in the context of environmental displacement also includes the adoption of special measures to 
ensure protection against environmental degradation, the obligation to treat victims without discrimination and to 
respect their right to seek safety elsewhere inside or outside their country (Articles 9[2][e] and 20[1]). All this is closely 
related to displacement induced by so-called ‘development projects’, carried out both by public authorities or private 
agents. The significant development-based displacement the continent is experiencing is yet to gain prominence in 
the international media and political agenda. Indeed, even though this root cause of internal displacement prevails 
in many African countries, it has largely gone unnoticed in discussions on humanitarian protection by regional and 
international agencies.105 Worse still, there is some political resistance of States and multinational companies to 
addressing this pressing problem.
Under the convention, Article 10(3), States must carry out the necessary environmental impact assessment before a 
particular project is undertaken. With regard to arbitrary displacement, special attention should be addressed to civil 
liability of multinational enterprises and other non-state actors, in particular those whose activities in extracting and 
exploiting economic and natural resources may degrade the environment and, consequently, generate displacements 
(Article 3[1][h]).
103 About the similarities and differences between both instruments, see International Refugee Rights Initiative, Comparison of the Kampala 
Convention and the IDP Protocol of the Great Lakes Pact. A briefing note by the International Refugee Rights Initiative, January 2014, www.refugee-rights.
org/Assets/PDFs/2013/Comparative%20Note%20on%20the%20Kampala%20Convention%20and%20IDP%20Protocol%20FINAL.pdf (accessed 29 
Apr. 2018).
104 A/HRC/26/33.
105 Romola Adeola, ‘What does development-caused displacement look like in Africa?’, IDMC, December 2016, www.internal-displacement.org/
library/expert-opinion/2016/what-does-development-based-displacement-look-like-in-africa (accessed 29 Apr. 2018).
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Furthermore, by analogy to the non-refoulement principle, forced return or resettlement is prohibited, especially to 
places where, due to environmental reasons, people’s life, safety, freedom and health may be at risk (Article 9[2][e]). 
Conversely, States are required to promote and create satisfactory conditions for voluntary return, local integration or 
relocation on a sustainable basis and in circumstances of safety and dignity (Article 11[1]).
In a similar way, effective protection measures to be taken by States must include the establishment of an adequate legal 
framework in accordance with international standards, providing fair and equitable compensation and other forms of 
reparation to people affected by damages in the wake of displacement. In this regard, the State’s obligation of due 
diligence is of the utmost importance, since the State must assume responsibility for the reparation and compensation 
that people deserve for displacement and damages as a result of negligence and inaction by public authorities in 
relation to the prevention of predictable disasters (Article 12). This provision is particularly relevant with regard to 
assets left behind by IDPs, for which Article 9(2)(i) requests States Parties to take necessary protective measures.
At this point and in line with a number of analysts, it is worthwhile noting that, despite being an instrument shaped to 
regulate internal displacement including that which is motivated by disasters related to climate change, the Kampala 
Convention may have indirect implications for the protection and assistance of external EDPs. Certainly, a vacuum will 
still persists in this regard both in the international and in the AU regional arenas. Yet, the Kampala Convention aptly 
can make up an initial step towards the establishment of the much-needed international legal, policy and institutional 
framework for the protection and assistance of those EDPs who manage to cross an internationally recognised State 
border. Without prejudice to the above, the following section will attempt to examine the degree of implementation of 
the Kampala Convention particularly focusing on environmental IDPs.
III. The implementation of the Kampala Convention
Regretfully, the weakness of the pan-African organisation with regard to the implementation of its own legal and 
political instruments is far from being new. For this reason, our starting point in assessing the effectiveness of the 
Kampala Convention is cautiously and justifiably pessimistic. This, however, instead of conditioning our gaze, provides 
us with preparedness to identify, value and celebrate possible good practices that may exist in the region regarding the 
domestication and implementation of the said convention.
III.1. Identifying good practices in domestication and implementation
III.1.1. The Harare Plan of Action for the implementation of the Kampala Convention
When it comes to identifying good practices in domestication and implementation, the first meeting of the Conference 
of States Parties to the Kampala Convention, held in Harare, Zimbabwe on 5 April 2017, may be considered as a good 
starting point. Along with showing political will to fulfill States’ obligations towards IDPs, this landmark event itself says 
much about the 27 States Parties’ strong commitment to make concrete progress on implementing the convention.
States Parties seem to be aware of the fact that, although the adoption of the Kampala Convention is generally 
heralded as a momentous achievement for the African Union, like other instruments, its effectiveness lies in its holistic 
implementation as well as in the translation of its provisions into protection and assistance to IDPs across the continent. 
In this sense, convened by the African Commission in accordance with Article 14 of the Kampala Convention, the 
aforementioned first meeting aimed to explore ways of strengthening cooperation and solidarity among States Parties 
in dealing with the issue of internal displacement and mechanisms and ways of enhancing the domestication and 
implementation of the convention.106
Certainly it is useful to take a look back to see what progress has been made since the Kampala Convention was adopted 
(eight years ago) and came into force (five years ago to date). Understandably, those who attempted to turn theory 
into practice107 did not manage going beyond the evaluation of the ratification process. Indeed, ratification is the most 
basic criterion to be considered in carrying out the assessment that is intended here. As of April 2018, 40 of 55 Member 
States of the African Union had signed the Kampala Convention, while 27 had ratified it, including the Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic, which is not a State member of the United Nations.108 Therefore, to date the ratification of the 
convention has been a successful process, so much so that it became the fastest AU treaty to enter into force. However, 
although is important, ratification itself is nothing but a step forward to make effective an instrument conceived and 
aptly considered a road map for action.109
In order to facilitate the implementation of the Kampala Convention, the above referred first meeting of the Conference 
of States Parties set the Harare plan of action (PoA) with priorities and activities to be adopted by the AU, States Parties, 
106 AU, Plan of Action for the implementation of the Kampala Convention adopted by conference of states parties, 5 April 2017, available at https://
au.int/en/pressreleases/20170406/plan-action-implementation-kampala-convention-adopted-conference-states (accessed 29 Apr. 2018).
107 IDMC, The Kampala Convention One year on: Progress and prospects, Geneva, 2013; IDMC, The Kampala Convention two years on: time to turn 
theory into practice. Briefing Paper, Geneva, 2014. 
108 See ‘List of Countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the Kampala Convention’, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7796-sl-
african_union_convention_for_the_protection_and_assistance_of_internally.pdf (accessed 29 Apr. 2018).
109 A/HRC/26/33, p. 8.
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Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and partners.110 This collective effort towards the implementation of the 
convention and strengthening of mechanisms for cooperation, solidarity and coordination among member States, 
the AU and other stakeholders has been rightly considered another fertile opportunity in pursuit of the aspirations 
of Agenda 2063,111 which principally lays emphasis on root causes, prevention and durable solutions to progressively 
eliminate forced population displacement across the continent.112
Previous to the Harare PoA, in 2014 the African Union Commission on International Law launched a Draft AU Model Law 
for the Implementation of the Kampala Convention,113 which is still under debate and intended to be used as a resource 
in the drafting process of national legislation to implement the Kampala Convention at the national level. It is expected 
that it will help expedite States Parties’ implementation of ‘incorporate[ing] their obligations under this Convention into 
domestic law by enacting or amending relevant legislation on the protection of, and assistance to, IDPs in conformity 
with their obligations under international law’.114
For their law and policy-making processes on internal displacement, States Parties of the Kampala Convention can 
likewise find support, among others, in the following tools:115 Domesticating the Kampala Convention: Law and Policy-
making (2014); Capacity-building on law and policy-making on internal displacement (2016); National Instruments on 
Internal Displacement: A Guide to their Development (2013); and Regulatory Frameworks on Internal Displacement 
(2016).
1.2. Some country examples, brief critical notes
As tabulated below (Figure 3), several African countries have developed or are developing domestic laws,116 policies117 
and strategies on IDPs, using the Guiding Principles, the 2006 Great Lakes Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to 
Internally Displaced Persons or the Kampala Convention as points of reference.
Figure 3: African countries that have adopted laws and/or policies on internal displacement
Countries that have adopted laws    Angola, Kenya, Sudan 
on internal displacement 
Countries that have adopted policies on   Burundi, Somalia, Uganda, Sudan, Zambia 
internal displacement 
Countries in the process of developing a law   Central African Republic (CAR), Chad,  
or a policy on internal displacement   Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya,  
       Liberia, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, South Sudan
110 ’The PoA is structured around five objectives of the Kampala convention:
• Establish a framework for solidarity, cooperation and promotion of durable solutions between states parties
• Establish a policy framework for the prevention, protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) at national level
• Promote and strengthen regional and national measures to prevent and eliminate the root causes of internal displacement and provide for 
durable solutions
• Promote the obligations and responsibilities of State Parties
• Identify specific obligations, roles and responsibilities of armed groups, non state actors and other relevant actors including civil society 
organisations’ 
(‘1st meeting of the conference of states parties to the Kampala Convention’, https://au.int/en/newsevents/20170403/1st-meeting-conference-
states-parties-kampala-convention (accessed 29 Apr. 2018)).
111 Adopted on 26 May 2013, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Agenda 2063 is a strategic framework for the socio-economic transformation of the 
continent over the next 50 years. It is built on, and seeks to accelerate the implementation of past and existing continental initiatives for growth and 
sustainable development. It is available at https://au.int/agenda2063.
112 ‘Concept Note’, https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/conceptnotes/32304-cn-concept_note_-_cosp_meeting_2017.pdf (accessed 29 
Apr. 2018).
113 AUCIL/Legal/Doc.6 (IX).
114 As foreseen under Article 3(2) of the Kampala Convention.
115 All of them are available at http://internal-displacement.org/law-and-policy.
116 This meaning laws sensu stricto and other forms of binding regulation. Following IDMC/Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, 
National Instruments on Internal Displacement. A Guide to their Development, August 2013, p. 38, the term laws refers to domestic legal orders, which 
vary considerably, with the national constitution generally being the highest-ranking legal norm. As such, it often contains a bill of rights which 
applies without reservation to all IDPs. The constitution is usually followed by acts of parliament (laws), and other binding regulations such as 
decrees, executive orders and ordinances. Constitutional amendments will rarely be needed in the development of a national instrument, but laws 
and other forms of regulation may be relevant. They create entitlements for individuals, identify national authorities’ obligations and designate 
bodies responsible for carrying them out. They also usually refer to applicable judicial or administrative procedures to enforce the law or other form 
of regulation.
117 This meaning a statement of basic principles and declared objectives that guide and direct a government and other parties in their actions 
to pursue the longer term goals it contains. According to the aforementioned the National Instruments on Internal Displacement. A Guide to their 
Development, this term refers to policies, strategies and action plans that can be developed and adopted more rapidly than laws, as they usually entail 
fewer formalities. Such instruments are not legally binding in principle, but they may still be so at an administrative level, in that public servants may 
be obliged to abide by them because they have been approved by cabinet or a relevant ministry. In some countries, policies may be made binding 
by an act of parliament.
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Countries that have a law and a policy on   Sudan 
internal displacement 
Countries that have a law and are developing  Kenya, Burundi 
a policy 
Countries with other instruments relevant   Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, RDC, Eritrea,  
to displacement118     Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra   
       Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda,  
       Zambia, Zimbabwe
Source: Global Protection Cluster119
It is important to note that not all the above-tabulated States are legally bound by the Kampala Convention. And the 
laws and policies developed by some of them, such as Angola (2000), Burundi (2001), Sierra Leone (2002), Uganda 
(2004), the Sudan (2009) and Kenya (2012), were adopted before their ratification of the convention. Another important 
aspect deserving to be highlighted is that the domestic frameworks adopted so far vary in scope, the guarantees 
of protection and assistance, as well as the coverage of relevant issues. In fact, as Chaloka Beyani notes, ‘not all the 
laws and policies include an appropriate definition of an internally displaced person or clearly identify institutional 
responsibilities, and some address only a particular cause or stage of displacement, such as conflict or return, while 
others focus only on particular rights’.120
This, however, does not preclude recognition that a number of States are taking important steps that may contribute to 
making the Kampala Convention an integral part of their domestic law. This is the case, for example, in Uganda, Kenya, 
Burundi, DRC, Burkina Faso, Mauritius and Senegal.
Figure 4: Some States’ examples of good practices
Uganda Its National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons, adopted in 2004, is broad in 
scope, including the establishment of a national coordination body, detailed 
arrangements, for intergovernmental coordination at the national and the 
local levels, specific provisions for aspects of protection and assistance, and 
arrangements for public education. A multi-stakeholder review of the Policy’s 
implementation was undertaken in 2006.
Kenya Developed and adopted a comprehensive framework to address displacemen. 
‘Although Kenya is not a party to the Kampala Convention, its efforts to develop 
a national policy on internal displacement stands out as an example of a good 
practice and should be built upon to guide other countries in the African Union’.121
Burundi Its comprehensive peace agreement (the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation 
Agreement for Burundi, 2000) includes multiple provisions relating to internal 
displacement that are consistent with the Kampala Convention.
DRC Its Child Protection Code (2009) includes a provision on the rights of displaced 
children, which specifies their right to protection and humanitarian assistance. This 
is an interesting example of a legal basis for protecting and assisting IDP children, 
even in the absence of specific legislation implementing the Kampala Convention.
Burkina Faso, Their national laws have criminalised forced displacement as a crime against
Mauritius, Senegal humanity and a war crime for both international and non-international
 armed conflicts.
Rwanda Its national law provides for the criminalisation of acts of arbitrary or forced 
displacement. More precisely, its Penal Code (2012) includes crimes and penalties 
relating to arbitrary displacement.
Source: The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Translating the Kampala Convention into practice: a stocktaking exercise, Geneva, October 
2016, pp. 26–7.
Bearing in mind the initial purpose of this paper, and considering the increasing real affirmation of climate change as 
a major driver of forced displacement, it is justified to ask to what extent the above-mentioned national policy and 
regulatory frameworks go beyond conflict and are effective in preventing environmental displacement and protecting 
the victims.
118 This meaning a wider set of normative tools, which comprises instruments or statements confirming the validity of the Guiding Principles, 
including peace treaties referring to them, laws or policies relevant but not specifically focused on displacement. See Global Protection Cluster – Task 
Team on Law and Policy, IDP Laws and Policies. A mapping tool, www.internal-displacement.org/law-and-policy (accessed 25 Apr. 2018).
119 Ibid.; Regulatory Framework on Internal Displacement. Global, regional and national developments, May 2016, www.internal-displacement.org/
assets/publications/2016/UNHCR-GPC-Reg-Framework-IDP.pdf (accessed 25 Apr. 2018).
120 A/HRC/26/33, p. 16.
121 A/HRC/26/33, p. 16.
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Yet, it should be noted that, to date (April 2018), out of the 27 States parties to the Kampala Convention, only one – 
Angola – has enacted national legislation on internal displacement, and just two – Uganda and Zambia – have adopted 
specific policies in this area. I therefore intend to briefly examine in the following subsection the possible incorporation 
of the Kampala Convention into Angolan domestic legislation, its implementation and, in particular, its present and 
future impact and effectiveness on the protection of EDPs.
2. Are the EDPs being protected courtesy of the Kampala Convention? Angola case at a glance
The foregoing suggests that, to some extent, domestic regulatory frameworks water down the scope of the Kampala 
Convention, particularly with respect to environmental IDPs due to slow-onset disasters and climate change. This is 
mainly due to the extended lack of comprehensive legal and policy national instruments that may cover all causes 
and phases of displacement and address current and future situations, offering greater protection to displaced 
communities and providing the authorities responsible for IDPs with a solid regulatory basis to address all phases of a 
variety of displacement situations.122 However, to be coherent, this partial conclusion must also and primarily consider 
how deep and effective the commitments and efforts of States and the AU are in establishing and advancing the 
agenda of disaster risk reduction strategies on the continent, that the fight against anthropogenic climate change and 
its terrible consequences is demanding.
2.1. Bringing together the Kampala Convention and the disaster risk reduction agenda
Adopted in Nairobi, on 16 April 2010, the Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Africa Regional Strategy 
for Disaster Risk Reduction (2006–2015) aimed to contribute to the attainment of sustainable development and poverty 
eradication through a substantial reduction in the social, economic and environmental impact of disasters, including 
risks associated with climate change. It starts by acknowledging the fact that the occurrence of disasters, and the social 
and economic losses caused as a result, are rising in Africa, which poses a great threat to Africa’s ability to achieve 
sustainable development. Then, it states that ‘disaster risk reduction (DRR) policies and institutional mechanisms 
do exist at various degrees of completeness in African countries. However, their effectiveness is limited. Hence 
a strategic approach to improving and enhancing their effectiveness and efficiency by emphasising disaster risk 
reduction is needed’ (emphasis added).123
In 2013, the Africa Position for the 4th Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction,124 after taking note of the ratification 
of the Kampala Convention, acknowledged the responsibilities of governments to protect people displaced by 
disasters and climate change and took measures to mitigate such displacement. It recognised the ongoing efforts 
to strengthen the monitoring, evaluation and reporting system for the Africa Regional Strategy and importance of 
verifiable reporting of disaster losses. It also indicated that ‘Africa has developed an Africa Status Report for DRR, which 
is a detailed analysis of the state of disaster risk reduction in the region, based on national and sub-regional reports, 
summarizing achievements as well as emerging trends and challenges’.
Launched in 2016 by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), the Disaster risk reduction in Africa: 
Status report (2015)125 ‘examines risk drivers that exacerbate natural hazards’ impacts on populations, and analyses 
the state of Africa’s preparedness against the risk of disaster in relation to the Hyogo Framework for Action126 (HFA, 
2005–2015)’. Having profiled the frequency, location and severity of natural hazards across Africa, the report found 
this continent is one that ‘holds half of the world’s most risk-prone countries, and is experiencing a rising number of 
disasters’.
Organised around five indicators such as: hazard and disaster impact profile of Africa, disaster risk drivers in Africa, 
status of Africa’s implementation of the HFA, investment and financing for disaster risk reduction in Africa, and the 
transition from the HFA to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction127 key findings of the report include the 
following:
122 This is said without ignoring that limiting the scope of a national instrument is possible and, in light of the particularities of the displacement 
situation (such as a particular cause of displacement, geographical area, phase of the displacement process, timeframe) may be appropriate, as long 
as such limitations must not be discriminatory and must not exclude certain IDPs from exercising their rights. See IDMC/Brookings-LSE Project on 
Internal Displacement, National Instruments on Internal Displacement, p. 35.
123 AU, Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (2006–2015), Nairobi, 16 April 2010, 
www.unisdr.org/files/13655_POAinEnglishadoptedinNairobi16April[1].pdf (accessed 29 Apr. 2018).
124 Held in Geneva on 19–23 May 2013.
125 UNISDR, Disaster risk reduction in Africa: Status report (2015), 2016, www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/51078 (accessed 25 Apr. 2018).
126 Adopted by the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held by the Member States of the United Nations in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan, on 18–
22 January 2005, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) is the key instrument for implementing disaster risk reduction. Its overarching goal is to 
build resilience of nations and communities to disasters, by achieving substantive reduction of disaster losses by 2015 – in lives, and in the social, 
economic, and environmental assets of communities and countries. It offers five areas of priorities for action, guiding principles and practical means 
for achieving disaster resilience for vulnerable communities in the context of sustainable development. The HFA is available at www.unisdr.org/
files/1217_HFAbrochureEnglish.pdf (accessed 27 APp. 018).
127 Being the successor instrument to the HFA, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 was adopted by United Nations 
Member States on 18 March 2015 at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai City, Japan. It is a 15-year, voluntary, non-
binding agreement which recognises that the State has the primary role to reduce disaster risk but that responsibility should be shared with other 
stakeholders including local government, the private sector and other stakeholders. It, therefore, aims at ‘the substantial reduction of disaster risk and 
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Africa faces a huge challenge from climate change. About 22 African countries are highly 
vulnerable to climate change, often manifested through drought. Progress has been slow in the 
implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action. (...) While DRR in Africa is being financed 
through national budget allocation, the private sector and international sources, it is clear more 
needs to be done. An immediate priority is to enhance the existing mechanisms and tools that 
measure progress in DRR, and review and assess risk baselines against the guidance contained in 
the Sendai Framework (emphasis added).
The report concludes revealing that no tools have been set up to measure preparedness under the Sendai Framework 
for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2030). This aspect and all the above tell much about the progress made to date, but 
also the long way to go to achieve the full implementation of both the Kampala Convention and the DRR regional 
agenda.
2.2. The case of Angola
With the adoption in 2001 and 2002, respectively, of the Norms on the Resettlement of Displaced Populations128 and the 
Standards on the Resettlement of Displaced Populations,129 Angola became the first country to incorporate the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement (1998) into its domestic legislation, with the aim of regulating the process of return 
and/or temporary or permanent resettlement of more than 4 million IDPs.130
In September 2004,131 the Government announced that some 4 million IDPs had been resettled. And the remaining 
340,000 should return to their places of origin as soon as possible, given the Government’s willingness to declare the 
closure of the resettlement process at the end of the year and the consequent closure of all the existing reception 
centres and camps for displaced persons, a measure justified by the need to ‘normalise and stabilise the country’.132
According to the Angolan Government, with the exception of the Cabinda enclave,133 IDPs have ceased to exist in 
Angola as of 2005. Consequently, since that time, there has been no monitoring of this phenomenon in the country, nor 
has the situation of the former IDPs and the level of their socio-economic integration134 been examined.
However, sooner rather than later, the events showed that forced displacement of populations is still a real and potential 
problem in this country. In fact, it is likely to be more structural than cyclical in nature, reinforced by the persistence 
and mutations of its predominantly political historical causes, which are exacerbated by environmental and economic 
factors. The poorly healed and even bleeding wounds of the 27-year-long armed conflict are being compounded by 
the impacts of climate change and exclusionary development projects that, in many cases, target the same victims as 
in the past of war.
By adopting the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into its national legislation, the Angolan Government 
assumes as root causes of forced displacement not only armed conflicts and situations of widespread violence, but also 
human rights violations, natural and man-made disasters as well as large-scale development projects.
Having overcome the first cause, war – but not its deep and lasting consequences – the other causes, perhaps 
surreptitious and less noisy, emerge in a disturbing degree in the current socio-political and economic context of the 
country. However, they seem to receive very little attention from national authorities, despite the fact that, if they are 
not tackled in a timely and appropriate manner, they could prove devastating in the foreseeable future.
In line with what was discussed above in section II, it should be stressed that, in addition to the extreme weather events 
that occur suddenly (especially floods), those of a slow and progressive nature, such as desertification, drought, erosion 
and soil degradation, are also of great concern in Angola.135 As the National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) refers to, 
in this country
the possible effects from the scenarios generated by the global models for a 50 to 100 year 
timescale may be the following: the occurrence of extreme climatic events; the extension of arid 
and semi-arid areas in the south of Angola; a reduction in rainfall below the dividing line between 
losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities 
and countries’ (<https://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/sendai-framework (accessed 27 Apr. 2018).
128 Council of Ministers Decree Number 1/01, 5 January 2001. 
129 Council of Ministers Decree Number 79/02 of 6 December, adopted to ensure the implementation of the ‘Norms on the Resettlement of 
Displaced Populations’, approved by Decree 1/01 of 5 January, to facilitate the organised resettlement and return to IDPs to their areas of origin. 
Attached to the decree are the implementing regulations, known as ‘Standard operational procedures of the Norms on Resettlement of Displaced 
Populations’.
130 In 2003, this figure of Angolan IDPs was estimated at 4.6 million. See HRW, World Report 2003 (Angola section), 14 January 2003, www.hrw.org/
legacy/wr2k3/africa1.html (accessed 27 Apr. 2018).
131 IDMC, The government announces that 340,000 IDPs should return by the end of the year (September 2004), www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ae6a6200.
pdf (accessed 27 Apr. 2018).
132 Lari, Andrea, ‘Returning home to a normal life? The plight of Angola’s internally displaced’, ISS Paper 85, Pretoria: ISS (February 2004), p. 2.
133 IDMC, Angola: Former IDPs share the common challenge of recovery and reconstruction, 12 December 2007, pp.  4–5, <http://www.internal-
displacement.org/countries/angola (accessed 27 Apr. 2018).
134 Ibid. 
135 Oliver Sykes, Vulnerabilidade rural, alterações climáticas y adaptação em Angola, Christian Aid, June 2013, p. 17.
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Lubango, Huambo and Malange; an increase in rainfall in the north of Angola; changes in ocean 
currents; an increase in average sea levels leading to changes in erosion and sedimentation; 
changes in river currents, leading to modified erosion and sedimentation patterns; change of 
temperature in lagoons.136
It is estimated that as a consequence of some of these phenomena, around 431,000 Angolans have been displaced 
between 2008 and 2012.137 Furthermore, available data and projections138 suggest that unless necessary adaptation 
and mitigation measures are taken, the scale of environmental displacement in Angola tends to increase.
Angola’s ratification of the Kampala Convention on 14 May 2013 is good news and a demonstration of the willingness 
of national authorities to be legally bound to prevent forced displacement and protect their citizens from it. This task 
requires, among other measures, the implementation of the aforementioned NAPA, as well as the elaboration of a 
National Disaster Risk Reduction Plan, which Angola still lacks. Equally commendable, in this regard, is the effective 
execution of the National Action Programme to Combat Desertification, adopted by the Government in June 2015, in 
compliance with the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought 
and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa (UNCCD).139
Certainly, Angola’s commitment to environmental and climate change issues is evident in the large number of relevant 
international legal instruments (treaties and agreements) to which the country is or in the process of becoming a 
party.140 Meanwhile, although all this indicates progress – at least on paper – in relation to the prevention and protection 
against environmental displacement in the country, there is still a great need to define and promote a national legal 
and political framework that, under the Kampala Convention, seriously takes this problem and its complexity in current 
and future development context of the country, where socio-political and economic vulnerabilities may easily be 
exacerbate by the impacts of climate change.
It should be noted that, although the Angolan law on internal displacement was considered by many to be ‘excellent’,141 
its implementation was fraught with profound irregularities and contradictions, having led to the worsening of the 
vulnerability and helplessness of many IDPs. Many of them were involuntarily resettled, exposed to landmines, severe 
weather events and deprived of basic social infrastructure and services. Many others remained or returned to the urban 
suburbs, mainly in the capital Luanda, where they remain trapped in chronic and intergenerational poverty.
Linked, therefore, to the mismanagement of the end of war-induced displacement factors such as persistent poverty, 
scandalous social-economic inequality, growing land speculation, exclusionary development projects, as well as 
extreme environmental events related to climate change are banishing large numbers of Angolans, turning many of 
the former war-IDPs into ‘development-induced displaced persons’ and/or environmental IDPs.
The domestication, operationalisation and implementation of the Kampala Convention in Angola should translate into 
a strong multi-level commitment of the State to this present and future challenge, subsuming the existing Norms on 
the Resettlement of Displaced Populations into a new and comprehensive legal and policy framework, which should 
merit a systematic and effective budgetary allocation. So far there is no sign in this direction. Preventing environmental 
displacement and protecting the victims in accordance with the Kampala Convention remains a real pending issue in 
Angola.
Conclusion
Is the implementation of the Kampala Convention effective in protecting IDPs by disasters and climate change?
The response to this apparently simple question has been far from straightforward. First, it has required taking an 
overview of the African context of internal displacement, with special mention to disasters and climate change as 
growing major drivers of such displacement, as well as to the provisions of the convention in this regard. Secondly, 
I reviewed and delved into the ongoing academic debate around the nexus between climate change and human 
mobility, and also the evolving of international legal and political system in addressing protection needs of IDPs in 
context of disasters related to climate change. Finally, the process of domestication and implementation of the said 
convention was examined, seeking its holistic character and, therefore, the effective attention that it dedicates to 
environmental IDPs.
The Kampala Convention clearly establishes the responsibilities of governments to protect people displaced by natural 
and human-made disasters, including climate change, and take measures to prevent and mitigate such displacement. 
Roughly five years since it came into force, challenges for its full implementation remain. Arguably, remarkable 
efforts have been made in this regard. However, its concrete impact on enhancing protection of and assistance to 
IDPs due to disasters and climate change is still imperceptible. Much needs to be done to achieve the adoption of 
136 Government of Angola, Angola National Adaptation Programme of Action under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Luanda, December 2011, p. 89.
137 AU / NRC, The Kampala Convention. One year on: Progress and prospects,(Geneva: IDMC, October 2013), p. 28.
138 Sykes, Vulnerabilidade rural, alterações climáticas.
139 Adopted in June 1994, it entered into force on 26 December 1996 and was ratified by Angola on 30 June 1997.
140 Governo de Angola, Minitério do Urbanismo e Ambiente, Relatório do Estado Geral do Ambiente em Angola, 2006, capítulo 5, pp. 29–34.
141 HRW, ‘Coming Home: Return and Reintegration in Angola’, Human Rights Watch, March 2005, 17, no.2(A).
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disaster preparedness and disaster management laws, and ensure that existing laws on disaster preparedness are 
comprehensive in nature, so as they encompass disaster risk reduction and management. Efforts are required to 
introduce proactive strategies to prevent or minimise displacement, and planned relocations, when appropriate, as 
well as the adoption of pre-emptive internal migration, which should be based on sound national policies and used as 
a coping or adaptive mechanism in the case of slow-onset disasters, and which should lead to durable solutions.
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Abstract:
This paper aims to concretise climate change adaptation obligations in the context of international migration. The 
movement of individuals and entire communities is predicted to be one of the gravest consequences of climate 
change. Migration is one form of response that has the potential to be both benefi cial and destructive for those facing 
the impacts of climate change. Managed migration is also a process states will likely initiate. This could take advantage 
of the opportunity to plan for predicted impacts, but it will also risk substantial human suff ering – especially in states 
that have poor human rights records. Until now, however, the nature of state obligations and responsibilities to adapt 
or assist others with adaptation has not been given suffi  cient consideration, particularly in the context of migration.
There are three adaptation obligations – of action, assistance, and cooperation – established by the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Every United Nations member state is a party to the UNFCCC, 
which means that these obligations are potentially powerful tools in the eff ort to address the impacts of climate change, 
including through migration. Yet the UNFCCC and climate change regime provide little guidance as to the meaning 
of these obligations. This paper therefore argues for the integration and application of other rules and principles of 
international law in the interpretation and implementation of adaptation obligations. By drawing on human rights 
law, principles of environmental law, guidance on resettlement and relocation, and work done by the Nansen Initiative, 
this paper seeks to develop and clarify the adaptation obligations of both countries of origin and destination for 
international migration.
Keywords
climate change adaptation, migration and displacement, human rights law, treaty interpretation, public international 
law
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I. Introduction
Climate change is causing or contributing to an increase in the frequency and intensity of climate events. These events 
and their impacts, along with some measures undertaken by states in response to climate change, adversely affect the 
livelihoods and human rights of growing number of individuals and communities. These adverse impacts, combined 
with existing vulnerabilities and other socio-economic conditions, serve as drivers in an expected increase in the 
movement of people. Such movement has long prompted concern; in its first report in 1990, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) warned that the ‘gravest effects’ of climate change may be those on migration, 
predicting that millions might migrate due to coastal flooding, shoreline erosion, and agricultural disruption.1 In 
response, some scholars and international organisations have sought to develop new legal categories of persons or 
proposed new legal agreements or frameworks to provide protection for those who will move in the context of climate 
change.2 These efforts have thus far failed.
Instead of offering a variation on attempts to create new legal vehicle or category, this paper builds on developments 
within the climate change regime.3 It aims to take advantage of the ‘opportunity’ climate change offers to bring 
migration protection to the forefront in international discussions.4 Within the regime, the connection between climate 
change and migration has been recognised by decisions of the Conference of the Parties (COP),5 the Paris Agreement,6 
and ongoing work of various committees.7
The climate change regime also creates legal obligations for states, although it does not specifically link these 
obligations to migration: states have legal obligations to prevent, to mitigate, and to adapt to the impacts of climate 
change.8 The focus on reaching an agreement to reduce emissions has led to more development of the obligations 
related to mitigation and prevention. But with growing understanding about the impacts of climate change and their 
occurrence, and the knowledge that at least some of these impacts will occur even in best-case scenarios, adaptation 
efforts have become increasingly important. As this paper argues, if clarified, obligations related to adaptation have 
the potential to be a powerful source of protection for persons affected by climate change, including those who move.
This paper therefore focuses on the obligations related to adaptation within the climate change regime. It identifies 
three adaptation obligations – the obligation to facilitate adequate adaptation, to assist, and to cooperate – and seeks 
to concretise these obligations in the context of international migration.9 To accomplish this concretisation, this paper 
integrates other rules and principles of international law in the interpretation and implementation of adaptation 
obligations. Integration is more than recognising that other international law rules or general principles apply alongside 
climate change agreements. It is, instead, an understanding of these obligations in their normative context, which 
includes other principles and rules of international law. These other principles and rules must be accounted for as a 
matter of treaty interpretation.10 They can also be used to provide content and clarify adaptation obligations.11
The approach in this paper represents an attempt to work with existing and evolving legal tools. This is intended as a 
starting point, and not a holistic solution. And while the analysis bears in mind the call to return to first principles, and 
1 IPCC, ‘Climate Change: The 1990 and 1992 IPCC Assessments, IPCC First Assessment Report Overview and Policymaker Summaries and 1992 
IPCC Supplement’ (IPCC, 1992).
2 For example, the 2011 attempt by UNHCR to introduce such a framework failed due to ‘a lack of willingness by a majority of governments, 
whether from reasons of sovereignty, competing priorities or the lead role of UNHCR in the process’ (Walter Kälin, ‘From the Nansen Principles 
to the Nansen Initiative’, Forced Migration Review, 41 (2012), pp. 48, 49); see Jane McAdam, ‘From the Nansen Initiative to the platform on disaster 
displacement: shaping international approaches to climate change, disasters and displacement’, University of New South Wales Law Journal, 39 (2016), 
pp. 1518, 1521.
3 The climate change regime refers to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), subsequent agreements 
– including the Paris Agreement – and decisions of the Conference of the Parties, and the institutions that develop rules and implement 
agreements.
4 See Benoît Mayer and Christel Cournil, ‘Climate change, migration and human rights: towards group-specific protection?’, in Ottavio Quirico 
and Mouloud Boumghar (eds), Climate Change and Human Rights: An International and Comparative Law Perspective (Routledge, 2015), p. 185.
5 Within the UNFCCC, the Cancun Adaptation Framework was the first output of the COP to recognise the issue. It invited all parties to take 
‘measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned 
relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels’ (UNFCCC COP, ‘Outcome of the work of the ad hoc working group on 
long-term cooperative action under the Convention (Cancun Agreements)’ (2010) FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add1 para 14(f )).
6 The preamble of the Paris Agreement suggests that parties should consider their human rights obligations to migrants when taking action to 
address climate change (Adoption of the Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015 (FCCC/CP/2015/L9/Rev1) preamble).
7 Parties at the Paris COP 21 also requested that the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) establish a task force to 
develop recommendations and approaches on displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change (UNFCCC COP, ‘Addendum, Part Two: 
Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Twenty-First Session, Decision 1/CP.21’ (2016) FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 21 para 39). The work of 
the task force is ongoing, and includes analysis of migration, displacement and planned relocation.
8 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 (1771 UNTS 107; S Treaty Doc No 102–38; UN Doc A/AC237/18 (Part II)/
Add1; 31 ILM 849) art 4 ; Paris Agreement, arts 4, 6, 7.
9 While the focus of this paper is on cross-border migration, these obligations can also be concretised as applied to internal migration. The 
author is addressing both international and internal migration in her doctoral research.
10 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (1155 UNTS 331) art 31.
11 See ILC, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law; Report of the Study 
Group of the International Law Commission, Finalised by Martti Koskenniemi’ (ILC 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 209 para 415; Campbell McLachlan, 
‘The principle of systemic integration and Article 31(3)(C) of the Vienna Convention’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 54 (2005), pp. 279, 
312; Richard K Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 320–21.
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warning that the use of existing legal tools might constrain thinking, it also takes seriously requests by some states and 
international actors to find solutions using existing law.12
The arguments presented in this paper also aim to be consistent with a shift in focus away from protection based on the 
categorisation of migrants and to the ‘drivers of movement, human needs, and how movement is playing out in different 
forms’.13 It is thus premised on the impacts of climate change continuing to play a key but not necessarily exclusive role 
in whether an individual moves. Moreover, as discussed below, a focus on adaptation avoids the retroactive focus on 
labelling migrants for the purposes of protection and the need for a new instrument.14
In order to ensure conceptual clarity, Section II of this paper first introduces key concepts and explains terminological 
choices. Because the subsequent legal analysis will refer to specific forms of migration and their attendant legal 
complexities, this section also includes a discussion of human mobility in the context of climate change. While sudden 
onset events are briefly discussed in this section, the analytical focus of this paper is on slow onset events, because (1) 
the longer time scale of their occurrence lends itself well to planning and preparation – and hence adaptation; (2) there 
is more uncertainty about sources of protection for migration across borders for those leaving areas impacted by slow 
onset events; (3) current humanitarian responses and work being done on disaster displacement and risk reduction 
aligns better with movement triggered by sudden onset events, leaving a bigger protection gap for slow onset events; 
and (4) migration as adaptation tends to be associated with slow onset events. Slow onset events are considered a 
greater challenge to fit into current legal frameworks, in part, due to this final factor; departure is perceived to be 
voluntary15 – migration as adaptation – and thus is not captured by protection frameworks based on forced movement.
Section III then discusses legal gaps in protection, with a particular focus on attempts to extend refugee protections to 
those who move in the context of climate change. This section confirms the need for legal approaches that can support 
the protection of those who move in the context climate change, but which do not rely on creating a new form of 
protected status for individual persons. Section IV develops the argument for adaptation obligations and international 
mobility. It looks, in part, to areas of law discussed in Section III that, in isolation, are insufficient to protect people on 
the move in the context of climate change – and applies them to migration as adaptation. Section IV begins with the 
obligations of a country of origin. It then turns to the obligations of receiving states, as well as obligations that are 
collective. The paper concludes with a discussion of what meeting these some of these obligations might entail.
II. Key concepts
1. Terminology
The discourse about climate change and human mobility includes wide range of terminology that defines and 
characterises movement and its causes. Confusion is created by the use of overlapping terms, and the lack of a 
universal legal definition or way to describe people who move in the context of climate change. Within the climate 
change regime, for example, movement has been categorised as ‘climate change induced displacement, migration 
and planned relocation’.16 Displacement is generally thought to be movement that is forced or compelled, whereas 
migration is considered a predominately voluntary form of mobility. However, movement does not fit neatly into 
categories but rather is understood as part of a continuum with most movement falling somewhere between entirely 
forced or voluntary.
Multiple factors contribute to whether a person moves from their place of residence.17 This includes environmental 
change, which can influence migration directly, or indirectly through impacts upon other drivers.18 The analytic focus 
of this paper is on adaptation, with the goal to facilitate voluntary, informed and enabled movement. Such movement, 
however, will not necessarily occur without other compelling or external drivers; rather it reflects an effort to seek 
opportunities elsewhere in order to build resilience or avoid significant or further harm before it occurs. Thus, this 
paper primarily uses the term migration to refer to various forms of movement in the context of climate change. 
12 Contra McAdam, ‘From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement’, p. 1539; to The Nansen Initiative, ‘Global Consultation 
Conference Report: Geneva, 12–13 October 2015’ (2015) 110–11, 140 (statements made by EU and Lesotho delegation representatives); IOM, ‘No. 18 
International Dialogue on Migration: Climate Change, Environmental Degradation, and Migration’ (2012), p. 30.
13 McAdam, ‘From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement’, p. 1540.
14 For criticisms of a new agreement or mechanism, see Jane McAdam, ‘Swimming against the tide: why a climate change displacement treaty 
is not the answer’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 23 (2011); Walter Kälin and Nina Schrepfer, Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of 
Climate Change: Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches (UNHCR 2012).
15 See The Nansen Initiative, ‘Agenda for the protection of cross-border displaced persons in the context of disasters and climate change’ (The 
Nansen Initiative 2015), vol 1, p. 24 para 36.
16 UNFCCC COP, para 14(f ); see also The Nansen Initiative, ‘Nansen Protection Agenda Vol 1’ (gathering information and best practices on these 
three forms of mobility); Koko Warner and others, ‘Changing climate, moving people: framing migration, displacement and planned relocation’ (UNU-
EHS 2013) Policy Brief No 8 (noting that the needs of persons under each of these categories of mobility differs).
17 See Kälin and Schrepfer, Protecting People Crossing Borders, 22; Warner and others, ‘Changing climate, moving people’, p. 40; OHCHR, ‘Protection 
of the human rights of migrants: strengthening the promotion and protection of the human rights of migrants, including in large movements’ (2016) 
A/HRC/RES/32/14 Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council para 7.
18 See François Gemenne, ‘Migration doesn’t have to be a failure to adapt’, in Jean Palutikof and others (eds), Climate Adaptation Futures 
(John Wiley & Sons, 2013), p. 235; Susan Martin, Sanjula Weerasinghe and Abbie Taylor, ‘What is crisis migration?’, Forced Migration Review, 45 
(2014), p. 6.
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Displacement and planned relocation will also be discussed, as their use in other legal guidance and forums to describe 
forced movement is relevant.19
This paper analyses migration associated with climate events. These events are generally distinguished by the rate at 
which they occur. Sudden onset events tend to be discrete and last for a matter of hours or days. In contrast, slow-onset 
events create incremental change that alters the natural environment over a course of months to many years.20 Slow 
onset events include increasing temperatures, sea level rise, ocean acidification, glacial retreat, salinization, land and 
forest degradation, loss of biodiversity, and desertification.21 Sudden and slow onset events do not always act as drivers 
of movement in isolation, but interact with one another and other factors to influence migration. For example, while 
sea level rise may gradually erode coastal land, it may be an increase in storm surges and salinization that leads people 
to move away from the area.
A few spatial and temporal considerations will also factor into the migration analysed in this paper. First, migration has 
long been a form of adaptation, although its perception as a failure to adapt presents practical challenges in pushing 
for its use as an adaptation measure.22 Second, as previous studies of migration related to environmental change 
indicate, most people initially move internally.23 Likewise, in the context of climate change, most migrants are expected 
to remain within a country.24 Planned relocation will also generally be internal. International movement and relocation, 
however, will occur. This creates the need for responses from both the country of origin and destination, which are the 
focus of this paper. Finally, adaptation is a response that can either seek to avoid impacts or mitigate the harm after it 
occurs. Movement as a form of adaptation can also address impacts before or after they occur.
2. Vulnerability and the multi-causality of migration
This paper is premised on several conclusions about climate change and the nature of migration. The first conclusion 
is about the multi-causality of most migration. While the primary reason for migration may be environmental change 
(some sudden onset events for example), it is often the result of the interaction multiple factors. These include 
individual vulnerabilities and preferences and social, economic, political and demographic factors. These factors may 
change over time, and include age, gender, ethnicity, livelihood and income, governance structures, insecurity and 
exposure to hazards.25 A person’s vulnerability, or propensity to be adversely affected by climate change,26 can also 
shift as their individual experiences or the broader context changes. The impacts of climate change disproportionately 
affect those already marginalised or facing discrimination,27 and this in turn can increase the pressure to migrate. Yet 
while vulnerability and environmental change can result in migration, it may also lead others to stay out of choice or 
necessity.28 Without state intervention, international migration tends only to be possible for those who have the means 
to travel over longer distances.
Those who move out of necessity rather than choice face increased risk of human rights violations.29 The conditions 
migrants face can exacerbate vulnerabilities, and put rights at risk in transit, crossing borders, and upon arrival. An 
international law system that enables these conditions and other barriers to entry, and which does not include a 
general right to enter a foreign country, further contributes to these risks.30
19 The Nansen Initiative Protection Agenda, for example, describes ‘disaster displacement’ as the forced or obliged departure of people from 
their homes as a result of natural disasters or to avoid the immediate and foreseeable impacts of a natural hazard. See The Nansen Initiative, ‘Nansen 
Protection Agenda Vol 1’, 16 para 16; see also Jane McAdam and Elizabeth Ferris, ‘Planned relocations in the context of climate change: unpacking 
the legal and conceptual issues’, Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law (2015), pp. 140–41 (discussing meaning of ‘relocation’ and 
‘resettlement’).
20 See UNFCCC, ‘Slow Onset Events – Technical Paper’ (2012) FCCC/TP/2012/7.
21 The COP considers these events as slow onset.See ibid., paras 26–49; UNFCCC COP, para 25.
22 See François Gemenne and Julia Blocher, ‘How can migration support adaptation? Different options to test the migration-adaptation nexus’ 
(IOM Working Paper Series no. 1, 2016), http://environmentalmigration.iom.int/migration-environment-and-climate-change-working-paper-series-
no-12016 (accessed 28 March 2017).
23 See Gemenne, ‘Migration doesn’t have to be a failure to adapt’, p. 238; Koko Warner and Tamer Afifi, ‘Enhancing adaptation options and 
managing human mobility: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’, Social Research: An International Quarterly, 81 (2014), p. 
307.
24 See, e.g., Chaloka Beyani, ‘Protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons: report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights 
of Internally Displaced Persons’ (United Nations 2011) A/66/285 para 19.
25 See Foresight, ‘Migration and global environmental change’ (UK Government Office for Science 2011) Final Project Report 11–12; OHCHR 
and Global Migration Group, ‘Principles and guidelines, supported by practical guidance, on the human rights protection of migrants in vulnerable 
situations – draft’ (2017).
26 GIPCC, ‘Annex II: Glossary’, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014), p. 128.
27 See UNFCCC COP preamble.
28 See Foresight, ‘Migration and global environmental change’, pp. 9, 12; Gemenne and Blocher, ‘How can migration support adaptation’, p. 5 
(stress on resources might reduce ability to move).
29 See OHCHR, ‘Situation of migrants in transit’ (2016) para 11.
30 See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, ‘Migration emergencies’, Hastings Law Journal, 68 (2017), pp. 609–26.
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3. Examples of mobility in the context of climate change
The connection between climate change and migration has been the subject of numerous predictions, which has 
prompted discussion about the implications of this relationship and potential responses. These discussions are 
important to advance potential protections for those who will move. However, sweeping estimates that attribute 
environmental or climate factors as the cause of future mobility are now met with scepticism.31 This is due in part to 
the multi-causality of migration, which makes it difficult to isolate environmental change – and slow onset processes in 
particular – as a driver of migration.32 Anticipating migration is also contingent: what occurs in the future will be greatly 
influenced by how humanity chooses to respond to climate change, now and in the coming years. Yet the impacts of 
climate change are and will continue to be a key driver in migration, which under some conditions can serve as an 
adaptation strategy.33
A few concrete examples illustrate how this might occur, and provide context for the legal analysis to come. Sea level 
rise is a paradigmatic example of a slow onset event that will likely have significant impacts on human mobility. An 
increase in global temperatures will cause sea level rise, although how much will depend on the increase. The IPCC 
predicts that temperatures will increase, and that absent mitigation global temperatures will rise by more than 1.5°C 
by the end of the century, and by more than 2°C without any intervention.34 This could lead to a global mean sea level 
rise somewhere between 0.26 and 0.82 metres above 1986 to 2005 levels by the end of the century.35 Ice sheet loss 
and sea level rise are expected to cause low-lying areas to experience adverse impacts, including submergence, coastal 
flooding, and erosion.36
For a state like Bangladesh, for example, where nearly one-quarter of the country is less than seven feet above sea level, 
and two-thirds is less than 15 feet above, there is a risk to a significant portion of the population. If the sea level rises 
by one metre, this could affect 18 to 20 per cent of the state’s total land mass and leave up to an estimated 15 million 
people without homes.37 Challenges from sea level rise are compounded by expected increases in river flooding, more 
intense tropical storms, soaring temperatures, and declining crop yields and availability of clean water.38 These impacts 
will disrupt livelihoods, affect health, and increases a risk of injury and death.39
This leaves affected persons and the state several options: to adapt and build resilience in order to stay; to migrate in 
advance of the most severe impacts; to wait and potentially face displacement; or to undertake a planned relocation. 
Given the predicted impacts, if there is not a state response to facilitate migration or relocation, then there will be people 
in impacted areas that will be forced to move. Furthermore, while migration may initially be internal, international 
movement will become increasingly likely as the impacts of climate change render more of a country uninhabitable or 
incapable of consistent agricultural outputs that many depend on for food and livelihoods, and as internal migration 
pushes those who can move abroad out of the country.40 Migrants are also more likely to cross borders if they are not 
provided with adequate protection, assistance, and durable solutions within their own country.
Sea level rise also threatens the territorial integrity of small island states. It can lead to submergence of land and 
saltwater intrusion of aquifers, and combine with storm surges and other environmental changes to affect migration. 
In this context, the need for international mobility options has been a focus of government delegations and academic 
analysis.41 This has raised questions about planned relocation, potential statelessness, and governance.42 Yet, even 
within some of these states, those living on outer islands are likely to move internally before pursuing options overseas. 
The international movement that does occur is likely to be planned and pre-emptive, which will require cooperation 
with other states.43
31 See, e.g., Stephen Castles, ‘Afterword: What now? climate-induced displacement after Copenhagen’, in Jane McAdam (ed), Climate Change and 
Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2010), p. 242.
32 The lack of data on migration related to environmental changes makes predictions difficult, particularly for slow onset events. See Dina Ionesco, 
Daria Mokhnacheva and François Gemenne, The Atlas of Environmental Migration (Routledge, 2016), p. 12.
33 See, e.g., IPCC, ‘Summary for policymakers’, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. 
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 20.
34 The IPCC has high confidence in these predictions. IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to 
the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’ (IPCC, 2014), p. 10.
35 Ibid, p. 13.
36 IPCC, ‘Summary for policymakers’, p. 17.
37 See The World Bank, Bangladesh – climate change and sustainable development (The World Bank, 2000), p.  40; Sonja Butzengeiger and 
Britta Horstmann, ‘Sea-level rise in Bangladesh and the Netherlands: one phenomenon, many consequences’ (Germanwatch, 2004), p. 6, https://
germanwatch.org/en/2755 (accessed 2 May 2017).
38 See The World Bank, ‘Turn down the heat: climate extremes, regional impacts, and the case for resilience’ (2013), pp. 110, 119.
39 See IPCC, ‘Summary for policymakers’, p. 13.
40 Rice production in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Delta region of Bangladesh, for example, accounts for 34% of national production that 
is exclusively used for domestic consumption. Much of this area is less than five metres above and at risk from rising sea levels (see The World Bank, 
‘Turn down the heat’, p. 129). See also Jane McAdam (ed), Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 
171–2 (while climate-related migration will mainly be internal, this might have a ‘domino’ effect that will push those with means to migrate abroad).
41 See, e.g., Jane McAdam, ‘“Disappearing States”, statelessness and the boundaries of international law’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Climate Change 
and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2010), pp. 121–6 (describing occasions when small island states raise relocation in 
context of climate change, as well as historical challenges with its use).
42 McAdam, ‘“Disappearing States”’; McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, pp. 119–60.
43 See McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, pp. 93–4.
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Desertification and other climate events will likewise exacerbate existing socio-economic vulnerabilities. Water 
availability is crucial; and during periods of long-time drought will make accessing the resources necessary to subsist 
increasingly difficult. In the Sahel region, for example, drought and environmental changes already cause seasonal 
migrations of agricultural workers and pastoralists.44 The region is also experiencing changes in rainfall patterns that 
have also caused heavy flooding. The existing patterns of migration in the region, which have been established over 
many years, can provide information on how those facing the impacts of climate change will move.45 The stressors from 
climate change, however, are compelling movement that is no longer part of a regular pattern of building resilience but 
rather a negative means to cope with increasing vulnerabilities.46
As these examples indicate, movement related to climate events will not occur as a single or uniform phenomenon. 
There will be a number of different scenarios, with contextual factors that require consideration in responses.47 Yet 
these factors need not be in tension with the analytic project of this paper. Thus, an effort to find a way to legally 
ground movement as adaptation can include obligations that are consistent across states, while remaining flexible 
enough to account for contextual differences.
III. Legal gaps in protection for cross-border migration
This section will briefly discuss current legal protection frameworks and their shortcomings as applied to movement 
related climate change. It will not go into great detail about the legal gaps created by current protection frameworks, 
as this has been done well elsewhere.48 A summary is necessary, however, to establish the extent that these frameworks 
provide protection – if at all – and how these areas of law might interact with adaptation obligations. It also establishes 
the need for new approaches to fill the gap in protection, which the rest of this paper seeks to explore.
1. Challenges and gaps in legal protection
There are several international legal frameworks that are relevant to migration and climate change: refugee law, law 
on statelessness, human rights law, and the climate change regime. The use of these frameworks to provide protection 
to migrants is limited. Those who migrate or are displaced in the wake of a climate event will not generally qualify as a 
refugee under the definition of the 1951 Refugee Convention.49 There will, however, be cases where discrimination or 
persecution occurs on a protected ground in the context of climate change. Thus, if a state discriminates in its provision 
of protection from or assistance after a climate event, this could create the circumstances necessary to meet the refugee 
definition. Gender-based violence and discrimination could also increase in the aftermath of climate disasters.50 In such 
cases, however, the trigger for protection is not the climate event itself, but the discrimination that followed.51 If the 
refugee definition is interpreted broadly, any movement resulting from the social position of an individual, which is 
based on discriminatory state policies or actions, could also allow for a refugee claim.52
Similarly, international law on statelessness will not provide most migrants protection. As discussed above, populations 
of small island states are likely to move before territory disappears or the state ceases to exist, and most of those 
who move will not fit the definition of a stateless person.53 The situation of these states is unprecedented; a shift in 
government is not contemplated or wanted, and even when certain criteria of statehood are not met, international law 
presumes the continuity of states.54
44 See Richard Black, Dominic Kniveton and Kerstin Schmidt-Verkerk, ‘Migration and climate change: toward an integrated assessment of 
sensitivity’ in Thomas Faist and Jeanette Schade (eds.), Disentangling Migration and Climate Change: Methodologies, Political Discourses and Human 
Rights (Springer Netherlands, 2013), p. 35.
45 See ibid 37; see also ‘Climate change, environment and migration in the Sahel’ (Micle 2012), www.micle-project.net/news.18.0.html?&L=2&tx_
ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=53&cHash=af2e0ced92447b 3cfd9d311ed573e936 (accessed 3 May 2017); UNEP, ‘Livelihood security: climate change, 
migration and conflict in the Sahel’ (UNEP 2011) 22–47, http://drustage.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/livelihood-security-climate-change-
migration-and-conflict-sahel (accessed 3 May 2017).
46 See, e.g., Alice Thomas, ‘Sahel villagers fleeing climate change must not be ignored’, The Guardian, 2 August 2013, www.theguardian.com/
global-development/poverty-matters/2013/aug/02/sahel-climate-change-displacement-migration (accessed 3 May 2017) (describing recurrent 
crises of droughts and flooding forcing people to move in the Sahel).
47 For an overview of displacement scenarios from climate events (sudden, slow-onset), the case of small island states, high risk areas within 
a state, and climate-induced unrest, see Walter Kälin, ‘Conceptualising climate-induced displacement’ in Jane McAdam (ed.), Climate Change and 
Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2010).
48 See, e.g., McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law; Ben Boer, ‘Climate change and human rights in the Asia-Pacific – a 
fragmented approach’ in Ottavio Quirico and Mouloud Boumghar (eds.), Climate Change and Human Rights: An International and Comparative Law 
Perspective (Routledge, 2015); Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Lavanya Rajamani, International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press 
2017) (forthcoming).
49 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1967.
50 See Elizabeth Ferris, ‘Disasters and displacement: what we know, what we don’t know’ (Brookings Institute, 2014), www.brookings.edu/blog/
planetpolicy/2014/06/09/disasters-and-displacement-what-we-know-what-we-dont-know/ (accessed 25 March 2017).
51 See McAdam, ‘From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement’, p. 1535; Ioane Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of 
Business, Innovation and Employment (2015) [2015] NZSC 107 para 25, 27; AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413 (Immigration and Protection Tribunal New 
Zealand) para 64 (application of Refugee Convention determined on a case by case basis).
52 Discussion with Professor James Hathaway, University of Michigan, October 2016 (notes on file with author).
53 See Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 28 September 1954.
54 For more on statelessness and climate change see McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, pp. 138–43; Mayer and 
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International human rights law will play an important role in providing protection for migrants. However, there are 
several challenges to accessing human rights as a direct source of protection for international migrants. The first 
is an issue of admittance. Under current international law, a migrant seeking to enter a state not his or her own 
must either be admitted at the discretion of that state or because the principle of non-refoulement legally binds the 
state not to expel or return a person who is a refugee or who would face arbitrary deprivation of life, torture, or 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.55 The latter prohibition is a cornerstone of complementary protection – a 
reference to the human rights-based protections that complement those provided by the Refugee Convention.56 The 
impacts of climate change are predicted to reach this threshold, where life is at risk or cruel, inhuman and degrading 
and inhuman treatment is likely upon return. Regional case law has interpreted the obligation to protect life to 
apply in the context of natural disasters, requiring a state to implement warning or defence systems for foreseeable 
disasters.57 This could be extended to prevent removal to a state that has failed to account for or mitigate harm from 
such disasters.58 To date, however, courts have not seen the threat of climate change as sufficiently severe enough to 
trigger non-refoulement obligations.59 Furthermore, inhuman and degrading treatment tends to require a state action 
or omission, and the general poverty or poor conditions a migrant may face upon return are generally insufficient to 
prevent removal.60
The second challenge is the accessibility of rights. All persons under a state’s jurisdiction, including international 
migrants, are entitled to human rights. Human rights apply universally, and are interdependent; yet there is often a 
lack of ‘focused protection’ that makes accessing rights difficult.61 The positive aspects of human rights obligations 
may be difficult to enforce, and the remedial nature of mechanisms that focus on violations may offer recourse too late 
for those in need of protection in the context of climate change. Indeed, as the analysis of adaptation obligations will 
make clear, impacts to the enjoyment of human rights caused by climate change do not automatically equate with a 
violation of an obligation.62 Moreover, a right may involve several obligations, including obligations to protect, respect, 
and fulfil that right. Thus, a government must not act in a way that violates human rights when responding to climate 
change, but it may be able to satisfy its human rights obligations in a number of different ways.63
In summary, to gain protection under current frameworks, a migrant must either fall under a legal category (refugee 
or stateless person) or be at grave risk upon return (complementary protection). These determinations are made after 
movement, with protection afforded to those forced to flee their country.64 Much of the movement discussed in this 
paper will occur in anticipation of significant impacts from climate change, and even when not entirely voluntary, will 
not fit into any existing migration category. Thus, significant protection gap remain – especially for people who cross 
international borders.
2. Migration policies and barriers to entry
The primary gaps in legal protection for international migrants come at the border and upon entry into another state. 
International law currently lacks legal obligations or clarity regarding admission into a country for most migrants, 
access to basic services upon arrival, legal status during one’s stay, and conditions for return.65 As discussed above, it 
may, in specific circumstances prevent return, but access to another state’s territory is not clearly mandated. There are 
also no specific obligations that address cross-border movement in response to natural disasters or impacts linked to 
climate change, including slow onset events.66 This enables migration policies and practices that criminalise entry or 
Cournil, ‘Climate change, migration and human rights’, pp. 180–1.
55 This principle can be derived from the language of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention Against 
Torture, and customary international law. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966 (United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol 999, 171) art 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 art 3; see also Elihu 
Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, ‘The scope and content of the principle of non-refoulement (Opinion)’,in Erika Feller, Volker Türk and Frances 
Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
pp. 151–8.
56 See McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, p. 53.
57 See Budayeva v Russia (Applications nos 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 15343/02) (ECtHR).
58 See McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, p. 60.
59 See, e.g., Ioane Teitiota v. The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, p. para 55.
60 See McAdam, ‘From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement’, pp. 1537–8.
61 See Stefan Gruber, ‘Human displacement and climate change in the Asia-Pacific’, in Ben Boer (ed), Environmental Law Dimensions of Human 
Rights (Oxford University Press, 2015)
62 Environmental pollution can prevent the enjoyment of a human right, but in order to constitute a violation, it must adversely affect a protected 
right rather than simply cause degradation of the environment. See Kyrtatos v Greece (Application no 41666/98) (ECtHR) para 52.
63 See Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani, International Climate Change Law.
64 This distinction is seen as important, as the international community ‘commonly acknowledged that those forced to leave their country face a 
heightened degree of vulnerability and thus have specific protection and assistance needs’. The Nansen Initiative, ‘Nansen Protection Agenda Vol 1’, 
p. 22 para [32].
65 See Jane McAdam and Marc Limon, ‘Human rights, climate change and cross-border displacement: the role of the international human rights 
community in contributing to effective and just solutions’ (Universal Rights Group 2015) Policy Report 18; The Nansen Initiative, ‘Nansen Protection 
Agenda Vol 1’.
66 See IOM, ‘Discussion Paper for WIM Technical Meeting: Synthesis of Relevant Information, Good Practices and Lessons Learned in Relation to 
Pillar 3: Enhancing Action and Support’ (2016).
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stay, border closures, pushbacks and other barriers to international migration. As a result, irregular migrants often face 
uncertain and dangerous conditions in transit and as they cross borders.67
The construction of international law and its current approach to migration has been criticised as contributing to so 
called ‘migration emergencies’, the result of a failure to effectively govern contemporary migration flows. Jaya Ramji-
Nogales highlights the way that law helps construct crisis, rather than how it responds to or is shaped by such crises.68 
In doing so, she explores examples where migration is the predicable outcome of an international legal framework 
that relies on the ‘path-dependent’ backward looking application of the refugee regime and the principle of non-
refoulement. Ramji-Nogales discounts the idea that migration emergencies or crises are always unpredictable and 
suggests a new approach – one that anticipates and addresses migration flows proactively to better ensure safe transit 
for migrants.69 Climate change lends itself well to such a new approach; its impacts possess an element of predictability 
that can be better managed with planning and cooperation.
IV. Adaptation obligations and international migration
1. Obligations of the state of origin
There are two primary obligations of the state of origin: to facilitate adequate adaptation and to cooperate in preparing 
for adaptation.
1.1. Obligation to facilitate adequate adaptation and plan for and implement adaptation actions
Under the UNFCCC, states ‘shall …(f)ormulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where 
appropriate, regional programmes containing…measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change’.70 The 
Paris Agreement builds on this, enhancing implementation of the UNFCCC’s overall objective by ‘[i]ncreasing the ability 
to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change’.71 It also establishes a ‘global goal on adaptation’ and creates a 
new legal obligation to plan for and implement adaptation actions.72 This requirement is softened, however, by the 
qualification that such planning and implementation is necessary ‘as appropriate’, which creates room for discretion 
in determining whether and how to meet this obligation.73 Yet adaptation can take different forms, and the generality 
also affords the opportunity to tailor actions to context, on the scale of international migration, or for specific instances 
of such migration.
a. Human rights law and the precautionary principle
To achieve such tailoring, the analysis turns next to how adaptation obligations relate to the cross-border scenarios 
introduced above. It answers this question in several ways: first, in the interpretation of any obligation, it is necessary 
to take the context of the treaty into account.74 The context includes the preamble, and the preamble of the Paris 
Agreement reminds parties of their human rights obligations when taking action to address climate change, specifically 
highlighting the rights of migrants.75 As a general matter, this means human rights must be considered in all migration 
related adaptation. This accords with the second tool to tailor adaptation to the migration context: the integration of 
human rights law as a relevant rule of international law.76
This integration has specific implications for the mobility that may arise in adaptation. An adaptation obligation combined 
with the integration of a relevant human rights law principle can result in the need to take a specific adaptation action, 
under circumstances that protect human rights. The state’s obligation to protect against arbitrary or forced migration 
provides a good example of this integration in practice. In some circumstances, where the expected impacts are likely 
to render other adaptation efforts insufficient, migration might be the appropriate adaptive response. This could be the 
case in parts of Bangladesh, where flooding begins to make land difficult to inhabit, or for small-island states, where 
sea level rise is expected to force mobility in the future. The inability to adapt in situ, combined with the obligation to 
protect against arbitrary displacement, could necessitate migration or planned relocation as and adaptation measure. 
Migration in this case would be a means to satisfy the obligation to plan for and implement adaptation, which becomes 
a necessary measure once the human rights based protection against arbitrary or forced displacement is integrated into 
the analysis. Thus, integration of a prohibition of arbitrary displacement into an understanding of adaptation obligations 
67 See OHCHR, ‘Situation of migrants in transit’, paras 12, 15.
68 See Ramji-Nogales, ‘Migration emergencies’.
69 Ibid., pp. 611–15.
70 UNFCCC, art 4.1(b) (emphasis added).
71 Paris Agreement, art 2.1(a).
72 Ibid., art 7.The article states that each party ‘shall, as appropriate, engage in adaptation planning processes and the implementation of 
actions, including the development or enhancement of relevant plans, policies and/or contributions, which may include: (a) The implementation of 
adaptation actions, undertakings and/or efforts….’, ibid. art 7.9.
73 See Lavanya Rajamani, ‘The 2015 Paris Agreement: interplay between hard, soft and non-obligations’, Journal of Environmental Law, 28 (2016), 
pp. 343, 352–3.
74 VCLT, art 31(2).
75 Paris Agreement, preamble.
76 VCLT, art 31(3).
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for a specific context – impending flooding in Bangladesh, or sea-level rise in small-island states – necessitates certain 
migration actions. These actions, in turn, should also comply with human rights.77
Human rights obligations may also create multiple duties that implicate a variety of different actions, much like 
adaptation obligations. For example, the prohibition on arbitrary displacement is partially derived from the freedom 
of movement and choice of residence owed to all lawfully within a state.78 This right may involve multiple duties: for 
the state of residence to respect an individual’s liberty of movement by avoiding any actions that might infringe on 
this right, and a positive duty to protect this right, especially if movement is also needed to access other human rights. 
These rights must be protected by the state of origin or residence, which has jurisdiction over and obligations to those 
within their territory. For international migration, individuals have a right to leave any country, which can only be 
limited when necessary to safeguard a state’s national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals, or 
rights and freedoms of others.79 There is also no corresponding right to enter another country. This presents a challenge 
in crossing a state border, which will be discussed in the next section. Thus, states must ensure the protection of liberty 
of movement, amongst other human rights of a migrant, up to the point that they reach and are seeking to cross an 
international border.
The precautionary principle provides further interpretive context for an understanding of adaptation obligations. 
The UNFCCC’s operative principles include an instruction that parties should take ‘precautionary measures’ to address 
climate change and ‘mitigate its adverse effects’; when impacts pose threats of serious or irreversible damage, such 
measures should not be postponed due to a lack of scientific certainty.80 These principles continue to apply to actions 
undertaken by parties, and the obligations contained in the Paris Agreement.81 Within the climate change regime, the 
precautionary principle is effectuated through concrete actions like adaptation. The principles contained in the UNFCCC 
do not create standalone obligations, but are linked to other obligations to provide guidance on how they should be 
implemented and understood. For adaptation obligations, the precautionary principle serves as a general catalyst for 
actions to adapt.82 The legal status of the precautionary principle as a norm of customary law is less certain.83 If it has 
risen to this level, then it further strengthens arguments for proactive adaptation. Its role within the regime, however, 
is clear: it is part of the treaty’s interpretive context, is included in the principles that guide the treaty’s implementation, 
and applies to adaptation measures.84
Taking a precautionary approach also addresses difficulties establishing human rights violations instead of accounting 
for risks to rights, and problems that arise in attributing causation for violations to those who have caused climate 
change. This analysis tends to happen after harm has occurred – which for those moving in the face of disasters and 
events related to climate change is often too late.85 Yet the dispositive question, as Special Rapporteur John Knox asks, 
is not whether impacts violate human rights, but which ‘human rights obligations provide important protection to the 
individuals whose rights are affected by climate change’.86
Interpreting adaptation obligations in a context that includes the principle, along with the integration of human 
rights law, could further strengthen arguments that states are obliged to facilitate migration with dignity and ensure 
meaningful and informed participation in any decision-making that affects migrants.87 Integration works with a variety 
of rights that are put at risk by foreseeable or actual impacts of climate change. Human rights obligations can assist 
in clarifying how much protection is needed and which measures to achieve this protection.88 Regional case law has 
already established that the right to life, for example, requires that governments regulate certain environmental risks 
and take positive actions to secure human rights.89
In Budayeva and others v. Russia, the European Court of Human Rights found that Russia had violated the right to 
life in its handling of a mudslide that killed eight people. The government was aware that there was a risk of such a 
77 See Paris Agreement preamble; see also infra.
78 ICCPR art 12; see UN Human Rights Committee, ‘CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement)’ (1999) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add.9 para 7 (right to reside in place of one’s choice includes protection against forced displacement).
79 ICCPR art 12(1), (3); but see Mayer and Cournil, ‘Climate change, migration and human rights’ (the necessary bases to limit freedom of movement 
and departure [e.g. national security, public order] are flexible); Bridget Lewis, ‘Balancing human rights in climate policies’, in Ottavio Quirico and 
Mouloud Boumghar (eds.), Climate Change and Human Rights: An International and Comparative Law Perspective (Routledge, 2015), p. 45.
80 UNFCCC art 3(3).
81 See Rajamani, ‘The 2015 Paris Agreement’, p. 342.
82 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 24–8.
83 See Nuclear Tests case (Request for an Examination of the Situation) (ICJ) paras 87, 91 (precautionary principle may now be customary international 
law relating to the environment); Roda Verheyen, Climate Change Damage And International Law: Prevention Duties And State Responsibility (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2005) 75 (considers the principle, as stated in the Rio Declaration, to be part of general customary international law).
84 See VCLT art 31(2) (context for treaty interpretation includes treaty text).
85 See OHCHR, ‘Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship between Climate Change 
and Human Rights’ (United Nations Human Rights Council 2009) A/HRC/10/61 para 70.
86 John H. Knox, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and 
sustainable environment’ (United Nations Human Rights Council 2016) A/HRC/31/52 para 36 (quoting OHCHR at para 71).
87 Human rights law should also be incorporated to ensure the human rights of migrants for any climate change related migration scenario. See 
OHCHR, ‘Key messages on human rights, climate change, and migration’ (2017).
88 See Knox, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations’, para 33.
89 See ibid., paras 37–39; Alan Boyle, ‘Human rights and the environment: where next?’, in Ben Boer (ed), Environmental Law Dimensions of Human 
Rights (Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 204.
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mudslide before it occurred, and it did not implement sufficient planning or relief policies or inform the public about 
the risk, even after the mudslide had begun.90 This case has parallels to climate change: the Russian government was 
not responsible for the mudslide; similarly, many developing countries including those in the concrete examples above 
(Bangladesh, small island states, countries in the Sahel) are not responsible for the events or disasters that contribute 
to risks to human rights. However, state governments in both cases are responsible for taking steps to safeguard the 
right to life. In Budayeva, the court found that a state’s general discretion to select what preventive measures should be 
undertaken to protect this right has limits; and taking no action is insufficient.91 Consequently, the right to life creates a 
positive obligation for states ‘to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their jurisdiction’.92
Domestic courts have made similar findings, as specifically applied to the risks created by climate change. The first case 
brought by citizens of a state to succeed in holding their government to account for climate change action was the 
Urgenda Foundation v. The State of the Netherlands case. It was also the first successful case that invoked human rights 
obligations and the precautionary principle: the court found the principles of the UNFCCC, namely the precautionary 
principle and inter and intra-generational equity, particularly relevant for establishing a duty of care and scope for 
climate policymaking. It also found the right to life relevant to the case, and it cited the recognition of human rights 
risks in the Cancun Agreements.93 In a different case a few months later, the Lahore High Court in Pakistan held that the 
government failed to implement its 2012 National Climate Policy and Framework. In doing so, the court declared that:
‘Climate change is a defining challenge of our time’ that for Pakistan ‘primarily resulted in heavy floods and droughts, 
raising serious concerns regarding water and food security. On a legal and constitutional plane this is clarion call for the 
protection of fundamental rights of the citizens of Pakistan, in particular, the vulnerable and weak segments of society 
who are unable to approach this Court.’94
The court cited the right to life, noted that this right includes the right to human dignity and a clean and healthy 
environment, and read these rights alongside Pakistan’s constitutional principles of equality, sustainable development, 
equity and the precautionary principle, amongst others. It also expanded its concern, from environmental justice to 
‘climate change justice’, which moves beyond localised and state bounded ecosystems and biodiversity.95 This implies 
a broader response, as well as action on the ground that prioritises adaptation.96
Other human rights can be integrated into an understanding of adaptation obligations, implemented through a 
precautionary approach. For example, rights to adequate housing, food, water, and the highest attainable standard 
of health are all put at risk by the impacts of climate change.97 Integration of obligations to protect, respect, and fulfil 
these rights might necessitate adaptation that includes migration or relocation in some contexts. For international 
migration, the confluence of these obligations and principles could necessitate state actions to facilitate adaptation 
across borders, or relocation to another state. The obligations of the state of origin, up to the border and aside from the 
cooperation required to implement such international migration, are the same as those owed to all migrants within 
their jurisdiction.
Planned relocation, however, is not an adaptive measure that has a strong human rights record. In the development 
context, relocation and resettlement have been used as a means to move individuals and communities away from 
areas where large-scale projects will be constructed. Without adequate planning and consideration of human rights 
greater suffering and impoverishment of relocated people is likely.98 Resettled communities are often worse off in their 
relocation site, although degraded land or impacts to living conditions from other climate related events may make 
remaining impossible or conditions elsewhere more promising.99 Most relocation will likely be internal. Yet, there will 
be impacts – like sea level rise for small island states – where international migration may be necessary. In the Pacific, as 
elsewhere, past planned relocations have serious consequences, which go beyond physical changes to affect identity 
and culture for many years after.100
These problems and the exacerbation of prior vulnerabilities and risks to human rights should make planned relocation 
a measure of last resort.101 Planned relocation must be undertaken with caution. The use of planned relocation as a 
form of adaptation, especially in a preventive rather than reactive manner, risks creating a justification for states to 
90 Budayeva v Russia (Applications nos. 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 15343/02).
91 Ibid., para 156.
92 Cyprus v Turkey, Merits, App no 25781/94 [2001] ECtHr 35 EHRR 30 para 219.
93 See Urgenda Foundation v The State of the Netherlands [2015] The Hague District Court C/09/456689/HA ZA 13–1396 paras 2.38, 2.49, 4.56. The 
court, however, focused on mitigation as the most effective tool because it considered adaptation unable to fully eliminate the danger of climate 
change (ibid., paras 4.71, 4.75).
94 Asghar Leghari v Federation of Pakistan [2015] Lahore High Court W.P. No. 25501/2015 para 6.
95 Ibid., para 7.
96 See Asghar Leghari v Federation of Pakistan (second order) [2015] Lahore High Court W.P. No. 25501/2015.
97 See OHCHR, ‘2009 Report’.
98 See, e.g., UNHCR, ‘Planned relocations, disasters and climate change: consolidating good practices and preparing for the future’ (2014), pp. 
34–48 (discussing lessons learned from development-induced displacement and resettlement).
99 See UNHCR, ‘Planned relocations, disasters and climate change’, para 26.
100 See Jane McAdam, ‘Historical cross-border relocations in the Pacific: lessons for planned relocations in the context of climate change’, The 
Journal of Pacific History, 49 (2014).
101 See ibid., p. 305; The Nansen Initiative, ‘Nansen Protection Agenda Vol 1’, p. 9 para 94; OHCHR, ‘Key messages on human rights, climate change, 
and migration’.
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use it as a tool accomplish other goals. Indeed, the endeavour of this thesis to understand how adaptation obligations 
can be concretised in the context of migration presents such a risk. But planned relocation is a process states will likely 
undertake as the impacts of climate change become more severe. It also offers an opportunity to plan in advance for 
such movement, a critical component of a successful relocation.102
International relocation – like internal – must comply with international law, and must take the domestic laws of both 
countries involved into account. There are several uses of planned relocation as adaptation. The first is as a preventative 
measure, to move people away from a hazardous location; the second is to enable a durable solution within a country 
for those already displaced; and the third, considered exceptional, is relocation to another country where large portions 
are not fit for habitation.103 Communities might also be relocated to make room for mitigation or adaptation projects, 
much like they have been in for large-scale development projects. In all cases, as relocation in other contexts has 
taught, informed participation of affected persons is both legally required and results in better outcomes. Affected 
persons have the right to participate in any government decisions on adaptation.104 Procedural rights are particularly 
important in planned relocation, to ensure that any relocation is not forced and does not violate the prohibition against 
forced evictions.105
Relocation is also more successful in the long-term when those participating do not believe their movement was 
coerced.106 As with other forms of movement, however, the distinction between forced and voluntary relocation is 
not categorical. Voluntary does not necessarily equate with full choice to move, but implies that other options might 
exist; forced tends to mean that no such realistic options are available.107 The concept of voluntary relocation is 
also complicated by the goal of relocation as a last resort, which if the case, may mean that no other options exist. 
Furthermore, the human right to return to one’s own country also implies the right to remain in that country.108 This 
may undermine voluntariness in international relocation for those who do not want to leave their country.
To better ensure any movement involves choice rather than a necessity, states undertaking relocation should provide for 
the meaningful participation and consultation of all affected persons, including relocated and receiving communities. 
For international relocation, this will require the participation of more than one state and communities in different 
countries, which again underscores the importance of fulfilling obligations to cooperate. For resettlement that impacts 
indigenous peoples’ rights, States must obtain their free, prior and informed consent as required by the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.109 And, any planned relocation must provide affected persons their full 
enjoyment of human rights and protect rights to self-determination, culture, freedom of movement, and family unity. 
Guidance on relocation further emphasises the need to restore and maintain previous living standards for relocated 
persons and receiving communities.110
To prepare for any managed migration, especially on a larger scale, requires planning, clear guidance, and legal and 
policy frameworks on adaptation that integrates relevant human rights. For international migration, this requires 
identifying a site for relocation, agreeing upon how border crossings should proceed, and whether and when return 
is contemplated.111 As discussed above, the current legal frameworks on their own cannot provide legal guidance on 
all of these issues. The limits to collective and cooperative obligations will be discussed below; but, at a minimum, the 
integration of human rights and precautionary measures into adaptation obligations mandates that proactive measures 
are taken to ensure migration occurs with dignity, and that any movement required to ensure human rights continues 
to protect these rights through the process of migration, from departure until after arrival. While most adaptation 
policies benefit some individuals more than others, any measure must be undertaken without discrimination.
102 Further policy and non-legal benefits of relocation and international migration will be discussed infra.
103 See The Nansen Initiative, ‘Nansen Protection Agenda Vol 1’, para 96; McAdam and Ferris, ‘Planned relocations in the context of climate change’, 
p. 139.
104 See, e.g., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948 (GA Resolution A(III)) arts 19–21 (rights to information, association, 
assembly, freedom of expression, which includes right to receive information and participate in government); ICCPR, art. 19 (right to freedom of 
expression includes right to receive and impart information).
105 The obligation to protect against forced evictions arises from the human right to adequate housing and non-discrimination provisions. See 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966 (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol 993, 3) art 11 (right to adequate 
housing); Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989 art 27; see also ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions 
and Displacement, Annex 1 of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard 
of Living’ (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2007) A/HRC/4/18, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Housing/
Guidelines_en.pdf.
106 See McAdam, ‘Historical cross-border relocations in the Pacific’, p. 326.
107 See Warner and others, ‘Changing climate, moving people’, p. 40 (Walter Kälin on distinguishing voluntary and forced movements of people); 
McAdam and Ferris, ‘Planned relocations in the context of climate change’, p. 143 (discussing same).
108 ICCPR, art 12(4); see UN Human Rights Committee ‘CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement)’, para 19 (right to return 
creates right to remain).
109 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 2 October 2007 art 18.
110 See The Brookings Institution and others, ‘Guidance on protecting people from disasters and environmental change through planned 
relocation’ (2015) para 15 (guidelines for internal relocation); Warner and others, ‘Changing climate, moving people’, pp. 31–5 (Elizabeth Ferris on 
planned relocation); ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement’, paras 52–58.
111 See Gruber, ‘Human displacement and climate change in the Asia-Pacific’, p. 194.
Responding to climate change and migration: adaptation and state obligations 37
b. Policy support and best practices for migration as adaptation
In addition legal obligations and principles, there are policy reasons and best practices that support adaptation action 
on migration and provide guidance on how those who move should be treated. These arguments support the legal 
analysis of this paper, and offer suggestions for the development of law and policy to better address gaps in current 
protection frameworks. Some of these suggestions come from various processes that are working on separate but 
related areas on human rights, climate change, and migration. These processes could also inform and draw on one 
another, so that they incorporate relevant legal obligations, remain consistent, and do not duplicate efforts to protect 
those on the move in the wake of a changing climate.112 The New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants, for example, 
references the Nansen Initiative, Paris Agreement, and Sendai Framework, while setting out a goal to negotiate Global 
Compacts on refugees and migrants, respectively.113 These Compacts aim to create a ‘range of principles, commitments 
and understandings…regarding international migration in all its dimensions’.114
The Nansen Initiative’s Protection Agenda provides references to legal protections and best practices to understand 
the implications of cross-border movement following natural disasters and events. It also reframes the perception of 
migration and climate change, which has leaned heavily on discourses that highlight the potential crises involved 
with large-scale movement and national security risks migrants might pose.115 The Agenda instead emphasises the 
importance of planning and proactive measures that are cornerstones of the approach advanced by this paper. It 
advocates for properly managed migration to help cope with the effects of climate change.116 And it suggests ways that 
this can be accomplished for cross-border movement, so that people can move before land becomes uninhabitable. 
These include mechanisms that are not legally mandated but could be a manifestation of cooperation within or 
outside of the climate change regime, such as visas that authorise entry and stay or bilateral or regional free movement 
agreements.117
The Agenda also recognises that governments are already using planned relocation, encourages improved use as both 
a preventative and responsive measure to disaster risk and displacement, and suggests certain factors to make for 
more sustainable relocation. Some of these factors are legally required, as discussed above (participation, respect of 
human rights). Other factors may not rise to the level of legal obligation, but are best practices, like accounting for 
affected persons community ties, cultural values, and psychological attachment to their residence.118 Finally, there are 
mechanisms – risk and impact assessments – that have a legal basis but that are not universally accepted as legally 
required.119
The Nansen Initiative and its Agenda focuses primarily on the phases of displacement. It links other forms of migration 
to displacement as a means to reduce its risk. It also discusses protection and assistance during displacement, and 
solutions and protections after displacement.120 Adaptation is needed throughout these phases, to reduce the 
likelihood of displacement and respond after it occurs. Responses to displacement also fall within multiple areas of 
the climate change regime’s focus; both as adaptation, as argued in this paper, and within the regime’s focus on loss 
and damage. Planning and preparation for displacement can include migration or relocation, but it can also involve 
efforts to boost resilience and adaptive capacity that helps people stay or prevents the need for mobility. Any mobility 
decision should involve choice, which ideally maintains the either the right to stay or the right to leave.121 This in turn 
increases the likelihood that a migrant can access known benefits of migration: livelihood opportunities, resilience, 
financial and social capital, and remittances that can help those in communities that do not move.122 These benefits are 
not limited to the migrant. As the Swedish delegate to the Nansen consultations noted, ‘migration can bring benefits 
to the countries of origin, countries of destination and the migrants and their families, if it’s responsibly facilitated.’123
In addition to being rooted in legal obligations and systemic integration, a rights and human centred approach to 
climate change responses is supported by ethical and climate justice arguments. As Mary Robinson explained:
The human rights approach, emphasising the equality of all people, is a direct challenge to the 
power imbalances that allow perpetrators of climate change to continue unchecked. The human 
112 See, e.g., McAdam and Limon, ‘Human rights, climate change and cross-border displacement’, pp. 21–3.
113 UN General Assembly, ‘New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants: Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly’ (2016) A/RES/71/1 
paras 18, 42, 50 (recognising other initiatives and processes).
114 Ibid., Annex II, para 2.
115 Lauren Nishimura, ‘“Climate change migrants”: impediments to a protection framework and the need to incorporate migration into climate 
change adaptation strategies’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 27 (2015), pp. 120–1.
116 The Nansen Initiative, ‘Nansen Protection Agenda Vol 1’, p. 9.
117 See ibid., pp. 26–7 paras 47, 51, 88; McAdam, ‘From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement’, pp. 1543–4.
118 The Nansen Initiative, ‘Nansen Protection Agenda Vol 1’, pp. 9, 38 para 95.P
119 Ibid., pp. 34–5 paras 77, 82; see UNEP, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights’ (UNEP, 2015), p. 22; Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters [Aarhus Convention] 1998.
120 McAdam, ‘From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement’, pp. 1520–1
121 See Jon Barnett and Michael Webber, ‘Migration as adaptation: opportunities and limits’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Climate Change and Displacement: 
Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2010), p. 38.
122 See Gemenne and Blocher, ‘How can migration support adaptation?’, p. 7 (describing benefits of migration); Barnett and Webber, ‘Migration as 
adaptation’, pp. 38, 44 (analysing positive contributions of migration as adaptation).
123 See The Nansen Initiative, ‘Global Consultation Conference Report’, p. 182.
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rights framework gives us the legal and normative grounds for empowering the poor to seek 
redress.124
Likewise, the vulnerabilities migration can create mean that access to rights and remedies are needed as a matter of law 
and justice. Draft Principles and Guidelines intended to protect vulnerable migrants advocate for human rights to be at 
the centre of all responses to migration and treatment of migrants. These Guidelines suggest that states take steps to 
achieve policy coherence on human rights and migration at local, national, regional and international levels.125 Indeed, 
policy consideration – and how climate policy is made – will influence whether mobility improves the welfare of those 
on the move or exacerbates risks to rights and human security.126 Again, while not legal obligations, Guidelines like 
these further indicate a trend towards holistic approaches to migration, protection throughout the process, and the 
contribution of a confluence of drivers including climate change. These, and other initiatives, further show the difficulty 
in finding space to shape law internationally, and the importance of the climate change regime in its recognition and 
will to address migration and climate change as a topic that can be planned for and managed.127
2. Obligations of the receiving state and collective obligations
This section turns to the obligations of a receiving state for international migration associated with climate change, as 
well as collective obligations of multiple states to assist and cooperate in adaptation. As with obligations of the country 
of origin, it will present sources that clarify or strengthen adaptation obligations on both legal and policy grounds. This 
section will also contemplate potential answers to the question of whether assistance and cooperation obligations in 
the climate change regime may in some way address a state’s sovereign right to control entry and stay of foreigners.
2.1. Obligations to assist
The UNFCCC and Paris Agreement include several assistance obligations, primarily focused on technological or financial 
assistance. On their face, these obligations do not appear to speak to international migration, or adaptation measures. 
However, the evolution of adaptation within the regime, from the Cancun Agreements to Paris, supports an argument 
that states should – and potentially must – assist other states when they undertake planned relocation or facilitated 
migration as a form of adaptation under the regime. At a minimum, states are obliged to assist developing country 
Parties in their adaptation efforts.
Under the UNFCCC, developed country Parties are required to provide financial resources ‘needed by the developing 
country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs’ of implementing measures that include those required to 
facilitate adequate adaptation. These costs must be agreed between the developing country Party and the financial 
mechanism for the climate change regime.128 The UNFCCC also requires developed country Parties to assist developing 
country Parties ‘that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation 
to those adverse effects.’129
The Paris Agreement expands the assistance obligations, declaring that ‘continuous and enhanced international 
support shall be provided to developing country Parties’ to implement other adaptation obligations.130 These include 
strengthening cooperation on adaptation, adaptation planning processes and implementation, and adaptation 
communication to the regime. This is a hard legal obligation.131 But it is not clear which states are bound by this 
obligation, and the nature and extent of this assistance is open to interpretation. Developed states might also owe a 
general duty to assist developing states under human rights law.132 Such an obligation could arise, for example, under 
a duty to fulfil human rights and could require assistance in mitigating or adapting to climate change.133
The provision of any adaptation related assistance in the context of mobility and climate change is also unclear. At a 
minimum, developed country Parties are required to provide financial resources ‘to assist developing country Parties 
with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention.’134 
124 Mary Robinson, ‘Climate change and justice’ (Barbara Ward Lecture, Chatham House, London, 11 December 2006), http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/
G00271.pdf.
125 OHCHR and Global Migration Group, ‘Principles and guidelines’, principle 1.6.
126 Warner and others ‘Changing climate, moving people’, p. 8.
127 See ibid., p. 15; Mayer and Cournil, ‘Climate change, migration and human rights’, p. 185 (link between climate change and migration provides 
opportunity to bring protection of migrants to forefront of political discussions).
128 UNFCCC, art 4.3.
129 Ibid., art 4.4. Developed country Parties are further obliged to provide assistance to developing countries through access to and transfer of 
technology and knowledge, which could be necessary for some adaptation activities (ibid., arts 4.3, 4.5).
130 Paris Agreement, art 7.13 (emphasis added).
131 See Rajamani, ‘The 2015 Paris Agreement’, p. 351.
132 See ICESCR, art 2; UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), ‘General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ 
Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant)’ (1990) E/1991/23 para 14.
133 Daniel Bodansky, ‘Climate change and human rights: unpacking the issues’, Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law, 38 (2010), p. 
521.
134 Paris Agreement, art 9.1.
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Other parties are also encouraged to do the same voluntarily.135 This creates a collective obligation owed by developed 
countries – who have as a group benefitted from and contributed most to the causes of climate change – to developing 
countries – those considered most vulnerable and who have benefitted least from carbon emitting technologies. Despite 
the mandatory nature of this obligation, financial assistance to date has been voluntary, the result of pledges from 
public and private sources. The pledge leading up to Paris, for example, promised a combined $100 billion of public and 
private funding by 2020. The decision adopting the Paris Agreement recognised this goal and encouraged significant 
increases in adaptation finance, which would better balance climate funding between mitigation and adaptation136 The 
climate change regime’s Adaptation Committee is exploring how to mobilise such support; deployment of funding for 
adaptation could come from multiple sources, although access to and implementation of funding in practice has been 
challenging.137 As this aspect of the regime develops, this could prove to be a valuable source in funding assistance to 
migrants, both internal and international. The IOM appears to agree, citing one of its current areas of intervention as 
facilitating access to the Green Climate Fund for human-mobility related actions.138 Within the regime, funding of up 
to $3 million per country for national adaptation plans or similar planning processes has recently been approved.139 
Many such plans to date, however, do not have detailed discussions of migration and/or on the role of human rights.140
Direct assistance in the process of migration or to assist migrants impacted by natural disasters and climate change 
is also lacking. There is no explicit duty of an outside state to provide assistance or a right to such assistance in these 
cases, although the Draft articles of protection of persons in the event of disasters create a duty for affected states 
to seek assistance if it does not have the capacity to respond, which outside states and other actors can provide.141 
Other international law mechanisms create limited obligations to assist. The United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea includes a duty of a ship flying a state’s flag to render assistance and rescue anyone in distress at sea, so 
long as this assistance does not put the ship in serious danger.142 It does not clarify what to do with persons rescued, 
including migrants, at sea and where they should be disembarked.143 This is consistent with one of the biggest issues in 
international migration: there is simply no right of admission into another country for most migrants. There are other 
means to gain entry, which as a non-refugee are either based on human rights protection and non-refoulement or the 
discretion of another state. At present, human rights concerns offer the best protections against return once a foreign 
state has exercised jurisdiction or a migrant has gained access to territory. But this hinges on the migrant’s state failing 
to protect human rights, and as Jane McAdam argues, it might be difficult to argue that a state is violating human 
rights to this degree if they are taking some steps to address the impacts of climate change.144 For disaster-induced 
displacement generally, the requisite imminent harm has not been met.145 This may change, as conditions deteriorate 
due to impacts, although the goal of migration as adaptation is to avoid the potential for such serious harm. Grounds 
for admission could be potentially expanded, when considering international solidarity or cooperation obligations, as 
will be discussed. Addressing this gap has also been highlighted by the Protection Agenda, which suggests that states 
either admit people and allow them to stay or refrain from returning them to places where they face risks.146
The need to assist could potentially be drawn from remedial sources as well, although the focus of this thesis is on 
obligations in the first instance. Jacqueline Peel analyses shared responsibility for the impacts of climate change. She 
looks to hold those responsible for the harm climate change will cause, and bases potential claims for reparation 
on climate justice and principles within the climate change regime, including inter and intra-generational equity.147 
Intergenerational equity is one of the bases for ongoing litigation in the United States, in a case where a group of 
young people are seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the government.148 Peel further concludes that the 
135 Ibid. art 9.2.
136 See ibid. para 115.
137 See Anju Sharma and others, ‘Pocket Guide to the Paris Agreement’ (ecbi 2016), pp. 16, 18–20.
138 IOM, ‘IOM Contributions to Global Climate Negotiations: 22nd Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC)’ (2016), p. 5. The Protection Agenda noted that ‘it remains to be seen to what extent climate change adaptation funding and other 
relevant funding will be available to address human mobility challenges. The Nansen Initiative, ‘Nansen Protection Agenda Vol 1’, pp. 18–19 para 28.
139 See COP, ‘Decision 10/CP.22: Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and Guidance to the Green Climate Fund’ (2017) 
FCCC/CP/2016/10/Add.1.
140 See, e.g., Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice, ‘Incorporating Human Rights into Climate Action’ (Mary Robinson Foundation 2016) 
version 2, www.mrfcj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Incorporating-Human-Rights-into-Climate-Action-Version-2-May-2016.pdf (accessed 
22 Sept. 2016); Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice, ‘Incorporating Human Rights into Climate Action’ (Mary Robinson Foundation 2014) 
version 1, www.mrfcj.org/resources/incorporating-human-rights-into-climate-action/ (accessed 22 Sept. 2016).
141 ‘Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters’ (ILC 2016) Report of the ILC A/71/10 arts 11–12.
142 Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 art 98.
143 See Ramji-Nogales, ‘Migration emergencies’, p. 630.
144 McAdam, ‘From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement’, p. 1536; Michelle Foster, ‘Non-refoulement on the basis of 
socio-economic deprivation: the scope of complementary protection in international human rights law’, New Zealand Law Review, 257 (2009), p. 284 
(non-refoulement evolving and could include concerns about economic, cultural, and social rights).
145 Ioane Teitiota v. The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, para 55; see McAdam, Climate Change, Forced 
Migration, and International Law, pp. 49–50. 
146 The Nansen Initiative, ‘Nansen Protection Agenda Vol 1’, pp. 7, 22 para 20.
147 Jacqueline Peel, ‘Climate change’, in André Nollkaemper and Ilias Plakokefalos (eds), The Practice of Shared Responsibility in International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 1015.
148 See Kelsey Cascadia Rose Julian, et al v United States of America, et al US District Court, District of Oregon 6:15-cv-01517-TC.
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FCCC’s principles might give rise to collective obligations for Parties to protect against climate change and respond.149 
Thus, if states breach obligations that exist under the climate change regime, or customary law obligations to prevent 
environmental harm (the ‘no-harm rule’), then remedial responses might be owed to those states harmed by climate 
change.150 In theory, these responses could include adaptation measures, and assistance with migration or displacement. 
Nothing within the FCCC or regime sets out the legal consequences for a breach of obligations. However, the obligation 
owed under customary law is focused on preventing environmental harm, rather than violations of human rights 
associated with impacts from climate change and human mobility. Such claims would need to be assessed on a case-
by-case basis, limiting their utility for handling the problem of migration in general. Shared responsibility has also been 
suggested for the refoulement of refugees, the state of origin and the state expelling a refugee.151 However, this requires 
an exercise of jurisdiction over the refugee by the receiving state and most who move due to climate change will not 
qualify as refugees.
Once a migrant is inside a new country, human rights duties apply to that state in virtually same manner as in state 
of origin. For international migration or planned relocation, integration of human rights means that affected persons 
are essentially owed the same substantive and procedural rights as they would be entitled in their home state. For 
relocation, the receiving state and community must participate in meaningful consultation, the state must provide 
information and access to effective remedies. Yet there are critical differences that leave international migrants with 
uncertainty. There is, for example, no right to remain in a country that is not one’s own. A principle of ‘temporary 
refuge’ might be able to provide some time-bound recourse. According to Guy Goodwin-Gill, this principle is rooted 
in customary international law and should be more broadly applied than non-refoulement. Both create obligations of 
admission and non-return, but Goodwin-Gill suggests that the two should not be linked, with the principle of refuge 
being the focus of protection of those who would be at risk if returned.152 Like non-refoulement, this is not the kind of 
proactive measure that is advanced by this paper. Nor is it clear what kinds of rights or entitlements are associated with 
the principle.153 If integrated into or linked to adaptation obligations, then this principle could provide a starting point 
to argue for admissions and stay. The risks to person within their country of origin must be established to justify its 
application. But it if state practice develops around assistance in the context of natural disasters, then it is possible for 
the principle to become a more plausible legal tool to apply to climate change.
As with measure to take within the country of origin, more concrete interventions have been offered outside of 
legal treaties. These include the Protection Agenda’s call for regional cooperative frameworks, the use of special and 
humanitarian visas, new temporary protection regimes, stays of deportation, and the provision of assistance to help 
avoid the need for migration.154 Any collaborative or cross-border initiative will require cooperation, which is also an 
obligation of the climate change regime.
2.2. Obligations to cooperate
The general duty of international cooperation underpins efforts to tackle climate change. Without concerted action, 
reducing emissions to a less dangerous threshold or adequate adaptation are not possible. The UNFCCC includes 
an obligation for Parties to ‘[c]ooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change’.155 The Paris 
Agreement further emphasises the importance of cooperation as it applies to adaptation and suggests that Parties 
strengthen their cooperation on adaptation to enhance adaptation actions while taking into account the Cancun 
Adaptation Framework.156 The Agreement highlights the provision of assistance to developing country Parties, as well 
as technical support and guidance.157 It also acknowledges the breadth of adaptation and the need for a collaborative 
global approach: ‘adaptation is a global challenge faced by all with local, subnational, national, regional and 
international dimensions’, which is a key component to ‘the long-term global response to climate change to protect 
people, livelihoods and ecosystems, taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of those developing country 
Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change’.158
The link to the protection of people and their livelihoods brings together adaptation with human rights concerns. 
This provides an indication of one of the purposes of adaptation, as well as an understanding of what cooperation 
entails within the Agreement. Interpretation of this obligation also requires consideration of other relevant rules of 
international law.159 For cooperation, other relevant rules can be found in human rights law and the UN Charter. Both 
149 Peel, ‘Climate change’, p. 1024.
150 See Peel, ‘Climate change’; Trail Smelter Arbitration, United States v Canada (1938 and 1941) 3 R.I.A.A. 1905.
151 See Maarten den Heijer, ‘Refoulement’, in André Nollkaemper and Ilias Plakokefalos (eds), The Practice of Shared Responsibility in International 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 481–2.
152 Guy S Goodwin-Gill, ‘Non-refoulement, temporary refuge, and the ‘new’ asylum seekers’, in Refuge from Inhumanity? War Refugees and 
International Humanitarian Law (Brill, 2014), p. 458.
153 McAdam, ‘From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement’, p. 1540.
154 See The Nansen Initiative, ‘Nansen Protection Agenda Vol 1’, p. 46; The Nansen Initiative, ‘Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced 
Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change’ (The Nansen Initiative 2015) Vol 2.
155 UNFCCC, art 4.1(e).
156 Paris Agreement, art 7.7.
157 Ibid., arts 7.7, 10.2.
158 Ibid., art 7.2.
159 VCLT, art 31(3)(c).
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of these are discussed, for example, as sources for a duty to cooperate in the 2009 Office of the High Commissioner of 
Human Rights (OHCHR) report on the relationship between climate change and human rights. The report emphasised 
the importance of cooperation given the ‘significantly higher’ risk of climate change in low-income countries.160 It 
found the sources – and hence guidance – for the obligation in the Charter of the United Nations and the ICESCR. 
The Charter sets out one of the purposes of the UN is ‘[t]o achieve international cooperation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms . . . .161 Cooperation is also called for to achieve ‘universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms’.162 Likewise, the ICESCR instructs states to take steps to achieve 
the rights in the Covenant ‘individually and through international assistance and cooperation’.163 Cooperation for the 
development and realisation of these human rights is an obligation of all states.164 On its own, a duty to cooperate 
derived from human rights law and the Charter may be difficult to link to direct action on climate change.165 John 
Knox acknowledges that while general, the language of the Charter suggests a commitment by states to act jointly 
to address global human rights challenges. Climate change is such a challenge, which presents a global threat that 
requires international cooperation to tackle.166 By integrating these sources of cooperative duties into the obligation to 
cooperate within the regime, and human rights becomes an aspect of adaptation planning and implementation. As a 
result, protection of human rights in responses is required not just of a territorial state, but of cooperative efforts as well.
The need for greater cooperation and the sharing of responsibility has been called for repeatedly in the context 
of migration. The preamble of the Refugee Convention explicitly calls for such cooperation in order to address the 
international scope of the problem.167 More recently, the New York Declaration recognised the importance of 
cooperation for refugees and migrants, as well as the differing capacities of states to respond to such movement. 
Cooperation is framed as offering ‘profound benefits for humanity’.168 Yet the ability to control borders and prevent 
irregular crossings remains firmly entrenched, in tension with the need to protect rights and freedoms in transit and 
after arrival and the commitment to cooperate to ensure ‘safe, orderly and regular migration, including return and 
readmission’.169
The difficulty with generalising what the obligations to cooperate might entail is in mandating specific responses. 
This has been an issue for the refugee regime, where despite institutional guidance and statements that conclude 
that international cooperation is essential for the operation of an international protection system, there is continued 
uncertainty about how to manifest this cooperation and what form measures should take.170 Knox makes the argument 
that environmental human rights and international cooperation could inform action on climate change in much the 
same way that this paper uses human rights law and principles to inform adaptation obligations. Cooperation under 
Knox’s framework could mean, for example, that states must assess actions joint, inform the public, and facilitate public 
participation in decision-making. Substantively, a cooperative framework would require adaptation activities to violate 
basic human rights.171 This minimum threshold would thus require cooperation to address small island states, which 
requires some form of facilitated migration.
V. Conclusion
The disaster and events caused by climate change, and the impacts upon individuals and communities are now a 
reality. As these impacts increase, and as states ramp up responses to climate change, the pressure for some individuals 
and communities to move will also rise. Climate change will exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and contribute to 
an increase in movement. This creates protection challenges for states experiencing and receiving more migration. 
There will be no single solution. This paper explored the role that international law might play, and the adaptation 
obligations within the climate change regime in particular. It sought to integrate and apply other rules and principles 
of international law in the interpretation and implementation of these obligations, and as applied to international 
migration. Such integration provides much needed content and guidance, although more work is needed to establish 
stronger links between financing, assistance, and adaptation activities.
160 OHCHR, ‘2009 Report’, p. 27 para 84.
161 Charter of the United Nations 1945 (1 UNTS XVI) art 1(3).
162 Ibid., arts 55–56. It has been argued that this creates an erga omnes duty to respect and observe human rights. Ottavio Quirico, Jürgen Bröhmer 
and Marcel Szabó, ‘States, climate change and tripartite human rights: the missing link’, in Ottavio Quirico and Mouloud Boumghar (eds.), Climate 
Change and Human Rights: An International and Comparative Law Perspective (Routledge, 2015), p. 25.
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164 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), paras 12–13.
165 See Margaux J Hall and David C Weiss, ‘Avoiding adaptation apartheid: climate change adaptation and human rights law’, The Yale Journal of 
International Law, 37 (2012), pp. 309, 344.
166 John H Knox, ‘Human rights principles and climate change’, in Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Kevin R Gray and Richard Tarasofsky (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 230–31.
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169 Ibid., paras 24, 26, 41, 54.
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As a concluding comment, this paper will consider what cooperation could or should involve for climate change 
migration. The collective aspect of international cooperation contrasts with the jurisdictional requirements of 
human rights treaties, which generally trigger obligations only when jurisdiction has been exercised. This points to 
the need to act in the face of risks to human rights, even if these risks are extraterritorial. This paper has argued that 
concretising adaptation obligations, including cooperation on adaptation, requires the integration of human rights 
and environmental principles. In the context of potential proactive migration, this creates obligations for home states 
to facilitate migration from places where rights are at risk. For potential receiving states, or other states generally, this 
could require cooperation to allow for international migration. However, this creates a tension with border control and 
efforts by states to curb or regulate migration. As a legal argument, admitting non-nationals is tenuous. Some legal 
concepts are possible to strengthen this claim. Shared responsibility is a possible source of a remedial obligation, but 
as discussed this would be determined based on an individual case and may be too late for proactive movement.
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 declares cooperation at multiple levels is ‘pivotal’ to 
disaster risk reduction and highlights small-island states, least developed countries, and land locked developing and 
African countries particularly in need of support due to their high vulnerability.172 Cooperation and assistance could also 
be manifested through regional arrangements to facilitate migration, which is especially important in the Pacific where 
small island states face inundation and loss of land.173 This is also the case in Latin America and the Caribbean, where 
a number of governments have already declared that cross border migration and displacement, and the challenges 
created by climate change and natural disasters, require a cooperative framework and plan. In this region, states have 
encouraged the creation of effective mechanisms of solidarity and international cooperation.174
Solidarity is called for in other international legal declarations, and is considered one of the ‘fundamental values to be 
essential to international relations in the twenty-first century’ by the UN Millennium Declaration. Shared responsibility 
and a respect for nature are also fundamental values. Solidarity as a value in the Declaration means that ‘[g]lobal 
challenges must be managed in a way that distributes the costs and burdens fairly in accordance with basic principles 
of equity and social justice. Those who suffer or who benefit least deserve help from those who benefit most.’175 
Solidarity as a concept can refer to the provision of support by states to others, and often support from one state to 
another that requires more assistance than others.176 It is the achievement of common objectives through differentiated 
obligations, and the adaptation of actions to benefit particular states or groups.177 Within the climate change regime, 
differentiation can be seen in the distinction between developed country Parties, who are tasked in various ways with 
assisting developing country Parties. The overarching purpose for all state Parties is the same: to avoid dangerous 
climate change or strengthen global responses to the threats it causes.178
In the context of migration, cooperation and solidarity could focus on efforts to ensure the safety and dignity of 
migrants. States should consider their contribution to the peril migrants currently face in transit, and uncertainty upon 
arrival. Efforts to prevent or punish entry into a state could have the effect of putting migrants life at risk, pushing 
people towards increasingly more dangerous journeys.179 Additional measures to assist migrants, rather than barriers, 
are needed to address their protection needs when crossing borders.180 Furthermore, once the complicity of states 
and the international system for conditions that put migrants lives and rights at risk is recognised, it is possible to 
reconceive assistance and cooperation as a responsibility of states who contribute to these conditions.181 Admission 
and refuge then become more a matter of obligation than an act of humanitarian assistance or discretion.
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international-laws-relationship-to-crisis-part-ii/#more-15014 (states’ non-entree measures partially to blame for the danger that causes the need for 
rescue; protection is thus less a charitable act due to state culpability).
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Abstract
This paper addresses the question of environmental displacement through the lens of EU asylum law, and, more 
specifi cally, by examining the potential application of directive 2001/55/CE (the Temporary Protection Directive, TPD) 
to persons fl eeing environmental sudden-onset disasters.
The TPD (never activated though adopted in 2001) is designed to grant temporary protection to an entire category of 
persons arriving in the EU en masse because of civil war, endemic violence, or systematic violations of human rights 
occurring in their home country. This paper shows on the one side that the TPD suff ers both from substantive and 
procedural characteristics that render its possible activation in response to civil wars and endemic violence extremely 
remote (at least in the current historical period).
However, the TPD may be fi t to protect persons fl eeing sudden-onset natural disasters, thus revealing itself one of 
the fi rst supra-national legal frameworks able to face (at least one aspect) of the phenomenon of environmental 
displacement. The paper argues that EU Member States would presumably be more favourable to a TPD’s activation 
if it were designed for displacement from rapid-onset natural disasters, since such disasters cause damages that are 
restorable in a relatively brief period. Hence, the paper calls for modifi cation of the TPD with a view to rendering it more 
specifi cally disaster-oriented.
Keywords
human displacement; temporary protection directive; sudden-onset disasters; Common European Asylum System
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I. Introduction
The current migration phenomenon has put the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) under severe pressure.1 
Facing unprecedented challenges, the European Union’s reaction is far from unequivocal: it is on the contrary highly 
diversified, with some Member States enabling reception policies for immigrants, and others trying to enshrine the 
possibilities of access to their territories.2
In the light of the current contingencies, the EU is asked to review some of its migration and asylum policies, with the 
aim of more efficiently dealing with a crisis capable of shaking the very basis of the European integration process.3 That 
is why a strengthening of the CEAS presently appears to be a priority. In this context, it might appear surprising, at least 
at first glance, that directive 2001/55/CE on temporary protection, the so-called Temporary Protection Directive (TPD),4 
is not taken into consideration at all.
The instrument was expressly created to deal with mass influxes of migrants to the EU, and although the current crisis 
could effortlessly be defined as a mass influx, the possible activation of the TPD is not even being discussed at the 
EU level. Indeed, with regard to art. 1 of this instrument, which states: ‘the purpose of this Directive is to establish 
minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons from third 
countries who are unable to return to their country of origin and to promote a balance of effort between Member 
States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving such persons’, it is reasonable to wonder why European 
institutions are currently not even mentioning the TPD in the 2015 European Agenda on Migration,5 and in the more 
recent Commission’s Communication titled ‘Towards a reform of the Common European Asylum System and enhancing 
legal avenues to Europe’.6
This work, starting from what is already outlined in the relevant doctrine,7 examines the reasons behind the lack of 
activation of the TPD. It also aims at showing that some significant modifications should be studied to realistically hope 
in its future activation. In this sense, the paper looks on the one hand – and in a comparative way – at the US Temporary 
Protection Status (TPS), and, on the other hand, it argues that a disaster-oriented evolution of the TPD might increase 
its chances of future utilisation, and meet at the same time the objective of granting some sort of protection for people 
fleeing sudden-onset environmental disasters.
II. The TPD: structure, goals, and attempts of activation
Adopted in 2001, the TPD was the first European piece of legislation dealing with asylum policies after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, that communitarised the subject, by imposing – with reference to temporary 
1 The legal instruments composing the CEAS are directive 2011/95/EU (Qualification directive) in OJ L 304/12, 30.9.2004; directive 2013/33/
EU (Reception directive) in OJ L 180/96, 29.6.2013; directive 2013/32/EU (Procedures directive) in OJ L 180/60, 29.6.2013; EU regulation nr 604/2013 
(Dublin III regulation) in OJ L 180/31, 29.6.2013; and EU regulation nr 603/2013 (Eurodac regulation) in OJ L 180/1, 29.6.2013. See on the subject in legal 
scholarship Dubolino D., L’identificazione dello Stato competente all’esame di una domanda di asilo: dalla Convenzione di Dublino al nuovo regolamento, 
in Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2004, p. 811; E. Fahey, ‘Joining the dots: external norms, AFSJ Directives and the EU’s role in the global legal order’, European 
Law Review (2016), p. 105; S. Mananashvili, ‘The diffusion of the EU Asylum Acquis in the eastern neighbourhood: a test for the EU’s normative power’, 
European Foreign Affairs Review (2015), p. 187; H. Lambert, J. McAdam, M. Fullerton (eds.), The Global Reach of European Refugee Law (Cambridge, 2013); 
den Heijer M., Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum (Oxford, 2013); O. Lynskey, ‘Complementing and completing the Common European Asylum System: a 
legal analysis of the emerging extraterritorial elements of EU refugee protection policy’, European Law Review (2006), p. 230.
2 In a nutshell, it is to remember that Germany has decided to open its borders and to grant unconditioned assistance to Syrian forced migrants, 
whereas other States have opted for an embitterment of border controls and reception policies for third-State individuals.
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little would change in fact?’, 27 June 2016, www.ejiltalk.org/brexit-is-everything-going-to-change-in-law-so-that-very-little-would-change-in-fact/ 
(accessed 25 June 2018); N. Barber, T. Hickman and J. King, ‘Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’: Parliament’s Indispensable Role’, 27 June 2016, https://
ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/27/nick-barber-tom-hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-50-trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role/ 
(accessed 25 June 2018); F. Savastano, ‘Prime osservazioni sul diritto di recedere dall’Unione europea’, Federalismi, 25 November 2015 (online); D. 
Harvey, ‘“In the light of the guidelines”: Brexit and the European Council’, 7 October 2016, https://europeanlawblog.eu/2016/10/07/in-the-light-of-
the-guidelines-brexit-and-the-european-council/ (accessed 25 June 2018).
4 Council directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced 
persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, 
in OJ L 212/12, 7.8.2001.
5 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: A European Agenda on Migration (Brussels, 13.5.2015, COM(2015) 240 final).
6 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Towards a reform of the Common European Asylum 
System and enhancing legal avenues to Europe (Brussels, 6.4.2016, COM(2016) 197 final).
7 See generally M. Ineli-Ciger M., ‘Time to activate the Temporary Protection Directive’, European Journal of Migration and Law (2016), p. 18; H. 
Beirens, S. Maas, S. Petronella, M. van der Velden, ‘Study on the Temporary Protection Directive Final report’, European Commission Directorate-
General for Migration and Home Affairs, January 2016 (online); M. Ineli-Ciger, ‘Has the Temporary Protection Directive become obsolete? An 
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Singer, V. Stoyanova (eds.), Seeking Asylum in the European Union: Selected Protection Issues Raised by the Second Phase of the Common European Asylum 
System (Brill, 2015); N. Arenas, ‘The concept of “mass influx of displaced persons” in the European Directive establishing the Temporary Protection 
System’, European Journal of Migration and Law (2005), p. 435; M. Notarbartolo di Sciara, ‘Temporary Protection Directive, dead letter or still option 
for the future? An overview on the reasons behind its lack of implementation’, eurojus.it – Rivista (online); V. Kolmannskog, ‘Climate change-related 
displacement and the European response’, paper presented in occasion of SID Vijverberg Session on Climate Change and Migration, The Hague, 20 
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protection – the adoption within five years of ‘minimum standards for giving temporary protection to displaced persons 
from third countries who cannot return to their country of origin and for persons who otherwise need international 
protection’.8
The TPD establishes a legal framework that should be applied in case the Union is willing to provide some categories 
of third-country displaced persons – forced to massively emigrate because of armed conflicts, endemic violence, 
and/or the risk of systematic violations of their human rights (art. 2) – with a temporary protection regime. The TPD’s 
protection system can last at most for three years (art. 4), and envisages a burden-sharing mechanism according to 
which all Member States should host the regime’s beneficiaries ‘in a spirit of Community solidarity’, depending on their 
national reception capabilities (arts. 25 and 26). The instrument, which is one of a kind since it codifies a ‘new’ form of 
international protection,9 introduces an exceptional procedure that can be activated by a qualified majority by the 
Council upon proposal by the Commission (art. 5). It aims to cope with emergency migration phenomena that cannot 
be managed through normal migration and asylum policies. The TPD is hence complementary to the ‘classical’ asylum 
policy of the Union, whose cornerstone is, as a matter of common knowledge, the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees (henceforth the Geneva Convention).10
The notion of ‘mass influx of displaced persons’ is the instrument’s most delicate and discussed element. Before the 
adoption of the TPD, such a concept had never enjoyed autonomous legal consideration,11 since international refugee 
law, as disciplined under the Geneva Convention, essentially aims at protecting individuals from the well-founded fear 
of being subject to persecutions in their home country because of some inherent characteristic of their own (more 
precisely, due to reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion).12 
The TPD leaves the discriminatory and individual elements behind, so as to provide with international protection entire 
categories of persons – therefore via a collective assessment approach13 – relying on the danger that these would 
experience in their country of origin: the necessity of a determined discriminatory motive as a ‘justification’ of the 
dangers and persecutions feared is therefore not directly significant to the international protection offered by the TPD.
This is why the instrument is complementary to the Geneva Convention, which offers, for clear historical reasons, 
a refugee definition anchored to the period in which it was adopted.14 The classical definition of a refugee under 
international law is consequently nowadays limited if compared to the totality of individuals who actually need 
international protection.15 It is in this sense that we should consider instruments such as the TPD or the Qualification 
Directive (where it enables subsidiary protection),16 namely instruments granting international protection within the 
8 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, 
adoption 2 October 1997, entry into force 1 May 1999, art. 63.2a). As regards current primary EU law, see art. 78.2c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union: ‘2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, shall adopt measures for a common European asylum system comprising: c) a common system of temporary protection for displaced 
persons in the event of a massive inflow’. It is worth noting that the evolution of primary EU law has brought significant renovation as regards the EU 
competence on the subject: whereas the previous disposition only conferred to the EU institutions to adopt ‘minimum standards’, the EU is currently 
enabled to enact common procedures on asylum matters. See in this regard, F. Pocar and M.C. Barufi, Commentario breve ai Trattati dell’Unione 
europea (2nd edn., Trento, 2014), p. 480.
9 See D. Perluss and J. Hartman, ‘Temporary refuge: emergence of a customary norm’, Virginia Journal of International Law, 26 (1986), pp. 551–626.
10 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (adoption 28 July 1951, entry into force 22 April 1954) to be read in conjunction with the Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees (adoption 31 January 1957, entry into force 4 October 1967). See inter alia, J.P. Gauci, M. Giuffré and E. Tsourdi (eds.), 
Exploring the boundaries of refugee law: current protection challenges (Leiden, 2015); E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, G. Loescher, K. Long and N. Sigona (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (Oxford, 2014); L. Silingenberg, The Reception of Asylum Seekers under International Law. 
Between Sovereignty and Equality (Oxford, 2014); F. Lenzerini, Asilo e diritti umani: l’evoluzione del diritto d’asilo nel diritto internazionale (Milan, 2009); 
G.S. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford, 2007).
11 In this sense, see Arenas, ‘The concept of “mass influx of displaced persons”’, p. 437. See also Notarbartolo di Sciara, ‘Temporary Protection 
Directive, dead letter or still option for the future?’, p. 1.
12 Art. 1(A)2 of the 1951 Geneva Convention.
13 Even though the assessment procedures are evidently different, it is useful to underline that in practice (at least) part of the refugee status 
assessments under the Geneva Convention are, prima facie, conducted on a collective rather than individual basis (see in this sense also Notarbartolo 
di Sciara, ‘Temporary Protection Directive, dead letter or still option for the future?’, p. 2). Such a trend – at least in those States that are less equipped as 
regards reception facilities– is often due to the impossibility to determine the individual statuses in case a State has to deal with tens of thousands of 
persons – if not even more – immigrating in its territory in the most disparate (and desperate) situations. In this sense, one of the ground weaknesses 
of the TPD already emerges: if one of its main aims is to provide relief to Member States national asylum systems in exceptional cases, it is important 
to underline how, de facto, the practice of collective assessments, theoretically exclusive to the TPD system, is also disseminated in the application of 
‘classical’ refugee protection systems.
14 In this regard, see J. Fitzpatrick, ‘Temporary protection of refugees: elements of a formalized regime’, The American Journal of International Law 
(2000), p. 280: ‘The 1951 Convention constitutes a key-element of the post-Holocaust human rights system’.
15 For a first analysis concerning the question of the categories that, even though not falling within the classical definition of refugee, need 
international protection, see ex multis a D. Martin (eds.), The New Asylum-Seekers: Refugee Law in the 1980s (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988).
16 Since the Fifties, the question concerning the enlarging of the ‘classical’ definition has covered a relevant role in the doctrine and in States’ 
practice. Indeed, the Final Act of the Conference adopting the Geneva Convention provided that: ‘The Conference expresses the hope that the 
Convention […] will have value as an example exceeding its contractual scope and that all nations will be guided by it in granting so far as possible to 
persons in their territory as refugees and who would not be covered by the terms of the Convention, the treatment for which it provides‘ (Final Act of 
the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, para. IV, Recomm. E). According to some scholars 
(see T. Spijkerboer, ‘Subsidiarity in asylum law: the personal scope of international protection’, in Bouteillet-Pacquet (eds.), Subsidiary Protection of 
Refugees in the European Union: Complementing the Geneva Convention? (Brussels, 2002), such declaration is the legal basis for the subsequent 
development of international protection legal frameworks which operate on a subsidiary or complementary level to the Geneva Convention. In 
any case, it seems possible to argue that this disposition aimed (and still aims) at encouraging States to create ex novo international protection 
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EU to individuals that do not fall within the classical definition of refugee.17
Thanks to the TPD’s adoption, the Union enjoys a legal framework whose main objective is, alongside with the obvious 
humanitarian considerations, to grant a ‘safety valve’ to Member States’ national asylum systems in the hypothesis they 
are put under severe pressure by non-conventional migration fluxes. The collective assessment approach in presence 
of mass asylum applications phenomena is indeed thought to lighten Member States’ financial and administrative 
burdens normally dedicated to individual assessment procedures.18 If, for instance, the TPD were activated to protect 
Syrian residents fleeing the current civil war, the sole requisite of citizenship or continuous Syrian residence would 
suffice to enter the protection regime. It would then be unnecessary to examine the individual status of every single 
protection seeker. Such an approach – de facto unilaterally adopted by Germany in 201519 – would lighten the burdens 
necessary to complete the examination of individual cases. The German Federal Government, when deploying the 
prohibition of deportation to Syria because of humanitarian considerations,20 has allowed for the release of temporary 
residence permits also for Syrians whose asylum applications had been denied or not been presented at all.
So, briefly, significant elements differentiate the Geneva Convention and the TPD: while the latter grants international 
protection (for instance substantially limited)21 only for a pre-determined period of time (one year, up to a maximum of 
three years),22 the former allows for more incisive and prolonged assistance, which is for sure more favourable for those 
who are entitled to it, and, consequently, evidently more ‘burdensome’ for the host country. Thus, the Union’s interest 
in activating the TPD appears clear in case of a mass influx of displaced persons. Thanks to the instrument, Member 
States could protect entire groups of persons just for a limited period, hence undertaking politically sustainable paths.
Apart from that – and again in the view of the ‘relief’ to national asylum systems – it is furthermore sobering to consider 
art. 2a) of the directive, according to which temporary protection should be granted ‘in particular if there is also a 
risk that the asylum system will be unable to process this influx without adverse effects for its efficient operation, in 
the interests of the persons concerned and other persons requesting protection’. It is today sufficiently clear that the 
efficient operation of some Member States national asylum systems is compromised. In the light of what has been 
assessed, for instance, by the Strasbourg Court and the ECJ in the cases N.S.,23 M.S.S. vs. Belgium and Greece,24 and B.A.C. 
vs. Greece,25 it can be concluded that the Greek system is incapable of working in the correct way (namely in the full 
respect of the non-refoulement principle and of the fundamental rights of asylum seekers). At the same time, the ECHtR 
judgment in case Tarakhel vs. Switzerland26 has raised doubts concerning Italy’s capability to face the current migration 
fluxes without compromising the correct functioning of its national reception system. Additionally, it remains to be 
seen how asylum polices enacted in Hungary27 can be reconciled with a correct application of the legal obligations to 
which Member States and the Union have agreed. In this regard, there is even some scholar maintaining that ‘[t]he level 
of protection introduced by the Temporary Protection Directive [would] be higher than the protection available today 
for many asylum seekers and refugees in Italy, Hungary and Greece’.28
Ultimately, also in the light of art. 2a), the reasons why the TPD might be activated in response to the current ‘refugee 
crisis’ appear clear: (i) in a relatively brief period, third country nationals have massively entered the Union, (ii) often 
because of endemic violence or armed conflicts occurring in their home countries, and (iii) their need for international 
instruments which have to enlarge the realm of those who should be provided with international assistance. The TPD, a sui generis piece of legislation, 
is beyond doubt one of these.
17 Qualification directive (2011/95/EU). See, in particular, Chapter V.
18 In similar terms see Fitzpatrick ‘Temporary protection of refugees’, p. 280; see also M. Ineli-Ciger, ‘Time to activate the Temporary Protection 
Directive’, European Journal of Migration and Law (2016), p. 32.
19 In this sense see F. Munari, ‘The perfect storm on EU asylum law: the need to rethink the Dublin Regime’, Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale 
(2016), p. 536.
20 On the grounds of Section 25 (Aufenthalt aus humanitären Gründen) of the Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die 
Integration von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet. For more information see www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/Germany/asylum-procedure/
treatment-specific-nationalities#footnote4_nllq8t0. Note that the German provisions implementing the TPD are to be found in Section 24 of the 
above-mentioned act. Its application relies on the Council’s decision to activate the TPD, as disciplined by the directive itself.
21 See Chapter III of the directive. In a nutshell, TPD protected individuals benefit from residence and working permits, access to educational and/
or professional programmes, housing, and – depending on their economic situation – social assistance (food sustenance and medical care).
22 TPD, art. 4.
23 CJEU, 21 December 2011, N.S. and Others, case C-411/10.
24 European Court of Human Rights, case M.S.S. vs. Belgium and Greece (Application nr 30696/09), (21 January 2011).
25 European Court of Human Rights, case B.A.C. vs. Greece (Application nr. 11981/15), (13 October 2016).
26 European Court of Human Rights, case Tarakhel vs. Switzerland (Application nr 29217/12), (4 November 2014), par. 115. On which see C.M. Cerna, 
‘Introductory Note to Tarakhel vs. Switzerland (Eur. Ct. H.R.)’, International Legal Materials (2015), p. 367; G. Vicini, ‘Regolamento Dublino e principio di 
“non-refoulement”, “the neverending story”: il caso “Tarakhel c. Svizzera”’, La Comunità Internazionale (2015), p. 203.
27 In this sense, see declarations by J. Dalhuisen, Director of Amnesty International’s Europe and Central Asia programme: ‘L’Ungheria si è 
trasformata di fatto in un paese nel quale la protezione dei rifugiati non è prevista, in evidente contrasto coi suoi obblighi sui diritti umani e con 
l’ovvia necessità di lavorare insieme agli altri stati membri dell’Unione europea e ai paesi balcanici per trovare una soluzione collettiva e umana alla 
crisi in corso’ (http://www.amnesty.it/crisi-dei-rifugiati-Unione-europea-ammonisca-formalmente-Ungheria). See also L. Gall, Human Rights Watch, 
‘Dispatches: Hungary puts asylum seekers at risk’, www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/13/dispatches-hungary-puts-asylum-seekers-risk. Further doubts 
relating the legality of the new Hungarian policies on migration and asylum may be inferred by the Commission’s behaviour, that on December the 
10th 2015 sent Budapest a notice of default, starting an infringement procedure against Hungary (see press release at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-6228_en.htm). Note that there has subsequently been no following to the procedure.
28 Ineli-Ciger, ‘Time to activate the Temporary Protection Directive’, p. 32.
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protection has compromised the correct functioning of different Member States’ asylum systems. And yet, within the 
European institutions’ attempts to activate the TPD are rare and, when undertaken, they result in silent failures. As the 
TPD is meant to face exceptional events, its lack of utilisation should not be a surprising factor itself: nonetheless an 
analysis of the past attempts of activation may be useful so as to argue why even a future activation of the instrument 
appears unrealistic.
The first genuine attempt29 to activate the TPD dates back to 2011, after the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring: 
the collapse of Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia and Gheddafi’s in Libya determined the structural failure of controls at the 
borders of the two countries, and many African inhabitants started with growing insistence to reach Italian or Maltese 
coasts.30 In May 2011, after the arrival in several months of about 26.000 individuals on the island of Lampedusa,31 two 
members of the European Popular Party started to lobby the Commission to activate its exclusive power of proposal 
of activation of the TPD. Their aim consisted in granting access to temporary international protection to the maritime 
migrants, and in redistributing them among Member States ‘in a spirit of Community solidarity’ in compliance with the 
burden-sharing mechanism which is established by Chapter VI of the directive32 (as well as in accordance with art. 80 
of the TFEU, which declares that policies on asylum and immigration ‘shall be governed by the principle of solidarity 
and fair sharing of responsibility’). The Commission maintained, in response, that the situation could not be considered 
as a ‘mass influx’, and that there were hence no sufficient reasons to propose an activation of the TPD to the Council. 
Former Commissioner Malmström’s argumentations appear in this sense enlightening: ‘At this point we cannot see a 
mass influx of migrants to Europe even though some of our Member States are under severe pressure. The temporary 
mechanism is one tool that could be used in the future, if necessary, but we have not yet reached that situation’.33
It is then today legitimate to wonder when and how it may be possible to talk about a mass influx of displaced persons 
under the TPD: the European institutions are not willing to do that even after the exponential increase of immigrants 
and asylum seekers who entered the EU as a result of the civil war in Syria, and of the rising of the so-called Islamic State 
within the Fertile Crescent area.
So, ultimately, there was no mass influx in 2011 – when some tens of thousands reached few Member States34 – and 
there is still no mass influx in the current period, when the Union as a whole with all its Member States are trying to deal 
with the arrival of hundreds of thousands of individuals in need. 
This contingency raises profound doubts as to existence tout court within the competent authorities of the willingness 
to activate the directive. An evident dilemma emerges: in case a circumscribed and punctual mass influx putting under 
‘severe pressure’ just few national asylum systems – as it was the case in 2011 – it seems unlikely that those Member 
States which are not directly involved in the crisis will be willing to accept the displaced persons’ relocation and 
resettlement mechanism which is provided for by Chapter VI of the TPD, and this is essentially because the situation 
appears manageable without resorting to the instrument; on the other hand, in the hypothesis of a mass influx as the 
current one, which involves the majority of Member States, the reaction does not go in favour of granting international 
temporary protection to some categories of individuals, it tends rather to circumscribe (with some exceptions) as much 
as possible the migratory fluxes.
It appears then that the TPD system is ontologically flawed by a fatal short circuit, whose effect is to limit decisively the 
probability of activation of the instrument.
III. The TPD: reasons behind the lack of activation
This part of the work analyses the reasons underlying the present lack of activation of the directive. For analytical 
purpose, the section is divided in two parts. The first part focuses on TPD’s ‘endogenous factors’: terminological and 
structural characteristics that render it unfit to be applied to migration phenomena surging from political collapse or 
civil war undergoing in a third country. The second part focuses on ‘external factors’: general and political contingencies 
that render the TPD’s activation far from probable as it currently stands and is interpreted. The analysis serves then to 
better understand how to enhance the instrument’s chances of activation.
1. Endogenous factors
The TPD describes mass influx as ‘[the] arrival in the Community of a large number of displaced persons, who come 
from a specific country or geographical area, whether their arrival in the Community was spontaneous or aided, for 
example through an evacuation programme’. Whereas the definition of displaced persons, contained in art. 2(c), results 
sufficiently clear (since it encompasses classical refugees, those who are entitle to subsidiary protection under the 
29 For an exhaustive analysis of the cases that could/should have brought to a TPD’s activation in the past, see Beirens et al., ‘Study on the 
Temporary Protection Directive Final report’, ch. 5.
30 See Ineli-Ciger, ‘Has the Temporary Protection Directive become obsolete?’, p. 225.
31 Ibid., p. 238.
32 See, in particular, TPD art. 25.1, and art. 26.1 and 26.2.
33 C. Malmström, ‘Debate on migration flows’ (2011), quoted in Ineli-Ciger, ‘Has the Temporary Protection Directive become obsolete?’, p. 238.
34 In similar terms see again Ineli-Ciger, ‘Time to activate the Temporary Protection Directive’, p. 32: ‘If the current migration crisis in Europe does 
not qualify as a mass influx situation, it is hard to imagine what would qualify as one’.
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Qualification directive,35 and, more generally, all those fleeing endemic violence, armed conflict, and generalised 
violations of human rights), the notion of ‘mass influx’ remains ambiguous. Through a joint examination of the TPD and 
of the Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum,36 we can nonetheless identify at least three elements characterising 
the existence of such an influx:37 (i) the displaced persons must come from an easily identifiable geographic area (as 
a State or a particular region), (ii) the arrivals’ intensity must be exceptional, and (iii) the normal reception and asylum 
mechanisms must reveal themselves not up to the task of correctly absorbing the migratory phenomenon. The UNHCR 
has adopted a very similar point of view in this regard.38
The necessity of identifying a circumscribed geographical zone of origin entails that the TPD regime cannot be applied 
to influxes of migrants and asylum seekers originating from various and heterogeneous third States. It appears thus 
legitimate to raise doubts about the potential activation of the TPD for migrants who come to the EU via maritime 
routes from North African coasts. These are points of departure for individuals of many and different nationalities, 
ethnicities, religions, etc, and it seems therefore too complex to delineate with sufficient accuracy the characteristics 
of the group that should be covered by a European temporary protection regime. In more direct terms, it would not 
appear justifiable, for instance, to grant protection to Libyan residents and not to those who, even though entering 
Europe in similar conditions (or even on the same boat), come from Sudan, Eritrea, or Somalia. Such a neat distinction 
between categories of individuals who often suffer from very similar human rights violations does not appear easily 
justifiable. An alternative scenario, similar in its effects but opposite in its premises, would on the other hand see the 
Union adopting a broad interpretation of the notion ‘specific geographical area’, considering as a unique region the 
whole area of North Africa and of the Horn of Africa. This would most likely lead to extremely harsh internal oppositions 
in Europe for the fear of an unsustainable migratory wave. In a nutshell, it is possible to maintain that the group(s) of 
individuals that reach the EU through the Mediterranean Sea lack(s) the ‘geographical requirement’ that is necessary to 
the activation of the TPD.
If this is true for migrants coming from North Africa, the same appears less clear with respect to those fleeing the 
Syrian civil war. In this case, it is beyond dispute that the EU is facing an exceptional influx, originating from a ‘specific 
geographical area’, and that is forcing some categories to flee their original regions because of the most brutal and 
systematic violations of their fundamental rights. Notwithstanding such considerations, the absence, within the TPD, 
of objective criteria capable of identifying clearly the existence of a mass influx attributes to the Council a broad 
margin of appreciation when it is called to decide on the directive’s activation.39 And exactly because of the ambiguity 
surrounding a central notion of the instrument, the Council’s decision seems, in the end, almost exclusively bound to 
considerations of political utility rather than to the application of the law.40
In this sense, in 2005, years before the current migration phenomenon and the economic crisis that hit several EU 
countries, an insightful scholar was considering these problems, putting in doubt the very effectiveness of the TPD’s 
system.41 After more than ten years, it remains difficult to contest the validity of these points.
Additionally, one further and frequently underestimated element makes the potential activation of the TPD even 
more remote: the ‘fear’ that the regime might ultimately become long-lasting, thereby losing its temporary (and thus 
politically sustainable) character. Such factor is particularly relevant in the hypothesis of a TPD’s activation for categories 
fleeing conflicts of indefinable duration (at least a priori), such as those today existing in Syria and Libya. Since the TPD 
offers temporary protection, the interest behind its activation would of course consist in the possibility of assisting 
the displaced only for a brief time, with the guarantee of repatriating them once the predetermined lapse of time 
has exhausted (one year, to a maximum of three). If the Union and the Member States cannot enjoy this certainty, the 
specific interest standing behind the activation of the directive disappears, since Member States would risk taking a 
no-way-out path by granting (probable) long-lasting protection.
Crises such as those in Syria and Libya are events whose end is not easy to hypothesise, and this uncertainty does not allow 
European institutions to activate the TPD without disproportionate concerns relating to the duration of the protection 
that its Member States should be granting. In this sense, art. 6.2 of the directive is highly relevant: ‘The Council Decision 
[determining the suspension of the regime before the programmed period] shall be based on the establishment of 
the fact that the situation in the country of origin is such as to permit the safe and durable return of those granted 
35 See generally J. McAdam, ‘The European Union Qualification Directive: the creation of a subsidiary protection regime’, International Journal of 
Refugee Law, 17 (2005), pp. 461 ff; K.M. Zwaan, ‘The Qualification Directive: central themes, problem issues, and implementation in selected member 
states’ (Nijmegen, 2007).
36 Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals and stateless persons as 
refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection /* COM/2001/0510 final – CNS 2001/0207 */.
37 In this sense see Notarbartolo di Sciara, ‘Temporary Protection Directive, dead letter or still option for the future?’; Arenas, ‘The concept of “mass 
influx of displaced persons”’.
38 See UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Commentary on the Draft Directive on Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass 
Influx, 15 September 2000, point 3 (online).
39 It is relevant to specify that at the time of the creation of the TPD, the adoption of a large notion of mass influx was intended to grant flexibility, 
and thus more application chances of the instrument. See in this sense Beirens et al., ‘Study on the Temporary Protection Directive Final report’, p. 2.
40 See in this sense H. Beirens, S. Maas, S. Petronella and M. van der Velden, ‘Study on the Temporary Protection Directive, Executive Summary’, 
European Commission Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, January 2016 (online), p. 2: ‘The procedure to activate the TPD is subject 
to, and ultimately hampered by, political debates at each step of the procedure. In sum, this makes for a potentially lengthy and cumbersome 
procedure, with little chance of attaining a qualified majority in the Council’.
41 Arenas, ‘The concept of “mass influx of displaced persons”’, p. 438.
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temporary protection with due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and Member States’ obligations 
regarding non-refoulement’. If this disposition is valid for the termination of the temporary protection regime before 
its natural ending, it is not easy to understand why the (would be) protected categories could be repatriated (even in 
case of expiration of the predetermined period), in unsafe, violent, and unstable situations. In other words, we should 
wonder why Member States would want to activate the directive for entire groups of individuals fleeing a situation of 
political collapse (civil war, ethnic cleansing, brutal persecutions to the detriment of certain minorities, etc), if they are 
not sufficiently certain about the improvement – in one up to three years – of the situation in the area of origin of the 
displaced. If – hypothetically – the TPD had been activated in 2012 to protect Syrian citizens, a ‘safe and durable return’ 
could still not be granted nowadays after five years. If this had been the case, Member States would now be forced 
either to extend the duration of the temporary protection or to incur in a violation of the non-refoulement principle 
by repatriating the subjects in unsafe conditions. It appears in the end clear that to avoid a similar and not unlikely 
impasse, Member States have a particular interest in not activating at all the TPD.42
2. External factors
Moving forward, a framework comparison between the political conditions currently facing the EU and the conditions 
experienced in 2001, the year of adoption of the TPD, offers some interesting insights to understand the TPD’s lack of 
activation. In fifteen years, two main events that took place make the directive far less attractive than it was in the past.
First, the increase in the Union’s Member States from 15 to 28 makes it harder to reach the majority of States that is 
necessary to activate the directive.43 If, of course, the proportion has not changed it is equally evident how it is more 
difficult to reach the sufficient votes nowadays, since the number of national political interests that must be taken into 
consideration (moreover concerning an issue like migration and international protection that is often highly politicised 
and sensitive) has in fact almost doubled since 2001.
Second, the impact of the economic and financial crisis that broke out in 2007, and that is still influencing part of the 
Western world, should not be underestimated. Political balances in many nations have shifted radically: in comparison 
to the first years of the millennium, many European States are experiencing a slowing down (if not even an inversion) 
of their economic growth. It is in this sense sobering to remember that from 2008 to 2014 the GPD in Greece has 
decreased by 33 per cent, in Spain and Hungary by 15 per cent, in Italy, the UK and Czech Republic by 10 per cent,44 and 
that an economic recovery still appears remote in several European countries. In a similar climate, nationalist political 
forces, often radically adverse to policies of assistance for third-country individuals, have found fertile soil.
This environment, exacerbated by significant public safety concerns, renders the space for a system such as the TPD’s 
always narrower. It appears quite clear that a temporary protection system aimed at protecting entire categories of 
individuals radically collides with the policies undertaken in several EU countries, such as Hungary, Austria, Croatia, 
and Slovenia, that have, for instance, built – or tried to build – barbed wire walls at their borders to slow down or stop 
influxes of migrants.
In addition, one further (and related) factor that may explain the lack of willingness in activating the TPD is enshrined 
in the notion of ‘pull-factor’. It is commonly believed that the activation of the instrument would increase the attractive 
factor of the Union, thereby intensifying the immigration phenomenon, and worsening – rather than relieving – 
national asylum systems. Where the studies on migration issues find that an increase of the pull-factors may increase 
immigration into a specific area,45 it appears reasonable to believe that the activation of the TPD would contribute to 
the intensification of immigration into the EU.
Notwithstanding this relevant point, it is important to underline that the ‘attractive component’ is, for those fleeing 
armed conflict and systemic violations of their human rights, quite marginal if compared to push-factors.46 ‘Persons 
fleeing armed conflict or violence do not necessarily look for a wealthier State or a State with better welfare conditions 
to flee to, but are in search of a secure place free from violence and persecution’.47 Data regarding the number of 
migrants and asylum seekers fleeing the Syrian conflict seem to confirm such conclusions: the vast majority of the 
displaced is currently hosted in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, while only about 10 per cent of Syrian forced emigrants 
have applied for asylum within the EU. Nonetheless, if the analysis shifts on this 10 per cent, an interesting element 
42 In case of an extension of the TPD regime beyond its predetermined time limits, its beneficiaries would de facto enter a legal vacuum, since 
EU law does not provide for a similar circumstance. An application of Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of 
third-country nationals who are long-term residents would at a first glance be imaginable, since it provides for the granting of the status of long-
term residents to third-country citizens that have legally and continuously stayed within a Member State for five years. However, notwithstanding 
the relevant time gap (it suffices to remember the TPD lasts as most for 3 years whereas directive 2003/109 applies after 5), it is worth highlighting 
that the latter, according to art. 3.2 specifically prohibits its application to third-country individuals allowed to stay in a Member State on temporary 
protection grounds.
43 Note that Denmark is not bound by the directive, as stated in the perambulatory clause nr. 26: ‘In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the 
Protocol on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Denmark 
is not participating in the adoption of this Directive, and is therefore not bound by it nor subject to its application’.
44 Data source available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.
45 See ex multis: Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Push and Pull Factors of international Migration: A 
Comparative Report, European Communities (2000) (online).
46 See E. Thielemann, ‘How effective are national and EU policies in the area of forced migration?’, Refugee Survey Quarterly (2012), p. 21 ff.
47 Ineli-Ciger, ‘Has the Temporary Protection Directive become obsolete?’, p. 234.
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emerges: from April 2011 to April 2016, according to UNHCR data, 800,509 Syrians have applied for asylum in the EU, 
with more than 60 per cent shared between Germany (401,018) and Sweden (110,333), 25 per cent among Hungary, 
Austria, Bulgaria, and the Netherlands, and less than 15 per cent among the remaining Member States.48 What appears 
relevant here is the comparison between the number of asylum applications in Germany and the other countries that 
did not undertake the policies of broad reception that were mentioned at the beginning of this work: this comparison 
suggests that the pull-factor of temporary protection policies – such the one unilaterally enacted by the German 
government – may have a significant impact on the number of asylum applications.
Finally, in cases in which the TPD should be activated – namely in situations of exceptional humanitarian crisis – the 
importance of the ‘attractive component’ (although unquestionably marginal if compared to push-factors), should not 
be underestimated when thinking about the chances of activation of the directive. In conclusion, it appears possible to 
maintain that the TPD – as currently structured – suffers from an excessively maximalist approach,49 incompatible with 
the current zeitgeist. The idea of granting immediate (though temporary) protection to entire categories of displaced 
persons to be shared among Member States in the name of the principle of solidarity was perhaps sustainable at the 
beginning of the millennium. The same system appears today all but sustainable.
IV. The way forward: a disaster-oriented TPD?
Bearing in mind the elements that render the TPD a non-attractive instrument – and assuming the necessity within EU 
law of an effective legal framework disciplining temporary protection – the final part of this work tries to identify how 
and when the directive could be realistically activated. One possible way to do that would consist in starting to consider 
the TPD as potentially able to address environmental displacement caused by sudden-onset disasters, namely events 
whose negative effects can be restored in relatively brief periods (and whose intensity and frequency is expected to 
increase due to climate change, thereby posing an increasing challenge to States, international organisations, and the 
international community as a whole).
To draw some inspirational elements from a different – but effective – temporary protection regime, it looks useful to 
look at the US Temporary Protection Status (TPS).50 The TPS lies like the TPD on a complementary level to the Geneva 
Convention,51 but it presents one major difference compared to the European instrument: whereas the latter allows 
the admission within the EU to third-country individual, the TPS simply prohibits repatriation of subjects being already 
in the USA, thereby ‘bypassing’ the TPD’s pull-factor concerns. When activated,52 the TPS applies to individuals already 
physically present in the US, and who – even though not falling within the classical definition of refugee – need 
temporary protection because of some particular event occurring in their country.
More precisely, the TPS can be activated in three scenarios: (i) in case of armed conflicts seriously threatening the 
physical safety of the foreigner subject to the hypothetical repatriation, (ii) when a foreign State asks for its activation 
as it is temporarily unable to manage the repatriation of its citizens because of a natural disaster, (iii) if the foreign 
State faces extraordinary and temporary conditions that do now allow for a secure repatriation. In such circumstances, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security can apply the TPS to determined categories of individuals for a period of six up 
to 16 months (extendable if the conditions in the country of origin do not ameliorate), with the effect of providing 
foreigners who satisfy the necessary conditions53 with temporary residence and work permits. The TPS is currently 
valid for more than 300,000 individuals coming from 13 different countries.54 Three among the most recent activations 
(Nepal, Western Africa, Syria) show, indeed, how the TPS is in fact capable of covering a broad spectrum of hypothesis: 
pandemics, natural disasters, civil wars. (Relevant, in a comparison with what previously stated about the TPD, appears 
especially the TPS activation for Syrian citizens. Following the beginning of the civil conflict, the TPS was activated in 
March 2012 – and should be expiring in September 2018, because ‘conditions in Syria have worsened to the point 
where Syrian nationals already in the United States would face serious threats to their personal safety if they were to 
return to their home country’.)
The TPS can be held as a valid and effective instrument: its numerous and diverse applications in the last two decades 
and a half show, in comparison to the lack of utilisation of the European system, the latter’s inadequacy. Thus, it would 
48 Source: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/asylum.php (accessed 2 Sept. 2016).
49 In this regard see Ineli-Ciger, ‘Has the Temporary Protection Directive become obsolete?’, p. 227: ‘It can be concluded that the Directive has the 
potential to protect a broad range of individuals coming to the Eu when a mass influx situation occurs’. It is thus reasonable to wonder if the totality 
of individuals that may potentially be covered by the TPD is excessively broad.
50 Adopted in 1990 and part of the Immigration and Nationality Act: ACT 244 – Temporary Protected Status (Sec.244. 1/ [8 U.S.C. 1254]).
51 In the sense of an enlarging of the scope of application of international protection systems, and in particular with reference to the notion of 
‘humanitarian migrant’, see C. Argueta and R. Wasem,’ Temporary Protection Status: current immigration policy and issues’, Congressional Research 
Service, 18 February 2016 (online), p. 1: ‘If the motivation of the migrant is determined to be economic improvement rather than the political reasons 
that underpin the legal definition [of refugees], the person is not considered eligible for asylum. This distinction is sometimes difficult to discern, 
because persecution as well as war may lead to economic hardships, and economic deprivation may trigger persecution or insurrection. Since factors 
such as extreme poverty, deprivation, violence, and the dislocation brought on by famine or natural disasters may evoke a humanitarian response, 
the term humanitarian migrants encompasses all those who emigrate to the United States for such reasons, including those who receive asylum’.
52 By decision of the Secretary of Homeland Security.
53 Possession of the passport of the designated State and evidence of physical stay in the US from the activation of the TPS regime.
54 For more data, see www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status#Countries%20Currently%20Designated%20for%20TPS; 
Argueta and Wasem, ‘Temporary Protection Status’, p. 7.
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seem logical to advocate for a minimalist-oriented reform of the directive: if the European legislator’s intent consists in 
strengthening the CEAS, a modification of the TPD should be oriented to an increase of its chances of activation, and 
this means towards more pragmatism. In this sense, the European system could ‘import’ some elements from the TPS.
First, a relevant element to be found in the TPS is the explicit reference to environmental disasters as events capable of 
determining its activation. A TPD’s modification (or reinterpretation) should be oriented to protect categories of people 
displaced by events whose duration can be forecast without excessive doubts, and sudden-onset environmental 
disasters tend to clearly fall within this kind of events. Since the rationale of temporary protection systems consists, self-
evidently, in granting temporary and not prolonged protection, it would be useful to equip the TPD with some further 
specifications regarding the sort of events that causes the mass influx, with the aim of circumscribing the chances of 
its activation in less vague boundaries. And it is precisely in this sense that it would be useful to explicitly underline in 
the text the role of sudden-onset disasters, such as floods, wind-storms, earthquakes, tsunamis, etc, which are major 
causes of displacement worldwide.
As shown, the activation of the TPD in case of mass influxes deriving from violent conflicts appears highly improbable. 
The directive would probably enjoy more chances of activation if it were (also) explicitly designed to face mass and 
temporary influxes of individuals displaced by natural disasters (similarly to what the TPS does).55
In this regard, art. 2c) of the directive is to be thoroughly analysed to understand to what extent the TPD is equipped 
for these events. The provision, when explaining the notion of ‘displaced persons’, underlines that their impossibility 
to return to the original countries must depend on ‘the situation prevailing’ there. It then offers some specifications as 
to the possible sorts of displaced that may fall within the definition (i.e., refugees and, more broadly, persons fleeing 
armed conflicts, endemic violence or generalised violations of human rights). The very broad notion of ‘situations 
prevailing in the country of origin’ clearly potentially encompasses environmental disasters, since the specifications 
that follow appear to have an explanatory rather than exhaustive function (as the wording ‘in particular’ suggests). 
Hence, the Council, upon proposal of the Commission, is not bound to strictly follow these specifications, and it appears 
in principle allowed to apply the TPD also in cases of mass influx deriving from sudden-onset disasters. Indeed, some 
major natural catastrophe can obviously create some ‘prevailing situation’ in the country of origin that could force 
entire categories to temporarily flee from their homes seeking protection abroad.
If this is the case, there would be no need to modify the directive, but just to begin reconsidering/reinterpreting it. A 
more careful analysis of the text suggests however that natural disasters, even though potentially falling within the 
realm of application of the directive, are not considered as possible causes of displacement under it. The text does 
not, in fact, mention at any time, neither in the preamble nor in its dispositions, such events. This is mainly because the 
instrument was adopted following the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the violence that broke out in the region during 
the Nineties.56 In 2001, European institutions were willing to create a legal framework aimed at institutionalising at a 
supranational level the humanitarian assistance that some States had exceptionally offered during the diverse phases 
of the Yugoslavian Wars.57 The TPD is hence (even though not being up to this task) almost exclusively designed to 
offer assistance to persons displaced by conflicts and generalised human rights violations. Natural disasters, although 
potentially relevant, appear to be not considered within its realm (at least according to the legislator’s willingness). 
This is why a disaster-oriented modification or fundamental reinterpretation of the directive appears nowadays useful.
We have seen that the TDP’s chances of activation currently appear very limited due to numerous reasons. Although 
some of the very same (enshrined in the pull-factor ‘fear’) would also apply to natural disasters-related displacement, 
this would at least avoid some.
For instance, sudden-onset disasters usually hit only limited and recognisable areas (with the exception maybe of 
droughts, whose sudden and temporary nature appears not certain at all), thereby satisfying the geographic requisite 
needed for the identification of the particular categories to be protected under the regime.
More importantly, this kind of disasters does not suffer from the dilemmas regarding the foreseeable temporariness of 
the protection to be provided. If, hypothetically, an earthquake struck Georgia, causing a mass but temporary emigration 
towards some EU Member States, a specifically disaster-oriented TPD could be activated to protect those forced to 
leave their country, and be used to redistribute them among different Member States according to their reception 
capabilities. Arguably, damage and devastation caused by the earthquake could be restored in the limited period 
envisaged by the TPD. Once normality in the country of origin is restored (namely rendering it capable of welcoming 
back its own citizens without precluding the correct enjoyment of their fundamental rights), the Union and its Member 
States would be able to enact manageable repatriation programmes (thus without incurring the paradoxes contained 
in the analysis of art. 6.2 of the TPD, according to which the categories protected by the TPD may be repatriated only in 
safe and stable conditions).
55 See Immigration and Nationality Act – Temporary Protected Status Section: ‘In general, The Attorney General, after consultation with 
appropriate agencies of the Government, may designate any foreign state (or any part of such foreign state) under this subsection only if […] (B) 
the Attorney General finds that (i) there has been an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental disaster in the state resulting in a 
substantial, but temporary, disruption of living conditions in the area affected […]’.
56 On the dawning of temporary protection frameworks in Europe see Fitzpatrick, ‘Temporary protection of refugees’, p. 286: ‘In the early 1990s, 
European states found themselves in an unwonted frontline position, with respect to forced migrants from the former Yugoslavia. They responded 
by favouring temporary protection and avoiding grants of durable asylum; additional interim measures of protection were introduced in national 
law and practice’; Humanitarian Issues Working Group, Survey on the Implementation of Temporary Protection, (8 March 1995), online.
57 See Fitzpatrick, ‘Temporary protection of refugees’, p. 280. See also Amnesty International, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: The Protection 
of Kosovo Albanian Refugees (AI Index No EUR 65/0399, 1999) (May 1999).
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In a longer-term perspective, a disaster-oriented evolution of the directive could also be significant to provide a 
particular subset of the category of so-called ‘environmental refugees’, a category that neither international nor EU 
law is nowadays adequately covering, with international protection. So-called ‘environmental refugees’ can very 
synthetically be defined as those forced to migrate because of environmental degradations that make their areas 
of origin uninhabitable.58 In some cases, an ‘environmental refugee’ might face difficulties determining the need for 
international protection, but under international refugee law (and also under complementary protection frameworks),59 
environment and its degradations are not considered causes of persecution depending on which the host country is 
obliged to grant international assistance. It is furthermore sobering to remember that the increase in the frequency 
and intensity of extreme meteorological events is a phenomenon related to the processes of global climate change we 
have started to experience in the current period,60 and that the phenomenon of migrations forced by environmental 
degradation consequently appears destined to significantly increase its humanitarian and numerical significance in 
the near future.61
Under this perspective, the Union – also in the light of its leading international role in environmental and climate matters 
– might have a particular interest in equipping itself with one of the first supranational legal instruments specifically 
addressing (at least one part) of a problem that will likely cover a growing importance in the decades to come.62 For the 
purpose of the present work, it is sufficient to stress that the macro-category of ‘environmental refugees’ (a definition 
that although legally flawed63 remains symbolically effective) may be divided – in case of cross-border movements of 
people – into two different sub-categories: (i) those pushed to migrate because of slow-onset disasters (such as sea-
level rise and desertification), and (ii) those fleeing sudden-onset events. Although this distinction surely suffers from 
oversimplification, it remains useful: it visibly clarifies that diverse protection regimes should be predisposed to protect 
the two different categories.
Persons belonging to the first category, consisting of those opting to emigrate from low-lying small island-States 
adducing as principal reason sea-level rise, do not, normally, experience absolute emergency situations, and their 
emigration is hence considerable as voluntary and pre-emptive, not deserving immediate and incisive international 
protection.64 Nevertheless, if we are to believe to the overwhelming majority of climate science and its predictions, 
we already know that such individuals need relocation programs onto other national territories,65 and/or evolutions in 
jurisdictional systems enabling for the application of the non-refoulement principle for those who would undergo – in 
case of repatriation to their (almost) uninhabitable home countries – inhuman or degrading treatments. Anyhow, in 
such a case the protection to be granted should be permanent, not temporary, thereby rendering the analysis of the 
TPD trivial for this specific category.
A disaster-oriented TPD would conversely be relevant for those fleeing the consequences of rapid-onset events. In this 
regard, it seems important to stress that the reflections of scholars and policy-makers should not concentrate only on 
climate change, a phenomenon that even though affecting climatic or meteorological disasters does not have any 
impact on others, such as geological ones. An excessive focus on the ‘climate change discourse’66 may, indeed, lead to 
58 See generally J. McAdam (ed.), Climate Change and Displacement, Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Oxford, 2010). See also G. Hugo, ‘Environmental 
concerns and international migration’, International Migration Review (1995), p. 105 ff; EACH-FOR, Synthesis Report, 14 May 2009 (online); Chairperson’s 
Summary, Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century, 6–7 June 2011, Oslo, para. 4 (online). As regards legal studies 
see among others A. Banwitiya Ntekangi, Vers un droit international des réfugiés écologiques (Kinshasa, 2014); J. McAdam, Climate Change, Forced 
Migration, and International Law (Oxford, 2012); Walter Kälin and Nina Schrepfer, Protecting People Crossing Borders in The Context of Climate Change: 
Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches (UNHCR Legal and Protection Research Series, PPLA/2012/01, February 2012); N. Westra, Environmental 
Justice and the Rights of Ecological Refugees (London, 2009).
59 See in this regard J. McAdam, Climate Change Displacement and International Law: Complementary Protection Standards (UNHCR, Divison of 
International Protection, May 2011 (PPLA/2011/03)).
60 For an exhaustive synthesis on the relation between extreme events and climate change see IPCC, ‘Summary for policymakers’, in C.B. Field, V. 
Barros, T.F. Stocker, D. Qin, D.J. Dokken, K.L. Ebi, M.D. Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, G.-K. Plattner, S.K. Allen, M. Tignor and P.M. Midgley (eds.), Managing the 
Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation, a special report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 1–19.
61 See for instance W. Kalin, former Representative of the United Nations’ Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, 
interview with Friederike Bauer, in Akzente, The Giz Magazine, March 2015 (online: https://akzente.giz.de/en/artikel/were-talking-millions.
62 In this sense, see also J.M. Bergoglio, Encyclical Letter Laudato Si’ of the Holy Father Francis on Care for Our Common Home (Vatican City, 2015), p. 
23, para. 25.
63 From a purely legal point of view, a ‘refugee’ for environmental-related reasons does not exist. The 1951 Geneva Convention, as already 
mentioned, accords protection for those persecuted because of religion, nationality, race, membership of a particular political opinion or social group. 
There is no reference at all to environment or climate. From a historical perspective, this makes perfect sense, since in 1951 massive environmental 
degradation and climate change were just a very remote mirage.
64 See in this regard, among many others, G. Sciaccaluga, ‘(Non) rifugiati climatici dal 1995 al 2015: perché il diritto internazionale dei rifugiati non 
può applicarsi al fenomeno delle migrazioni causate (anche) dai cambiamenti climatici’, Rivista Giuridica dell’Ambiente (2015), p. 465 ff.
65 It is worth noting that the Maldives’ Government has started discussion with Sri Lanka to by some latter’s territories to be used in case of 
necessity. As regards internal relocations in the Pacific also due to climate change, note the case of Carteret Islands in Papua New Guinea (see S. 
Pascoe, ‘Sailing the waves on our own: climate change migration, self-determination and the Carteret Islands’, QUT Law Review (2015), p. 72 ff; B. 
Lewis, ‘Neighbourliness and Australia’s contribution to regional migration strategies for climate displacement in the Pacific’, QUT Law Review (2015), p. 
86 ff). Recently in the US $52,000,000 has been allocated to relocate a Lousiana community which is losing its territory because of sea-level rise (see 
‘A Louisiana tribe is now officially a community of climate refugees,’ Huffington Post, 12 February 2016); similarly, a 600-inhabitant village in Alaska has 
decided to start relocation programmes for similar reasons in August 2016 (see ‘U.S. village in Alaska votes to relocate due to climate change’, Grand 
Fork Heralds, 21 August 2016).
66 The ‘climate change discourse’, namely the totality of beliefs, scientific certainties and political-ideological behaviours that tend to identify 
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a hazardous reductionism, at least in the light of granting international protection to the victims of natural disasters. 
As law needs some precise boundaries to enjoy a degree of effectiveness, it is crucial to critically look at the panoply of 
proto-legal definitions that identify the categories of subjects that should be protected under international law, such 
as survival refugees, humanitarian refugees, hunger refugees, and environmental and climate refugees. As previously 
maintained, the TPD might become practically relevant if it were to protect those fleeing temporarily a sudden-onset 
natural disaster – irrespective of its cause67 – whose effects can as a matter of fact be restored in one, two or three years 
at most.
Finally, some reflection should also be dedicated to the modifications to be brought to the TPD’s activation procedure, 
thoroughly disciplined by art. 5. The Commission currently enjoys the exclusive power of proposal, and the Council has 
then to decide by qualified majority whether to activate the instrument or not. As shown, such a system concedes, to 
the end of favouring the TPD’s utilisation, an excessive margin of appreciation to European institutions and, especially, 
to Member States national priorities. It would seem hence important to advocate for a modification of the system. It 
looks probable that a modification of the directive intended to enhance its chances of activation would encounter 
some political obstacles, at least in the current phase. It is nonetheless possible to make some propositions to foster the 
debate concerning this particular issue.
A first useful modification would probably consist in granting, as the US TPS does, a right to the third-State suffering 
from a particular event (and, more specifically, from a natural disaster), to ask the Commission to trigger its power of 
proposal. Furthermore, if such change was accompanied by the obligation – for the competent European institutions – 
to motivate in detail their decision regarding the TPD’s use (e.g. by stating which quantitative requisites are needed to 
assess the existence of a ‘mass influx’), it would be possible to limit the margin of appreciation which is today existing. 
Although the duty to state reasons is integral part of EU law, this paper argues that the TPD should call for a duty of 
detailed motivation upon competent institutions. For instance, if such approach had been followed in 2011, following 
the ‘severe pressure’ experienced by Italy and Malta, the Commission would have had to clarify the reasons why it was 
not possible, at that time, to ‘see a mass influx of migrants to Europe’. Indeed, the Commission and the Council, even 
though remaining free to activate the system or not, would in this way inevitably shed some light on the scope of 
application of the directive.
Second, it would also be useful to make changes with respect to the power of proposal of activation recognised to 
European Member States. As the TPD currently stands, Member States can merely ask the Commission to take into 
consideration the proposal of activation, and the latter is then merely bound to an examination of the request (‘[the 
Commission] shall also examine any request by a Member State’, art. 5).68 This paper argues that by granting Member 
States a greater incisiveness, it would be possible to stiffen the activation procedures, thereby increasing the chances 
of activating the TPD. For instance, a useful modification would consist in binding the Commission to propose the 
activation to the Council in case a determined quota of Member States agrees on this action. By so doing, a minority of 
Member States would de facto enjoy the power of proposal to the Council.
Furthermore, with the objective of raising the TPD’s chances of activation (but also responding to the need for a more 
incisive democratic legitimation of EU decisions), the role of the European Parliament should also be strengthened. 
Art. 5 currently disposes that once the Council’s decision is taken, the Parliament must be informed, thereby reducing 
the latter’s role in the decision-making process to a mere passive actor. Again, it would seem reasonable to provide the 
Parliament with a (at least indirect) power of proposal of activation of the TPD, e.g. by obligating the Commission to 
trigger its proposal powers if a determined majority of the Parliament agrees on the activation.
Finally, a change would consist in decreasing the quota of votes needed in the Council to activate the directive. The 
need for a qualified majority sharply limits the chances of activation of the instrument even in the (hypothetical) 
introduction of the above modifications. Consequently, if the final objective consists in enhancing the TPD’s chances of 
activation, it appears quite clear that the latter should, in the name of the principle of solidarity, be subject to a Council’s 
decision taken by simple majority of its components. However, such proposal needs to be examined through the lenses 
of some sincere pragmatism, since it is as matter of fact highly improbable that the Union and its Member States will 
be willing to pursue such a path. Indeed, decisions in the Council are taken with a qualified majority (55 per cent 
of Member States accounting for at least 65 per cent of the European Union’s population) in most issues. Unanimity 
decisions tend to cover the rest, whereas simple majority (required, according to art. 238.1 TFEU, when no explicit 
disposition is to be found) is in fact limited to a restricted number of issues, mainly concerning the Council’s internal 
organisation. Being the Union an organisation of intergovernmental and supranational character, it is unlikely that the 
activation of an instrument like the TPD will be subject only to a simple majority decision.
in climate change the principal challenge of the present century, and attributing to it the emergence of phenomena highly impacting on social, 
political, and economic balances, can be traced in a recent study by the US National Academy of Science (C.P. Kelley, S. Mohtadi, M. Cane, R. Seager 
and Y. Kushnir, ‘Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought’, PNAS, 112 (17 March 2015), which finds that 
the serious drought that has hit Syria before 2011 is one of the decisive drivers of the current civil war. The study, which was cited by many media, 
has fuelled the idea that the conflict is caused by climate change. Such a belief is obviously just an oversimplification of the articulated and complex 
thesis that is maintained in the study, which certainly helps to show how the Syrian drought – in whose causation and manifestation climate change 
has played a role – is a contributory cause to the conflict.
67 By so doing, the distinction between ‘climate’ and ‘environmental’ refugees falls without excessive complication.
68 Something that occurred in 2001 with the requests of activation of the TPD by Malta and Italy (see above).
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V. Conclusion
This paper has shown why it seems unrealistic to hope in the activation of the TPD as currently conceived and interpreted. 
The nature of the instrument, which was adopted in more prosperous times, appears nowadays incompatible with a 
Union of 28 Member States, suffering from negative economic fluctuations, and dealing with the greatest migration 
phenomenon since the end of WWII.
The lack of utilisation of the TPD is in part due to inherent terminological characteristics – the ambiguity of the notion 
of mass influx – which, alongside with the activation procedure – requiring the qualified majority in the Council –, 
leaves broad discretional powers to national political priorities. In a period of economic weakness and concerns 
about internal political balance, such a margin of appreciation makes it possible for Member States to avoid the very 
discussion concerning the instrument’s activation.
It seems hence appropriate, with the aim of strengthening the CEAS, to advocate for a pragmatic reform of the TPD 
system. This works calls therefore for a stiffening of the activation procedures, and, relying on the assumption that the 
Union and its Member States might uniquely be prone to use the instrument in response to events whose negative 
effects can be restored in a relatively brief period, it also calls for a sudden-onset disaster-oriented evolution of the 
directive. Furthermore, a disaster-oriented TPD would contribute to the solution (at least under EU law) of part of the 
problem concerning environmental displacement.
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